(1) 93 - 1068

NO.

FILED
DEC 29 1993
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A.
Petitioner

VERSUS

JERRY YOUNG
Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF *CERTIORARI* TO THE LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF *CERTIORARI*

Gerard T. Gelpi
(Counsel of Record)
C. Gordon Starling, Jr.
GELPI, SULLIVAN, CARROLL & GIBBENS
430 Notre Dame Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: (504) 524-9714

Attorneys for Petitioner,
Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.

A B Letter Service, Inc., 327 Chartres St., New Orleans, La. (504) 581-5555

36 pp

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. The Court should grant *certiorari* to resolve a split in the circuit courts of appeals as to whether a vessel owner's duty to make safe the portions of the ship and ship equipment that it turns over to discharging stevedore, (the "turnover duty" of *Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De los Santos*, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614 (1981)), extends to cargo loaded by an independent, foreign stevedore. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, as well as the Louisiana Fourth Circuit, conclude the duty extends to the cargo. The Third Circuit concludes the duty extends only to the vessel and her equipment, not the cargo.

2. The Court should grant *certiorari* to resolve a split in the circuit courts of appeals concerning the duty a vessel owner owes longshoremen employed by a discharging stevedore for personal injuries arising out of the negligent stowage of the cargo by an independent, loading stevedore. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, as well as the Louisiana Fourth Circuit, conclude a vessel owner is liable if it *knew or should have known* of the dangerous condition of the cargo and fails either to correct or warn of the condition, thereby implying a duty to supervise. The Third Circuit concludes a vessel owner is liable only if it has *actual knowledge* of the improper stowage and fails either to warn or to correct the condition, recognizing the vessel owner has no general duty to inspect cargo operations at the loading port.

LIST OF PARTIES

The following are the parties to this proceeding:

1. Jerry Young,
plaintiff-respondent;

2. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.,
defendant-petitioner[1],

3. Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A.,
defendant;

4. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc.,
intervenor.

---

[1] Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.1, Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. states that it has no parent corporations or non-wholly owned subsidiaries.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED i

LIST OF PARTIES ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v

DECISIONS BELOW 1

JURISDICTION 1

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 8

I. ARCASA OWED NO DUTY WITH RESPECT TO THE CARGO 12

II. A SHIPOWNER SHOULD NOT BE LIABLE TO A DISCHARGING LONGSHOREMAN FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT STOWAGE OF CARGO BY AN INDEPENDENT STEVEDORE UNLESS THE SHIPOWNER HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE NEGLIGENT STOWAGE 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

III. ARCASA OWED NO DUTY TO CORRECT THE CARGO STOWAGE BY ENSIDESA NOR WARN COOPER LONGSHOREMEN OF THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION OF THE CARGO 24

CONCLUSION 28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES **PAGE**

Bonds v. Mortensen and Lange, 717 F.2d 123, 127-28 (4th Cir. 1983) 27

Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K., 835 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir. 1987), *cert. denied,* 486 U.S. 1007, 108 S.Ct. 1733 (1988) 11, 13-19,24

Futo v. Lykes Bros. SS Co., Inc., 742 F.2d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 1984) 15

Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, S.A. 730 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1984) 13,15,19-20

Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1031, 1036 (5th Cir. 1983) 24

Hunter v. Navrom, 690 F.Supp. 517, 519 (E.D. La. 1988), *Aff'd,* 868 F.2d 1386 (5th Cir. 1989) 15

Lemon v. Bank Lines Ltd., 656 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1981) 13,15,19-20,25-26

McCullough v. S.S. Coppename, 1983 A.M.C. 2547 (E.D. La. 1982) 25

Melanson v. Caribou Reefers, Ltd., 667 F.2d 213 (1st Cir. 1981) 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

CASES **PAGE**

Morris v. Compagnie Maritime de Chargeurs Reunis, 832 F.2d 67, 71 (5th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 108 S.Ct. 1676 (1988) 23

Pluyer v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.,664 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982)] 26

Pollizi v. M/V ZEPHYROS II MONROVIA, 860 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1988) 25

Raymond v. I/S CARIBIA, 626 F.2d 203, 206 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 969, __ S.Ct. __ (1981) 12,15

Riggs v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., ____ F.3d ____, 1993 WL 452738 (9th Cir. 1993) 11-12,15,21

Robertson v. Tokai Shosen K.K., 655 F.Supp. 152, 154 (E.D. Pa. 1987) 12

Sammiline Co., Ltd. v. Woods, 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853 (1990) 11

Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614 (1981) i,8,10-12,14-15,17-18,20,22,24,26

Spence v. Mariehamns R/S, 766 F.2d 1504 (11th Cir. 1985) 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

CASES **PAGE**

Taylor v. Moram Agencies, 739 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) 25

Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 294 (1982) 16,21

Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd., 873 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied* sub nom, *Sammiline Co., Ltd v. Woods* 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853 (1990) 11-13,15,17,19,21

STATUTES

33 U.S.C. § 905(b) 2,5,8

TEXTS

Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 343 and 343A 8

DECISIONS BELOW

The decision of the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit is reported at 617 So.2d 517 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), and is reproduced in Appendix A. (App. pp. 1a-62a.) On May 12, 1993, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit denied the application for rehearing filed by co-defendant, Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. (hereinafter "ENSIDESA"), which order is reproduced in Appendix B. (App. p. 63a.)

On October 1, 1993, the Supreme Court of Louisiana denied the applications for writs of *certiorari* filed by petitioner, Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. (hereinafter "ARCASA"), ENSIDESA, and plaintiff, which are reported at 625 So.2d 170-71, and reproduced in Appendix C. (App. pp. 64a-66a.)

JURISDICTION

On March 31, 1993, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit entered judgment from which ARCASA seeks review. On May 12, 1993, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit denied ENSIDESA's application for rehearing.

ARCASA timely filed its application for writ of *certiorari* or review with the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which that Court denied on October 1, 1993. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and Rule 13.4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

The following statute of the United States of America is in-

volved in this petiton:

33 U.S.C. § 905(b):

> In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any arrangements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such person was employed to provide shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking services and such person's employer was the owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer of the vessel, no such action shall be permitted, in whole or in part or directly or indirectly, against the injured person's employer (in any capacity, including as the vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer) or against the employees of the employer. The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 22, 1982, Jerry Young, a longshoreman for seventeen years, employed by Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc. (Cooper), allegedly was injured while unloading a cargo of steel I-beams from the M/V LORENA. The M/V LORENA, a Spanish flag cargo ship, was owned and operated by ARCASA, a Spanish corporation. ENSIDESA, shipper and owner of the cargo of steel I-beams, was the voyage charterer of the M/V LORENA.

ARCASA and ENSIDESA executed a voyage charter party for carriage of the cargo from Aviles, Spain to either New Orleans or Houston, at ENSIDESA's option. Under the terms of the charter party, ENSIDESA was required to load, stow, and discharge the cargo. ENSIDESA also was required to provide "all materials and/or wood for dunnage and any separations required."

ENSIDESA employees prepared a stowage plan for the cargo, which the master of the M/V LORENA approved. The plan merely identified the quantity and location of the cargo in the cargo holds of the vessel. It did not indicate the manner of stowage nor did it describe the dunnage to be used.

On October 17-22, 1982, ENSIDESA employees loaded the cargo aboard the vessel at Aviles, Spain. In accordance with Spanish custom, ENSIDESA stowed the I-beams in the "H" configuration, so if one were looking at the end of the beams down their lengths, the ends would resemble the letter "H." ENSIDESA placed wooden dunnage between layers or tiers of beams in the customary fashion. The cargo surveyor in Spain did not notice

anything unusual about the manner in which the dunnage was used for the cargo.

The M/V LORENA departed Spain and arrived in New Orleans in November 1982 to discharge a portion of the cargo. ENSIDESA hired Cooper to offload the cargo; discharge commenced on November 21, 1982.

Cooper supervisory personnel inspected the vessel and her cargo before beginning the discharge operations. They authorized the longshoremen to unload the cargo, as the longshoremen had the expertise to discharge the cargo safely, and the operation presented no unusual hazards.

The Cooper supervisors also monitored the discharge. They never stopped the unloading prior to the accident, although they had authority to do so (or would bring the matter to the attention of a superior) had they concluded that the operation was too hazardous. Indeed, they would not have let the longshoremen work the cargo if they thought the conditions were too hazardous.

The Cooper supervisors customarily recorded problems encountered during the stevedoring operation on Cooper's "vessel activity log" form. In this instance, the only report of any "hazards" concerned mud and clay on the wharf from previous operations concerning another vessel. Nothing on or about the wharf had anything to do with plaintiff's injury.

The longshoremen did not complain about the stow or report any difficulties in discharging the cargo. The longshoremen did not ever communicate with any vessel personnel.

No member of the vessel crew had anything to do with the discharge operation. There was no evidence that vessel personnel observed any part of either the loading or the discharge operation, much less that they were put on notice of any problems allegedly encountered by the longshoremen either in Spain or in New Orleans. The entire discharge was conducted by and was the responsibility of Cooper, which had been hired by ENSIDESA. Moreover, ENSIDESA conducted the entire loading in Spain.

Cooper discharged the cargo with its crane barge, the LISA C, located between the M/V LORENA and the wharf. The deeper the men got into the hold, the more crushed was the wooden dunnage. At some locations several bundles of I-beams were resting directly on the bundles below. At approximately 2:00 p.m. on November 22, 1982, during the second day of discharge, Young was working in one of the two holds of the M/V LORENA. Plaintiff claims he sustained injury when a breakout wire - used to lift the end of a bundle of beams - slipped off, striking him. After plaintiff's injury, the remainder of the cargo of beams were discharged in the same manner, without incident.

In October, 1984, Young filed suit against ARCASA for vessel negligence pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). Cooper filed an intervention for medical and compensation payments. Young amended his petition to name Cooper, the owner of the LISA C, and ENSIDESA as defendants. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Cooper and against Young concluding Cooper acted in the capacity of a stevedore, not a vessel owner, with respect to the LISA C.

On January 26, 1989, ARCASA filed a cross-claim against ENSIDESA for indemnity pursuant to the charter party. ENSIDESA later filed a cross-claim against ARCASA.

A jury trial was held on April 17, 1989. The district court severed the cross-claims of ARCASA and ENSIDESA. The jury returned a verdict, finding ENSIDESA 85% at fault and ARCASA 15% at fault in causing plaintiff's damages, and awarded plaintiff $1,700,000.00 in damages. (Jury Verdict, Appendix D, pp. 67a-71a.) The court entered a Partial and Final Judgment, filed of record, May 24, 1989. (Appendix E, pp. 72a-74a.)

ARCASA and ENSIDESA filed separate motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively for new trial, which the district court denied in an Amended Final Judgment entered on September 1, 1989. The trial court also ruled that neither ARCASA nor ENSIDESA were entitled to indemnity or contribution from the other. (Appendix F, pp. 75a-77a.) Thereafter, ARCASA and ENSIDESA moved for reconsideration and to remit the damage award, which the district court denied, and entered final judgment on October 6, 1989. (Appendix G, pp. 78a-79a.)

On October 25, 1989, ARCASA filed an appeal with the Louisiana Fourth Circuit, claiming the district court erred in denying ARCASA's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the absence of facts concerning ARCASA's breach of any duty to the Cooper longshoremen; in failing to strike the testimony of plaintiff's cargo surveyor, or "liability expert;" in prohibiting an expert in stevedoring operations to testify in rebuttal; in denying its motion for new trial based on the Court's erroneous jury instructions and the entry of a verdict con-

trary to the law and evidence; in failing to grant remittitur; and in denying ARCASA's cross-claim against ENSIDESA. ENSIDESA also filed an appeal.

The Louisiana Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of ARCASA's cross-claim, and ordered ENSIDESA to provide indemnity to ARCASA for its portion of the judgment. 617 So.2d at 544, App. A, pp. 59a-61a. The appellate court also reduced the damage award from $1,700,000.00 to $1,106,046.00. 617 So.2d at 536-544, App. A, pp. 41a-59a. The court of appeal concluded ARCASA "knew or should have known that the method of stow" created a hazard to the discharging longshoremen and therefore it was liable to plaintiff. 617 So.2d at 528, App. A, p. 21a. The court opined that "a reasonable owner/operator...would have perceived the dangers presented by the [stow]." *Id.*

ENSIDESA petitioned for rehearing concerning the cross-claim and indemnity in favor of ARCASA. On May 12, 1993, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit denied rehearing. (App. B, p. 63a.)

ARCASA timely applied for a writ of *certiorari* or review with the Louisiana Supreme Court contending that "knew or should have known" was the improper standard; that ARCASA owed no duty to correct ENSIDESA's cargo stowage or to warn the Cooper longshoremen of that open and obvious condition; that no evidence established ARCASA breached its duty to plaintiff; and that the court of appeal should have reduced the damage award further. ENSIDESA and plaintiff also applied for writs of *certiorari* or review with the Louisiana Supreme Court. On October 1, 1993, the state supreme court denied the applications of all the parties. (App. C, pp. 64a-66a.)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

In 1972, the Congress amended the LHWCA, in part, to eliminate a vessel owner's absolute liability to a longshoreman for the breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, but retained the vessel owner's liability for negligence. Congress did not set forth the standard of care for vessels. Instead, the legislature delegated that task to the judiciary through the "application of accepted principles of tort law and the ordinary process of litigation." H.R. Rep. No. 1441, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., *reprinted in* 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4704.

Nine years later, in *Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De los Santos*, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614 (1981), this Court granted *certiorari* to resolve the disagreement among the circuit courts concerning the applicable standard of care a vessel owed longshoremen under § 905(b). The Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits applied the land-based negligence standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 343 and 343A. *Id.* 451 at 163 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. at 1620 n. 9. The First, Third, and Ninth Circuits refused to follow the Restatement standard because that would bar recovery by a contributorily negligent longshoreman or a longshoreman injured by an open and obvious condition. *Id.*

The Court enunciated three duties of the vessel owner which depended on the phase of the cargo operations and the vessel owner's degree of involvement:

1. Before turning the vessel over to the stevedore "[t]he shipowner has a duty with respect to the condition of the ship's gear, equipment, tools and work space to be

used in the stevedoring operations; if he fails at least to warn the stevedore of hidden danger which would have been known to him in the exercise of reasonable care, he has breached his duty and is liable if his negligence causes injury to a longshoreman." *Id.* at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622.

2. Once the stevedoring operations begin, "the vessel may be liable if it actively involves itself in the cargo operations and negligently injures a longshoreman or if it fails to exercise due care to avoid exposing longshoremen to harms from hazards they may encounter in areas or from equipment under the active control of the vessel during the stevedoring operation." *Id.*, 101 S.Ct. at 1622.

3. Once the stevedoring operations have begun, if the stevedores "judgment [in continuing to use defective vessel equipment] was so obviously improvident that [the vessel owner], if it knew of the defect and that [the stevedore] was continuing to use it, should have realized that the [defective vessel equipment] presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoreman, [such presents a question of fact as to whether the vessel owner has] a duty to intervene and repair the [defective vessel equipment]. *Id.* at 175-76, 101 S.Ct. at 1626.

The paragraph describing the third duty ends with the nebulous statement "[t]he same would be true if the defect existed from the outset and [the shipowner] must be deemed to have been aware of its condition." If "deemed" means the shipowner is deemed to have a knowledge even when in the exercise of due care it did not acquire actual knowledge of the defective condition, this is a return to the warranty of seaworthiness which the 1972 amendments

abrogated. If this sentence is interpreted, as it correctly should be interpreted, as merely a factual statement applicable to the *Scindia* case in the fact intensive paragraph from which the general duty is drawn, the reintroduction of liability without fault is avoided. In the instant case, although there was no evidence the vessel owner even performed an inspection of the cargo owned by another and loaded by another, the appellate court inferred knowledge and essentially re-established the warranty of seaworthiness.

Thus, the *Scindia* Court clarified the responsibilities of the parties involved in cargo operations in a single port.

Twelve years after *Scindia*, the circuit courts are in disagreement over what duty a vessel owner owes under LHWCA § 905(b) to longshoremen discharging cargo improperly stowed in a foreign port by an independent stevedore. The split concerns the application of the first *Scindia* duty, often referred to as the "turnover duty," in this context. The vessel owner has the duty:

> to exercis[e] ordinary care under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety to persons and property, and to warn [ ] the stevedore of any hazards on the ship or with respect to its equipment that are known to the vessel or should be known to it in the exercise of reasonable care, that would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of

> his cargo operations and that are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work.

Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622.

Three Justices of the Court previously recognized the split between the Third and Fifth Circuits concerning that duty. *Sammiline Co., Ltd. v. Woods*, 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853 (1990) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Kennedy, J., dissenting from denial of *certiorari*).

The Third Circuit concludes the turnover duty extends "to the ship's gear, equipment, tools and work space to be used in stevedoring operations," not the cargo. *Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K.*, 835 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 486 U.S. 1007, 108 S.Ct. 1733 (1988). Additionally, the Third Circuit concludes the vessel owner has no general duty to inspect or supervise cargo operations and thus should be liable, if at all, for negligently stowed cargo only upon attaining actual knowledge of the hazard. *Id.* at 496.

The Fifth Circuit, recently joined by the Ninth Circuit, reached the opposite conclusions on both points. See *Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd.*, 873 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied sub nom., Sammiline Co., Ltd. v. Woods*, 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853 (1990); *Riggs v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co.*, ____ F.3d ____, 1993 WL 452738 (9th Cir. 1993). Those courts do not distinguish between a vessel's gear and equipment and cargo loaded aboard the vessel by a third-party concerning the turnover duty. *Woods*, 873 F.2d at 848-49; *Riggs*, at *3. Furthermore, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits conclude vessel owners are liable for

negligent stowage of cargo where the vessel owner knew or should have known of the dangerous condition. *Woods*, 873 F.2d at 851-52; *Riggs* at *3. In the instant case, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit followed the rationale of the U.S. Fifth Circuit in *Woods*, and found ARCASA liable because it knew or should have known the method of stow presented risks to the discharging longshoremen. ARCASA respectfully suggests the Court grant *certiorari* to resolve the split concerning the duty, *if any*, a vessel owes a longshoreman injured while unloading cargo defectively stowed by an independent stevedore.

I. ARCASA OWED NO DUTY WITH RESPECT TO THE CARGO.

As pertains to ARCASA, Cooper and Young, this matter involves only the first *Scindia* duty - the turnover duty. In setting forth the parameters of the turnover duty, this court referred to the "ship and its equipment." *Scindia*, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622. The Court did not mention or refer to the duty extending to the *cargo*.

This is no surprise. The shipowner's expertise lies in the navigation and care of the ship and its equipment. In contrast, as this Court and others consistently have recognized, it is the stevedore that is "expert and experienced" in handling cargo, not the shipowner. *Id.*, 101 S.Ct. at 1622; *Raymond v. I/S CARIBIA*, 626 F.2d 203, 206 (1st Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 451 U.S. 969, 101 S.Ct. 2045 (1981); *Robertson v. Tokai Shosen K.K.*, 655 F.Supp. 152, 154 (E.D. Pa. 1987).

The court of appeal concluded ARCASA knew or

should have known that ENSIDESA's stowage of the I-beams in the "H" configuration presented risks to the Cooper longshoremen. In so holding, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit followed U.S. Fifth Circuit precedent which erroneously extended a shipowner's responsibility to discharging longshoremen for cargo negligently loaded by foreign stevedores. 617 So.2d at 526-27, App. A, pp.16a-19a (citing *Woods, supra; Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, S.A.*, 730 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1984); and *Lemon v. Bank Lines Ltd.*, 656 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1981). The Louisiana Fourth Circuit, however, did not specifically address whether the turnover duty encompasses cargo of the vessel, although it improperly and implicitly transformed cargo into part of the ship and her equipment. The court's opinion thus is legally erroneous.

Derr is directly on point. As in the case at bar, a longshoreman was injured while offloading cargo from the vessel, alleging his injuries resulted from cargo negligently stowed by a foreign stevedore. The Third Circuit specifically recognized that the stevedore was in the best position to avoid accidents during cargo operations. *Derr*, 835 F.2d at 493. The court also observed:

> *Scindia* compels the holding that the shipowner has no duty to supervise or inspect cargo *loaded or unloaded* by stevedores and therefore may not be held liable for injuries arising out of the stevedore's failure to perform his job properly.

Id. (emphasis added)(footnote omitted). Derr contended the vessel was liable for breach of the turnover duty for the cargo, because the cargo was the "work space" of the vessel used by the stevedore. The Third Cricuit disagreed:

> We construe that language to refer to the physical work space. *The [Scindia] Court could not have intended by this reference to establish a duty by the ship with respect to cargo that it had expressly negated in other portions of the opinion.* Thus, there was no basis in either of these cases for the jury to have found negligence by the ships on basis of any defective equipment or gear.

Id. at 495-96 (emphasis added).

In addition to *Derr*, other circuits have recognized that the shipowner's duties with respect to the cargo are not the same as the duties with respect to the ship or its equipment. In *Melanson v. Caribou Reefers, Ltd.*, 667 F.2d 213 (1st Cir. 1981), the First Circuit stated:

> We do not find that *Scindia* changes the result in this case. *Scindia* involved a situation where equipment belonging to the ship which had been malfunctioning for two days injured a longshoreman. The court found that where the "judgment" of the stevedore in allowing the longshoremen to use the winch was "so obviously improvident" and the ship knew or should have known that the condition "presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoremen...that in such circumstances it had a duty to intervene and repair..." 101 S.Ct. at 1626. *This case concerns the condition of the cargo and not the condition of the ship's gear.* Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the stevedore here acted "improvidently" in allowing the longshoremen to unload the cartons after it was found that some of them were frozen together.

Id. at 214-15 (emphasis added). See also *Raymond, supra,* where the First Circuit concluded that it is the condition of the ship, not the cargo, for which the vessel may be held responsible. *Raymond,* 626 F.2d at 200.

The Fifth Circuit and courts within the Fifth Circuit also have noted that *Scindia* addressed the ship's equipment or gear, not other hazards that may occur aboard a ship. *Futo v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc.,* 742 F.2d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 1984); *Hunter v. Navrom,* 690 F.Supp. 517, 519 (E.D. La. 1988), *aff'd* 868 F.2d 1386 (5th Cir. 1989)("An extremely important factor distinguishing *Scindia* from the case at hand is that in *Scindia* the dangerous condition of the stevedore operations resulted from a winch which was part of the ship's gear.")

In *Woods,* the Fifth Circuit considered whether the *Scindia* duties extended only to the vessel's gear and equipment, and not the cargo, as the *Derr* court concluded. However, the court concluded its decisions in *Lemon* and *Harris* required the rejection of *Derr's* reasoning. "Settled case law in this circuit forecloses the conclusion that a vessel does not...bear any responsibility for the vessel's cargo and its manner of stowage." *Woods,* 873 F.2d at 848-49. Although *Lemon* and *Harris* held a vessel owner liable for negligently stowed cargo, neither of those cases ever discussed the distinction between cargo and equipment for purposes of the *Scindia* turnover duty. Constrained by precedent, the *Woods* panel could not reconsider that rationale, but had to await *en banc* consideration, which subsequently was denied. 878 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1989).

In *Riggs,* the Ninth Circuit also addressed whether

the turnover duty was limited to the vessel and her equipment, and not the cargo. The *Riggs* court relied on the precedent of *Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd.*, 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 294 (1982). *Turner*, however, did not address this Court's distinction between the vessel, her equipment and the cargo.

It is clear the circuit courts are split on whether the vessel owner's turnover duty extends to the cargo. ARCASA submits the Court should grant *certiorari* to clarify the duty, if any, concerning the cargo.

II. A SHIPOWNER SHOULD NOT BE LIABLE TO A DISCHARGING LONGSHOREMAN FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT STOWAGE OF CARGO BY AN INDEPENDENT STEVEDORE UNLESS THE SHIPOWNER HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE NEGLIGENT STOWAGE.

As discussed above, the Court's choice of the terms "ship" and "equipment" for the objects of the turnover duty indicates that duty does not encompass cargo loaded by an independent stevedore. As the Third Circuit correctly noted in *Derr*, cargo does not comprise a part of the vessel's equipment or gear, the defects of which would require the owner to warn the stevedore or to correct the condition. Accordingly, ARCASA owed no duty to Young for the negligent stowage of the cargo.

However, should the Court conclude a vessel owner owes a duty to a discharging longshoreman, ARCASA submits that duty should not be any greater than the duty the

the vessel owner owes to a loading longshoreman injured during cargo operations at the loading port.

The Louisiana Fourth Circuit, in applying to wrong standard, concluded:

> [T]hat the vessel owner, ARCASA, *knew or should have known* that th[e] method of stow presented these risks to the longshoremen. That is "a reasonable owner/operator...would have perceived the dangers presented by the [stow]."

617 So.2d at 528, App. pp. 21a. (quoting *Woods, supra)* (emphasis added). This is the same standard of conduct set forth in the turnover duty. The duty a shipowner owes to longshoremen with respect to *cargo, if there is any such duty at all,* is not the same duty it owes to longshoremen with respect to the ship or its equipment. Moreover, it represents an application of the "general 'reasonableness' " standard against which the concurrance of Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, warned. *Scindia,* 451 U.S. at 180-81, 101 S.Ct. at 1628-29.

As with the previous issue, the circuit courts of appeal are divided over the appropriate standard of care of the vessel owner. In *Derr,* the Third Circuit followed the *Scindia* court's pronouncement that the shipowner has no duty of supervision or inspection with respect to hazardous conditions that arise within the confinds of any cargo operations. *Derr,* 835 F.2d at 493 (citing *Scindia,* 451, 101 S.Ct. at 1624.) This Court did not limit its ruling solely to loading operations.

The *Derr* court posited the following standard of care:

> Because the ship has no duty to inspect cargo stowage operations, the ship can be held liable for failure to warn of improper stowage, if at all, when the ship has both *actual knowledge* and the danger was *not open and obvious.* The district court in *Derr* found undisputed evidence that the danger was apparent to both the vessel and the stevedore, and that there was no warning that the ship could have given that would have added to the knowledge of a competent stevedore. Indeed, appellant conceded in his brief that even the lack of dunnage and storage, alleged to be an underlying cause of the accident, "was a condition that could have been discovered by a reasonable inspection of the hold."... Consequently, as a matter of law, there was insufficient evidence upon which a jury could find liability.

Id. at 496 (emphasis added)(footnote and citations omitted). The actual knowledge standard is appropriate, since that is the same standard required before a vessel owner should intervene in cargo operations at the loading port, pursuant to the third *Scindia* duty. The Third Circuit also expressly rejected plaintiff's contention that the customary observation of loading and discharging of cargo by vessel personnel imposes a duty of supervision over such cargo operations, stating:

> Even if it were true that a vessel customarily observes the loading of cargo, understandable in light of its potential liability for certain damage to cargo...we agree with the district court that such observation cannot be used to reimpose the general duty to supervise the stevedore. Nor can

> such observation be vaulted into the type of avtive involvement and control that would trigger the ship's liability.

Id. at 494 (citations omitted).

The Fifth Circuit, prior to the *Woods* decision, was factually consistent with *Derr.* In *Lemon,* a longshoreman was injured while unloading rolls of burlap and bales of jute from the vessel because the rolls had been loaded in the hold so that gaps were created between the rolls, the sweat battens, and the skin of the ship. He sustained injury when one of the sweat battens broke away causing the bales to fall on him.

The Fifth Circuit specifically noted that the chief mate of the vessel had *actual knowledge* of the improper loading technique and failed to take action either to correct the stowage at the loading port or to warn the plaintiff or his co-workers of the dangerous condition *he knew* existed within the stow. *Lemon,* 656 F.2d at 116. Thus, the vessel owner was liable because it had actual knowledge of the nonobvious defect.

In *Harris,* the evidence established that before the accident, the shipowner *knew* the cargo was improperly stowed, and actively contributed to the defect, by failing to order dunnage. There was no evidence that an independent stevedore loaded the cargo which the Fifth Circuit felt could exonerate the vessel owner. *Harris,* 730 F.2d at 299 n.2.

Thus, *Lemon* and *Harris* stand for the proposition that a vessel owner is liable for negligent stowage of cargo if it has actual knowledge of the defect. Yet, in *Woods*, the Fifth Circuit applied the turnover duty to negligently stowed cargo. There a foreign stevedore stowed two cargoes of pipe, one bound for New Orleans, the other bound for Houston. That stevedore improperly loaded the cargo such that the Houston pipe overlapped the New Orleans pipe in several places within the hold, a condition the vessel owners knew existed. Woods, a discharging longshoreman in New Orleans, was injured when a pipe jammed in the Houston cargo causing the pipe to swing around in the hold.

Although the vessel owner knew of the overlapping condition, it contended it lacked actual knowledge of the danger and should not be liable under the first *Scindia* duty. The Fifth Circuit disagreed:

> Under the first *Scindia* duty, there is no requirement the vessel owner have actual knowledge of the danger presented before liability will attach. Rather, that duty speaks only in terms of a failure to exercise due care (although we measure its duty with regard to, not the ordinary stevedore, but the "expert and experienced" stevedore exercising "reasonable care". The law of negligence has never required that a tortfeasor actually be aware of the risks which its actions create before it may be liable, and *Scindia* does not add such a requirement in this context. *See Harris,* 730 F.2d at 299 (defendants may be

> liable under the first duty [in] situations where the [defendants] *knew or should have known* of the dangerous condition).

Woods, 873 F.2d at 851-52 (original emphasis).

Although the *Woods* court correctly states the turnover duty as regards a condition of the vessel and equipment, the court errs in two respects. The Fifth Circuit contends the actual knowledge standard does not govern actions the vessel owner creates. This position assumes the vessel created the negligent stowage, which was inconsistent on those facts and in contravention of the *Scindia* court's pronouncement of no requirement of supervision or inspection by vessel owners of cargo operations.

Secondly, the Fifth Circuit reasons *Scindia* does not add "the requirement [of actual knowledge] in this context." However, *Scindia* did not address negligent stowage of cargo by an independent stevedore, but only the defective condition of a vessel's winch used in discharge operations.

The Ninth Circuit also holds a vessel owner liable for negligent stowage, but on different grounds. In *Riggs*, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the vessel owner's duty as a policy choice on who among the vessel, the discharging stevedore, or the longshoreman, could best control and bear the risk of loss for injuries resulting from improperly stowed cargo. *Id.* at *3 (citing *Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd.*, 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 294 (1982)). The Ninth Circuit concluded the vessel should, since it could choose its loading stevedores, supervise their work when necessary, and can correct or warn others of the

dangers of the cargo. *Id.* at *4.

The rationale of the Ninth Circuit is flawed on all three points. First, the Ninth Circuit concluded without support that the vessel owner chooses who loads the ship. In fact, in this case, like many others, it was the charterer [ENSIDESA], not the owner, who chose the loading stevedore. Second, the Ninth Circuit contends the vessel can supervise the work when necessary. In effect, the Ninth Circuit requires the vessel to supervise, as it will be liable if it does not. This statement is in direct conflict with this Court's conclusion in *Scindia* that a vessel owner has no general duty by way of supervision of inspection concerning the work of the loading stevedore once operations commence. *Scindia*, 451 U.S. at 172, S.Ct. at 1624-25. Lastly, the Ninth Circuit concludes that the vessel owner could correct or warn of the concealed danger within the cargo. However, the vessel owner has no duty to intervene in the loading of cargo unless it has *actual knowledge* of the dangerous condition. The Ninth Circuit again is requiring vessel supervision of the loading stevedore.

In this case, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit re-defined the roles and responsibilities of the shipowner in relation to those of the stevedore. According to that court, vessel personnel become the specialists in cargo operations in addition to their duties and responsibilities with respect to the navigation and maintenance of the ship. Apparently now the stevedore, the formerly acknowledged expert in cargo operation, should defer to vessel personnel regarding these operations. *Scindia* is directly to the contrary in holding without equivocation that the determination whether to proceed with cargo operations is a matter of judgment committed to the stevedore *Scindia*, 451 U.S. at 175, 101 S.Ct.

at 1626. As stated by the Court:

> A shipowner has no general duty by way of supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations that are assigned to the stevedore.

Id. at 172, S.Ct. at 1624. The shipowner is entitled to rely on "an expert and experienced stevedore" acting with reasonable care and in general owes no duty to a longshoreman injured in the course of cargo operations. *Morris v. Compagnie Maritime de Chargeurs Reunis*, 832 F.2d 67, 71 (5th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 485 U.S. 1022, 108 S.Ct. 1576, (1988).

Under the rationale of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the vessel owner is caught in a Catch-22: If the vessel owner does not supervise the loading of cargo, it is liable in the discharge port for negligently stowed cargo, because of what it should have known. If the vessel owner does supervise or inspect the cargo stowage in the load port, it still will be liable for injuries at the load port and discharge port, since it actively participated in the loading operations.

At the loading port, the shipowner has to intevene in the cargo operations only when it has *actual knowledge* of a defect in the ship and her equipment and *actual knowledge* the loading stevedore will not correct the defect, thus posing a hazard to *its* longshoremen. Actual knowledge is an objective standard which the loading longshoreman must prove, among others, in order to recover against the vessel. The court of appeal has con-

cluded ARCASA was liable for failing to exercise reasonable care to provide safe cargo (yet ENSIDESA supplied and loaded this cargo), apparently part of a safe ship and equipment, for the work of the stevedore at the discharge port. Reasonable care is a *subjective* standard of care, which examines what the vessel owner should have known. It is inconsistent to hold the shipowner responsible for what it *should have known* concerning allegedly negligent loading/stowage causing injury during the cargo discharging operations when it is responsible for injury during loading operations only upon *actual knowledge* that the cargo loading operations were unsafe. ARCASA suggests the appropriate standard of care of vessel liability in cases of negligently stowed cargo should be the actual knowledge standard enunciated by *Derr* and logically compelled by *Scindia.*

III. ARCASA OWED NO DUTY TO CORRECT THE CARGO STOWAGE BY ENSIDESA NOR WARN COOPER LONGSHOREMEN OF THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION OF THE CARGO.

As set forth above, a corollary to the turnover duty is the shipowner's duty to warn the stevedore only of *hidden* dangers of which the shipowner is aware or should, by the exercise of reasonable care, be aware. *Scindia*, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622; *Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co.*, 709 F.2d 1031, 1036 (5th Cir. 1983). There obviously cannot arise a duty to warn of *hidden* dangers if there was no danger, *hidden* or otherwise, known to the shipowner. Yet, the court of appeal remarkably concluded the open and obvious condition of the cargo in the lower holds was no defense to ARCASA's alleged negligent failure to warn. This is clearly an error of law.

The testimony of the longshoremen and Cooper supervisory personnel established that the condition of the cargo and dunnage was open and obvious for anyone to see. There were no "hidden" dangers. Any alleged duty to warn the longshoremen "is not breached if the defect causing the injury was open and obvious and one that the longshoremen should have seen. An obvious defect should be as apparent to the stevedore and its longshoremen employees as to the shipowner." *Pollizi v. M/V ZEPHYROS II MONROVIA*, 860 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1988).

In *Taylor v. Moram Agencies*, 739 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit observed that the damaged condition of the cargo in that case, torn sacks of beans, was obvious to the stevedore when the vessel's hatches were opened. Thus, the court concluded there was no duty on the part of the vessel owner to warn of obvious dangers. *Id.* at 1387. The court further noted that the stevedore superintendent walked through the sacks and did not consider them to be hazardous; consequently, it was reasonable for the shipowner to expect the stevedore to take appropriate steps to maintain a safe work place. *Id.* at 1388. Thus, although the alleged dangerous condition existed *prior* to the commencement of cargo operations, the court found the shipowner could not be held liable to the plaintiff longshoreman.

District courts within the Fifth Circuit have critized *Lemon* as it conflicts with *Scindia*, concerning the absence of a duty to correct or warn of an open and obvious condition. In *McCullough v. S.S. Coppename*, 1983 A.M.C. 2547 (E.D. La. 1982), the district court stated, after noting that several Fifth Circuit opinions had recognized the continu-

ing vitality of the "open and obvious" doctrine:

> Interestingly, the *Lemon* court then quoted verbatim the *Scindia* standard concerning the shipowner's duty "to at least warn the stevedore of *hidden* dangers which would have been known to him in the exercise of reasonable care."...and incongruously applied it in place of established Fifth Circuit doctrine to a fact situation in which the danger was clearly known to the injured longshoreman. ...The cited passage from *Scindia*, however, refers only to hidden dangers, and the *Lemon* court's interpretation of that passage overlooks earlier language in the *Scindia* opinion indicating that the shipowner's duty extends only to dangers "that are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work." *Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De los Santos, supra*, 451 U.S. at 167, 1981 A.M.C. at 609.
>
> In my view, the *Pluyer v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.*, 664 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982)] decision is a more accurate interpretation of the meaning of *Scindia* than the *Lemon* decision . *Lemon* applies *Scindia* to a fact situation with which *Scindia* was not directly concerned; *Pluyer* recognizes the implicit limitations of the *Scindia* ruling.

Id. at 2552. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the vessel owner, holding that the vessel owner owed no duty to warn of the open and obvious dangers of inadequate lighting, the presence of cracked boards and broken pallets, and of a partially uncovered hatch opening.

In *Spence v. Mariehamns R/S,* 766 F.2d 1504 (11th Cir. 1985), the Eleventh Circuit noted that the manner of stowage, although it posed a hazard to the longshoremen, did not affect the ability of the stevedore to discharge the cargo with reasonable safety. The court further noted that the shipowner's duty to warn of *unknown* dangers was not triggered as the hazards were known to the stevedore and longshoremen.

In *Bonds v. Mortensen and Lang,* 717 F.2d 123, 127-28 (4th Cir. 1983), the Fourth Circuit stated:


> However, the malfunctioning bell and ship's design being obvious and known to all, the shipowner was entitled to rely on Ryan-Walsh's judgment as to whether discharge operations could safely be undertaken. Ryan-Walsh obviously concluded that these conditions did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm, for the longshoremen proceeded to unload the ship's cargo without complaint or incident until the time of the accident.

That reasoning, which applied to *ship's equipment,* applies with greater force here as the alleged defect involved only the *cargo*. Accordingly, there simply was no breach by ARCASA of any alleged duty owed to the longshoremen prior to the commencement of cargo operations.

CONCLUSION

There is a clear split in the circuits, concerning the duty of a ship owner to a longshoreman employed by the discharging stevedore when the longshoreman has been injured by the negligent stowage of cargo by an independent loading stevedore. This split has been previously acknowledged by three members of this Court. Considering this Court's constitutional mandate to ensure uniformity of the admiralty law of the United States, which it has zealously performed, ARCASA respectfully requests this Court grant this petition for writ of *certiorari* to clarify the duties, if any, of a vessel owner in this context.

Respectfully submitted,



GERARD T. GELPI
(Counsel of Record)
C. GORDON STARLING, JR.
Gelpi, Sullivan, Carroll & Gibbens
430 Notre Dame street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: (504) 524-9714

Appeal Counsel for
Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.

11/a/11035/petcert.sct

(2)

93-1068

NO.

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
DEC 29 1993
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A.
Petitioner

VERSUS

JERRY YOUNG
Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF *CERTIORARI*
TO THE LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

Gerard T. Gelpi
(Counsel of Record)
C. Gordon Starling, Jr.
GELPI, SULLIVAN, CARROLL & GIBBENS
430 Notre Dame Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: (504) 524-9714

Attorneys for Petitioner,
Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.

A B Letter Service, Inc., 327 Chartres St., New Orleans, La. (504) 581-5555

S/BP

INDEX

Page

APPENDIX A 1a

APPENDIX B 63a

APPENDIX C 64a

APPENDIX D 67a

APPENDIX E 72a

APPENDIX F 75a

APPENDIX G 78a

APPENDIX A

MARCH 31 1993

JERRY YOUNG	NO. 90-CA-1107
versus	COURT OF APPEAL
ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A. AND K & B EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.	FOURTH CIRCUIT
	STATE OF LOUISIANA

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, FOR THE
PARISH OF ORLEANS
NO. 84-17780, DIVISION "I"
HONORABLE BERNETTE, J. JOHNSON, JUDGE

JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG
JUDGE

(Court composed of Judge Charles R. Ward, Judge Joan Bernard Armstrong, and Judge Steven R. Plotkin)

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER
The Maritime Building
203 Carondelet Street, Suite 355
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
and
LAWRENCE S. KULLMAN
Lewis & Kullman
2615 Pan-American life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

MILES P. CLEMENTS
ANDREW S. DE KLERK
Lemle & Kelleher
2100 Pan-American Life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130-6097
FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
EMPRESA NACIONAL SIDERURGICA, S.A.

GERARD T. GELPI
RANDALL C. COLEMAN, III
Gelpi, Sullivan, Carroll & Gibbens
430 Notre Dame Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130-3610
FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A.

REVERSED IN PART;
AMENDED; AFFIRMED
AS AMENDED.

Defendants, Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. ("ARCASA") and Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. ("ENSIDESA"), vessel owner and vessel charterer, respectively, appeal a trial court judgment awarding plaintiff, Jerry Young, a longshoreman, $1,700,000.00 in damages for personal injuries sustained while offloading the M/V LORENA. The trial court also dismissed cross-claims filed by ARCASA and ENSIDESA against each other.

ENSIDESA is a Spanish company which manufactures and ships steel from a port in Aviles, Spain, to, among other ports, the Port of New Orleans, Louisiana. This appeal centers around ENSIDESA's October 1982 shipment of a cargo of 60-foot steel "I-beams" to New Orleans aboard the M/V LORENA, a ship owned and crewed by ARCASA. ENSIDESA was the charterer of the M/V LORENA, as well as the shipper and owner of the steel beams transported on the ship. The agreement between the parties was a time charter, a contract by which the owner of a vessel lets a vessel to another person for a specified time or use. The owner continues to operate the vessel with its master and crew who remain servants of the owner.

The cargo of steel beams, which were banded together in bundles, was loaded aboard the M/V LORENA and the port of Aviles, Spain by ENSIDESA stevedores. The "I beams" were "stowed" in the "H" formation. That is, if one were looking at the end of the beams down their length, the ends resembled the letter"H". Beams may also be stowed so that the ends resemble the letter "I". Pieces of wood, or "dunnage," were placed between the layers or tiers of beams.

Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc. ("Cooper"), had contracted with ENSIDESA to offload the steel beams in New Orleans. Plaintiff was a longshoreman employed by Cooper. The offloading began on November 21, 1982. Plaintiff was working in the hold of the ship with a work "gang" gathering and securing bundles of steel beams to be lifted out of the hold by a crane situated on a barge moored in the Mississippi River between the M/V LORENA and the dock. The members of plaintiff's gang, including those working in the hold with him, the foreman, the "flagman" or man who signals the crane operator, and the ship "superintendent," were all Cooper employees. The crane being used to unload the steel was owned by Cooper, was situated on a barge owned by Cooper, and was operated by a Cooper employee. The offloading operation was under the sole direction of Cooper personnel without any assistance whatsoever from ENSIDESA or ARCASA personnel.

Present during the offloading were the longshoremen in the hold of the ship, including plaintiff, a foreman, and a flagman who positioned himself where he could observe the men in the hold and the crane. The operator of the crane manipulated the crane only at the direction of the flagman. The ship superintendent, the senior Cooper employee, was also present during the offloading.

The beams were in bundles and the men were lifting no more than three or four bundles at a time. Apparently limited by the capacity of the crane. The deeper the men got into the hold, the more crushed they found the wooden dunnage. As a result of the crushed dunnage, bundles of beams were resting directly on the bundles underneath, rather than being separated by dunnage.

The unloading involved "breaking out" bundles of beams so that two chains could be pulled underneath and attached to each end of a "spreader bar" which was lowered by the crane. The spreader bar, here twenty feet long with cables and hooks attached at each end, allowed the crane to safely lift long cargo items, such as the sixty-foot beams, with two points of attachment. In the breaking out process, a "breakout wire," (cable), was slipped approximately six inches under one end of the beams. A man in the hold would then signal the flagman who in turn would signal the crane operator who would lift the end of the beams up approximately three and a half feet so that a chain could be thrown underneath. Then, on a signal from the flagman, the crane operator would lower the beams. The process would then be repeated for the other end of the beams. The two chains would be wrapped around the beams, attached to the spreader bar cables, and the beams lifted out of the hold by the crane.

Normally, the dunnage separating the tiers of beams allowed the breakout wire to be slipped far enough under the beams so that the crane could safely lift the beams so the men could throw the chains underneath. However, the dunnage on the M/V LORENA was so badly crushed that many of the beams were resting on the ones underneath, making it impossible to get the breakout wire far enough underneath. So, the men had to "nip" the beams. "Nipping" involved getting the breakout wire as far under the beams as possible, sometimes just under the edge of one beam. Often, such as on this occasion, pry bars would be used to separate the beams so that the breakout wire could be inserted. After putting the wire under the edge of the beams, on signal, the crane operator would lift the beams

slightly, and a longshoreman standing by would place a piece or pieces of dunnage under the beams. The crane would lower the beams and, ideally, the dunnage would support them until the relaxed breakout wire could be moved further underneath so that the ends of the beams could be safely lifted and the chains thrown underneath. One witness testified that sometimes it might be necessary to nip the beams three or four times before getting the wire far enough under the beams to lift them and throw the chains underneath.

In the mid-afternoon hours of November 22nd, the second day of offloading, the men proceeded to nip some beams which were resting on the tier of beams underneath. Plaintiff's job was to place a piece or pieces of dunnage under the beams when the crane lifted them up. The breakout wire was placed as far under the edge of the beam as the men could get it. They signalled to the flagman who signalled to the crane operator to lift up. As the crane began to lift up and the breakout wire tighten, the wire suddenly popped off. The spreader bar began wobbling, swinging the attached breakout wire. The flagman shouted for the men to run but as plaintiff attempted to get out of the way he was struck with the breakout wire or cable and fell, resulting in his sustaining personal injuries.

The case revolves around the condition of the stow. That is, the condition presented by the badly crushed dunnage, requiring the longshoremen to nip the edge of the beams in order to breakout the beams. It is undisputed that the manner in which the beams were stowed, i.e., stacked in the "H" configuration, with the edges resting on the wood dunnage, resulted in the dunnage being crushed

to a much greater extent than it would have been had the beams been stowed in the "I" configuration. The edges of beams stowed on the "H" tend to cut the wood.

There was conflicting testimony regarding the safety of the stow. Plaintiff, himself, offered no testimony that the stow was particularly dangerous. He said the work was basic longshoring work - offloading steel. He had used the tools, a pry bar and breakout wire, for years, and had offloaded that type of cargo before. He confirmed that he had used a breakout wire many times on steel stowed like that on the M/V LORENA. According to plaintiff, it was a typical workday, nothing out of the ordinary.

There was testimony by plaintiff in an earlier deposition that he had thought perhaps the boom of the crane had moved, causing the breakout wire to slip off the beams and subsequently strike him. He also stated in a deposition that he thought the cause of the accident may have been the longshoremen trying to lift out too many bundles of beams at one time, i.e., more than four. At trial he explained that these were the things he thought may have contributed to or caused the accident; but that he didn't know the cause. Other witnesses, however, testified that the boom of the crane did not move just prior to the accident, and that the men were not trying to lift out more than four bundles of beams at the time of the accident.

The foreman of plaintiff's work gang on the day of the accident, who was retired at the time of trial, viewed a photograph of the M/V LORENA's cargo hold and testified that he saw nothing dangerous about the stow. He had seen that type of stow many times before, and said it was

a "perfect," "safe" stow. He said the people who loaded the steel beams knew what they were doing. He said he would have stopped the work if he had seen something unsafe while the plaintiff and the other men were offloading the vessel.

An ENSIDESA employee, Mr. Garcia, the director of a private section of the Port of Aviles, Spain, testified that in 1982 *all* steel beams loaded at the Port of Aviles were loaded in the "H" method. They did not begin loading in the "I" method until 1983. He later stated that from 1956 to 1985, 29 years, ENSIDESA loaded steel beams on the "H." From 1985 to the time of trial, April 1989, 80% of the steel beams ENSIDESA loaded were stowed on the "H." Only 20% of steel beams, bound for the United States and Canada, were loaded on the "I." Today, if a customer requests it, ENSIDESA loads steel beams using the "I" method. This is done primarily for ships bound for the United States and Canada. Garcia stated that United States and Canadian buyers request that beams be stowed on the "I" because they arrive in better condition. He testified that the loading longshoremen were following instructions of an ENSIDESA employee, but that the master of the vessel works with an ENSIDESA employee, the chief of port operations, to work out a stowage plan prior to loading a vessel. The longshoremen follow that plan when loading the vessel. Garcia also admitted that it is harder to offload steel beams in the "normal" way when the dunnage is crushed. He vaguely mentioned that one can use a "gigantic clamp," a device apparently used in some unnamed other ports, *not* the Port of New Orleans.

Another ENSIDESA employee, Captain Cazon, the

chief of port operations for the Port of Aviles, testified that he supervised stevedoring operations at that foreign port. He said that before October 1982 he had loaded steel beams on the M/V LORENA using the "H" method. He was still loading ships that way at the time of trial, and stated that to his knowledge, ENSIDESA had never received any complaints from anywhere in the world that the "H" stowage method was dangerous on unsafe to unload. He admitted, however, that United States and Canadian companies had requested that ENSIDESA load steel beams using the "I" method.

Cazon testified that he and ENSIDESA employees prepare stowage plans with the master or captain of the vessel, who must approve the plans; the captain of the vessel has the last word with regard to the method of the stow. When he prepares plans Cazon takes into consideration the safety of the stow. Part of his duty is assuring that the cargo is stowed in a manner which will be safe to persons handling the cargo. Cazon admitted that, although one of the reasons for using dunnage is to separate the tiers of beams to facilitate offloading, loading the beams using the "H" method results in more destruction of dunnage than loading by the "I" method. The witness also admitted that the loading of steel beams in the "I" method takes no more time than loading them in the "H" method and said that the cargo is less likely to be damaged by compression if the "I" method is used. But, he said it's safer for the beams to be stowed in the "H" method because the cargo is less likely to shift during transit, although he admitted that all beams are more stable if bundled together, which, in the instant case were.

Douglas Lemott, a longshoreman since 1974, was working with plaintiff offloading the M/V LORENA at the time of plaintiff's accident. Lemott testified that at the time of the accident they were approxmately halfway down into the hold of cargo and were breaking out steel beams which were resting on each other - "sort of interlocked" - a condition resulting from wood dunnage being crushed by the "sharp edges" of the "H" loaded beams. He stated that he was handling the breakout wire and, because of the crushed dunnage, getting it under the edge of the beams "was dangerous." He said that it was a dangerous stow. Lemott admitted that whether stowed on the "I" or on the "H," it is expected that dunnage is more compressed as they get farther down into the load. He further admitted that after plaintiff's accident, which occurred on the second day of offloading, they finished offloading the vessel, despite the condition being worse after plaintiff's accident. Lemott also stated that beams stowed in the "I" position sometimes fall over.

John Porter, a longshoreman for 26 years at the time of trial, was also working with plaintiff at the time of the accident. He said the dunnage higher up was in good condition but as you got farther into the hold it was more "chopped up," with beams resting on beams. He said it was a dangerous stow. Porter mentioned to his foreman that the dunnage was getting worse, but was told to take his time and be careful. He said he had seen beams stowed both in the "H" and "I" positions "hundreds of times," and had offloaded cargoes loaded both ways. He said from a safety standpoint there was nothing that could be done - the beams had to be offloaded.

Glen Reibe, the Cooper ship superintendent, said that steel beams were usually loaded in the "I" position. He said that there was nothing Cooper could do to correct the situation with regard to the manner of stow. They just had to be careful unloading the steel. He said the stow was dangerous, although he did not stop the offloading because of that danger.

Joseph Johnson, an 18-year Cooper employee, was the Director of Regional Loss Control for the stevedoring company. Also know as a "safety man," he checked those vessels which Cooper was unloading twice a day. He said the dunnage on the M/V LORENA was crushed as a result of the beams being stowed on the "H." He said, "for all practical purposes it might as well have not been there." According to Johnson, the only thing Cooper could do regarding the stow was to work it in the safest manner possible. He admitted that he believed the cargo could be safely offloaded.

Sam Douglas, another career longshoreman - 21 years on the job at the time of trial - testified that he had unloaded steel beams during his career, but "very seldom" beams stowed on the "H". He said the normal method of stowing beams is on the "I," and he generally offloaded cargoes of beams stowed in that manner. He said that beams stowed on the "H" crush the dunnage and therefore you cannot get the breakout wire under the beams. Douglas was confronted with a statement signed by him reflecting that he had previously reported to a defense investigator that photographs of a vessel loaded with steel beams stowed on the "H" showed beams stowed the only way he has ever seen them stowed. Although Doulgas

testified that he can write, the statement had been written by the investigator. Douglas maintained that he didn't read the statement before signing it, and that he couldn't recall saying what was contained in the statement.

Plaintiffs presented as a witness, Albert Ross, a "marine surveyor." Ross was accepted as an expert in the area of marine surveying as an expert in safety regarding stevedoring operations.[1] Ross testified that he could not recall ever seeing a ship stowed with steel beams in the "H" manner. He stated that between 1972 and 1977, as a port captain at the Port of Antwerp, Belgium, he had supervised the loading of steel beams in the "I" method. In November 1982 he was hired by Cooper to inspect the condition of the cargo of steel beams on the M/V LORENA. He testified that the beams were stowed in the "H" position and there was considerable damage to the cargo, i.e., bending and flange damage, primarily due to compression of the dunnage. He said the cause of the compression was the weight of the beams together with the method of stow - on the "H." Ross said it was a "hazardous" and "dangerous" stow - not a "correct" stow.

On cross-examination Ross said he had never been a stevedore or longshoreman. He couldn't recall whether he told the Cooper ship superintendent that he thought the stow was dangerous. He was aware that the foreman of plaintiff's gang thought the cargo was in perfect condition. Although he first stated that he could not recall ever seeing

---

[1]Defendants raise as an assignment of error the trial court's qualification of Ross as expert regarding stevedoring operations, as well as the trial court's exclusion of an expert liability witness, Peter Duffy. See discussions, *infra*.

a "full" vessel loaded with beams on the "H," on cross-examination he said that in February 1982 he may have surveyed the M/V LORENA which was loaded with beams stowed on the "H." He also admitted that he may have surveyed three other vessels which apparently were stowed with beams loaded on the "H." Finally, he admitted that he did not know whether the condition of the stow had anything to do with the accident.

The trial court found that ARCASA, as the vessel owner, and ENSIDESA, as the charterer and/or loading stevedore, were both negligent, their negligence being a factual and legal cause of plaintiff's damages. Fault was assessed at 15% to ARCASA and 85% to ENSIDESA. The trial court subsequently denied motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial filed by both ARCASA and ENSIDESA. Both defendants now appeal.

LIABILITY OF ARCASA

ARCASA's primary assignment of error is that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that it was negligent and that such negligence was a cause of plaintiff's injuries.

We first address the applicable standard of appellate review. Federal jurisdicition over 33 U.S.C.A §905(b) claims is based upon the general maritime law. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1); *Russell v. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores,* 625 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980). State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to hear LHWCA cases by virtue of the "saving to suitors" clause of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1); *Bynum v. Patterson Truck Lines, Inc.,* 655 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1981);

Allen v. Keeney, 442 So.2d 1171 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), *writ denied,* 445 So.2d 1232 (La. 1984). State courts apply their own system for reviewing factual determinations of juries in general maritime law and LHWCA cases. *Simmons v. Hope Contractors, Inc.,* 517 So.2d 333 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), *writ denied,* 518 So.2d 510 (La. 1988).

The question of negligence in a maritime case is a question of fact for the jury. *Randolph v. Laeisz,* 896 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1990). Louisiana appellate jurisdiction extends to review of questions of law and fact in civil cases. La. Const. art. 5, §§ 5 and 10. On appellate review, a court may not disturb the factual findings of a judge or jury unless those findings are clearly wrong. *Rosell v. Esco,* 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989); *Arceneaux v. Domingue,* 365 So.2d 1330 (La. 1978); *Canter v. Koehring, Co.,* 283 So.2d 716 (La. 1973).

Plaintiff, a longshoreman, is covered under the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA").[2] Under 905(b) of the LHWCA, a longshoreman injured on a vessel may recover damages for those injuries from the vessel owner under a negligence theory.[3] §905(b)'s "vessel" includes a time charterer such

---

[2] 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901 *et seq.*

[3] 33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b) provides in relevant part:

> In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of the vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person

ENSIDESA. See, 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(21); *Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd.*, 873 F.2d 842, 846 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1989), *certiorari denied, Sammiline Co., Ltd. v. Woods*, 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853, 107 L.Ed.2d 847 (1990). In the seminal case of *Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos*, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court defined the duties owed by a vessel owner to the stevedore and his longshoremen. These duties were succinctly stated by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeal in *Hill v. Texaco*, 674 F.2d 447, 450-51 (5th Cir. 1982):

> First, *before the stevedore begins his work*, a shipowner must exercise care to make safe the portions of the ship that it turns over to the stevedore. In discharging this duty the ship may rely on the stevedore's performing its task with reasonable care. The shipowner must also warn the stevedore of hidden unsafe conditions on the ship of which the ship is, or should be, aware.
>
> Second, *once the stevedore begins its operations*, the shipowner has no general duty to supervise work or to inspect the area assigned to the stevedore, unless custom, contract, or law imposes such a duty on the shipowner. The shipowner need not monitor the stevedore's operations; rather, the shipowner is entitled to rely on the stevedore's expertise and reasonableness.

(footnote 3 continued)

was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in proving stevedoring services to the vessel.... The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred.

> Third, the Supreme Court made an exception to the general absence of a duty of the shipowner to protect employees of the stevedore *during cargo operations.* The duty arises when two conditions are fulfileed. *If* the shipowner becomes aware during the stevedore's work that the ship or its gear poses a danger to the longshoremen, and *if* the shipowner also learns that the stevedore is acting unreasonably in failing to protect the longshoremen against the danger, then the shipowner acquires a duty to intervene and protect the longshoremen. The shipowner can have knowledge of a defect if the defect develops during the stevedore's operations and the shipowner had actual knowledge, or if the defect exists at the outset and the ship 'must be deemed' to have knowledge of it.
>
> (footnotes omitted)(emphasis ours)

In *Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd.*, 656 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1981), the U.S. Fifth Circuit described the judicial balancing of supervisory duties between the vessel owner and the stevedore:

> The shipowner is therefore responsible for eliminating dangerous conditions which exist at the outset of the stevedoring operations, but has 'no duty by way of supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations.' It is the stevedore who must see to the safety of cargo operations. (citations omitted)

Id. at 115.

In *Lemon*, the court held that a vessel owner could be liable under *Scindia* if it knew or should have known of an improper loading technique and failed to take actions to either correct the stowage or warn the offloading stevedore's employees of the dangerous condition contained in the stow. *Lemon*, 656 F.2d, at 116. In *Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, S.A.*, 730 F.2d 296, 299 (5th Cir. 1984, the same court, citing *Lemon*, again held that a vessel owner could be held liable for negligently stowed cargo which caused an offloading longshoreman to be injured. See in accord, *Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd., supra.*

As in *Lemon* and *Harris*, we are concerned in the instant case not with conditions which develop *after* offloading stevedoring operations begin, but with a condition present when the vessel is turned over to the stevedore. The alleged negligence "occurred in the method and manner of stowing cargo that was delivered to the longshoremen and stevedore." *Harris, supra* at 299. Therefore, although the alleged dangerous condition caused by the crushed dunnage on the M/V LORENA became more apparent as the longshoremen got deeper into the stow, the second and third *Scindia* duties are not relevant to our analysis. The primary burden contemplated by *Scindia* was the duty of the vessel owner to turn over to the offloading stevedore a vessel which could be offloaded with reasonable safety. This is the focus of our analysis.

One dispositive issue is whether the stow was dangerous. To find ARCASA negligent the jury had to find that the stowage of the steel beams resulted in a dangerous condition, a condition which made it more probable than not that the longshoremen could not offload the vessel with

reasonable safety. There was considerable testimony adduced at trial regarding this issue, much of it conflicting. The jury was faced with accepting the testimony of those witnesses who stated that the stow was dangerous or those maintaining that it was not. That is, the jury was faced with a credibility call. In *Rosell v. Esco, supra*, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated the rule of appellate review when considering findings based upon credibility calls by the factfinder.

The court stated:

> When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error—clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said. Where documents or other objective evidence so constradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder [sic] would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may well find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. But where such factors are not present, and a factfinder's finding is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one of one two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. (citations omitted)

549 So.2d at 844-45.

In the bulk of cases dealing with dangerous stows, the issue of whether the condition is actually dangerous appears to be one of fact. See, *Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A.*, supra; *Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd., supra.* In the instant case, as in *Woods v. Sammisa*, defendants argue that the stow was not unreasonably dangerous or out of the ordinary. In addressing this argument in *Woods*, the U.S. Fifth Circuit, referring to *Harris*, stated:

> [In *Harris*], evidence that a stow was "dangerous" and "very, very poor[]" was held to be sufficient to support a jury finding of negligence; we did not require that the record contain testimony, almost of a talismanic quality, that the stow be "unreasonably" dangerous or that the cargo could not be discharged with "reasonable" safety. We similarly refuse to do so here.
>
> Whether a stowage method is reasonable depends upon a myriad of factors, including the absolute and relative danger which it presents vis-a-vis other stowage methods, and the feasibility of such other methods. In essence, the question is how a reasonable vessel interest exercising due care would allow the cargo to be stowed, and what it would conclude about its stowage methods.

In *Woods*, the plaintiff was injured breaking out steel pipe at the Port of New Orleans. Pipe bound to Houston, Texas overlapped pipe being offloaded in New Orleans. Commenting on the sufficiency of the evidence for a finding of negligence on the part of vessel owner, the court stated:

> [T]here was ample testimony in this case to support a jury finding that the overlapping condition of the cargo meant that the New Orleans pipe could not be discharged with reasonable safety. Testimony at trial indicated that an overlapping stow was unusual, that it increased the risk of damage to the cargo and injury to the longshoremen, and that those risks could have been avoided by either stowing the Houston pipe without having it overlap the New Orleans pipe—as was contemplated by the cargo plan prepared for the time charterer—or unloading the overlapping Houston pipe before unloading the New Orleans pipe. In sum, there is ample evidence from which a jury could conclude that the defendants therefore did not exercise care in providing the longshoremen with a reasonably safe place in which to work. (footnotes omitted)

The duty owed by the vessel owner is measured with regard to an "expert and experienced" stevedore exercising "reasonable care." *Woods v. Sammisa*, 873 F.2d at 851. The evidence supports the finding that plaintiff and his fellow longshoremen were expert and experienced stevedores exercising reasonable care at the time of the accident.

In the instant case, there was credible testimony to substantiate the factual conclusion that, although it was common for steel beams to be stowed on the "H," that method of stowage increased the risk of damage to the cargo and injury to the longshoremen. The testimony supports the conclusion that the risks to the plaintiff and other longshoremen could have been greatly reduced, if not

almost completely eliminated, by stowing the beams using the "I" method of stow, and perhaps, using harder wood as dunnage. The "I" method of stow was just as feasible as the "H" method. The benefits of the "I" stow far outweighed the *only* problem mentioned, i.e., the possibility that the beams stowed on the "I" might be damaged as a result of the cargo shifting. But, even regarding this factor, one of ENSIDESA's own employees stated at one point that stowing beams on the "I" actually reduced the risk of damage to the cargo. The evidence further supports the conclusion that the vessel owner, ARCASA, knew or should have known that this method of stow presented these risks to longshoremen. That is, "a reasonable owner/operator...would have perceived the dangers presented by the [stow]." See *Woods v. Sammisa*, 873 F.2d at 852. The evidence furnishes support for a finding that it was more probable than not that ARCASA's conduct contributed to plaintiff's accident and resulting injuries. We are unable to say that the trial court was clearly wrong in finding that ARCASA was at fault in causing damage to plaintiff.

Evidence that the danger of the stow was open and obvious is no defense to liability here under the first *Scindia* duty. *Treadaway v. Societe Anonyme Louis-Dreyfus*, 894 F.2d 161, 167; *Woods v. Sammisa*, 873 F.2d at 852-53; *Stass v. American Commercial Lines, Inc.*, 720 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 1983); *accord Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos*, 451 U.S. at 176, n. 22, 101 S.Ct. at 1626, n. 22; see also, *Fernandez v. M/V Rio Limay*, 572 So.2d 730, 733 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990), *writ denied*, 575 So.2d 397 (La. 1991).

LIABILITY OF ENSIDESA

Under the facts of this case, the duty owed under *Scindia* by ARCASA is not significantly different than that owed by ENSIDESA under *Scindia*. Based upon the evidence, we are unable to say that the jury would have been clearly wrong to conclude that a "reasonable ... time charterer would have perceived the dangers presented by the [stow]." See, *Woods*, 873 F.2d at 852. In addition, ENSIDESA, as loading stevedore, clearly bears responsibility for the dangerous condition presented by the beams which it stowed. ENSIDESA breached its duty of reasonable care under all of the circumstances, in failing to load the vessel so that it could be offloaded with reasonable safety.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

ENSIDESA and ARCASA submit that the trial court erroneously submitted certain theories of liability under *Scindia* when there is no evidence in the record to support them. Defendants cite *Woods v. Sammisa Company, Ltd. supra*, for the proposition that such an error mandates a remand for a new trial.

La. C.C.P. art. 1793(C) states:

> A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto either before the jury retires to consider its verdict or immediately after the jury retires, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. If he ob-

jects prior to the time the jury retires, he shall be given an opportunity to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.

In the instant case, ENSIDESA and ARCASA failed to make a proper objection as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1793(C), and therefore waived their right to raise as an assignment of error the giving of these jury instructions. Moreover, this assignment of error relates to theories of liability involving a hidden danger, one that is not open and obvious. The evidence is undisputed that, as the longshoremen got deeper into the hold and were breaking out the beams, the condition of the stow - the crushed dunnage and interlocking bundles of beams - was open and obvious to them. Unlike the situation in *Woods v. Sammisa, supra,* we are confident that the jury did not find defendants liable based upon either the theories involving a hidden danger.

DIRECTED VERDICT

ENSIDESA assigns as error the failure of the trial court to grant its motion for a directed verdict pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1810. The denial of a motion for directed verdict is an interlocutory order and is not appealable. *Adams v. Pourciau,* 417 So.2d 860, 862 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), *writ denied,* 422 So.2d 157 (La. 1982). Moreover, under the well-accepted rule for review of judgments granting directed verdicts, there was "substantial evidence" such that "reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions." Thus the motion was properly denied. *Oppenheim v. Murray Henderson Undertaking,* 414 So.2d 868 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).

MOTION FOR J.N.O.V. AND NEW TRIAL

ENSIDESA and ARCASA assign as error the failure of the trial court to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.O.V.), or in the alternative, a new trial. A J.N.O.V. should be granted only when the evidence is so overwhelming that no reasonable juror could reach any other conclusion. Further, the trial court cannot consider issues of credibility in reaching its decision. *Fernandez v. General Motors Corp.*, 478 So.2d 999, 1001 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985), *reversed on other grounds*, 491 So.2d 633 (La. 1986); *McLain v. Holmes*, 460 So.2d 681, 682 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), *writ denied*, 463 So.2d 1321 (La. 1985).

Considering the evidence, and our finding as to ENSIDESA's and ARCASA's liability, we are unable to say that the trial court erred in denying their motions for J.N.O.V. as to liability. For reasons later discussed, the issue of the J.N.O.V. as to damages is moot.

As to the motions for new trial on the ground that the judgment appeared "clearly" contrary to the law and evidence, La. C.C.P. art. 1972(1), for the foregoing discussed reasons, we find no error on the part of the trial court in failing to grant ENSIDESA or ARCASA a new trial on the issue of liability. Nor do we find any merit to the argument that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting a new trial under La. C.C.P. art. 1973, which provides that the trial court "may" grant a new trial if there is good ground therefor.[4]

---

[4] ENSIDESA's argument that a new trial was mandated under La. C.C.P. art. 1972(3), on the ground of jury misconduct, will be addressed later in this opinion.

MOTION TO CONTINUE

ENSIDESA raises as an assignment of error, the trial court's failure to grant its motion to continue the trial, filed at 2:53 p.m. on Friday, April 14, 1989, less than three days before the Monday, April 17th start of trial. ENSIDESA moved for a continuance to enable it to arrange for an independent medical examination of plaintiff after it allegedly discovered new evidence that plaintiff had been involved in a gunfight in 1986, and received gunshot wounds "that significantly impact[ed]" his medical condition. ENSIDESA claimed that information about the gunshot wounds had never been provided to it despite repeated discovery requests. The motion was denied on the day of trial, April 17th.

In December 1987, plaintiff was examined on behalf of ENSIDESA by Dr. James Laborde, an orthopedist. During the course of this examination X-rays were taken. Dr. Laborde confirmed that the X-rays revealed bullet fragments, including one large fragment in the upper chest region, and another in the area of plaintiff's jaw bone. Dr. Laborde could not recall whether he asked plaintiff about these bullet fragments. Dr. Laborde subsequently discussed his evaluation of plaintiff with counsel for ENSIDESA, and the information is contained in his report.

Dr. Rennie Culver, a psychiatrist, was called as a witness by ENSIDESA. In September 1988, plaintiff was examined by Dr.Culver on behalf of plaintiff's employer, Cooper Stevedoring. During the examination, plaintiff informed Dr. Culver that he had been shot in 1986 and had surgery in connection with the gunshot wound. This infor-

mation was contained in Dr. Culver's report. Dr.Culver was called as a witness by counsel for ENSIDESA, and questioned extensively about the history-or lack of it-given to him by plaintiff. ENSIDESA knew or should have known of the information in Dr. Culver's report about the gunshot wound(s).

A continuance *shall* be granted in cases where the moving party shows that he has been unable, with the exercise of due diligence, to obtain evidence material to his case. La. C.C.P. art. 1602. Even assuming arguendo that ENSIDESA did not discover that plaintiff had been wounded in a 1986 gunfight until shortly before trial as it claims, considering the foregoing, we are unable to say that it exercised due diligence in discovering this information. It apparently had this information in its possession, or access to it, long before the date set for trial.

A continuance *may* be granted if there is good ground therefor. La. C.C.P. ar. 1601. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance will not be disturbed by an appellate court absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. *Heap v. Weber Const. Co. of Louisiana, Inc.*, 407 So.2d 799 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); *Clay v. Clay*, 467 So.2d 166 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1983). For the foregoing reasons, we are unable to say that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying ENSIDESA's motion for a continuance to enable it to schedule an examination of plaintiff relating to the residual effect of the gunshot wounds on his physical condition.

MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS

ENSIDESA raises as an assignment of error the

trial court's cancelling of two medical examinations it had scheduled for plaintiff on April 7 and 10. These examinations were scheduled on March 27, 1989, three weeks before trial. Plaintiff maintains that he learned of these scheduled examinations on March 30, 1989. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion requesting that the trial court cancel the examinations. The trial court did not give any reasons for its granting of plaintiff's motion and cancellation of the examinations. Apparently, it was because the examinations were set 10 and 7 days before the April 17 trial was to begin.

La. C.C.P. art. 1464 authorizes a trial court to order a party to submit to a physical examination. The regulation of medical examinations is subject to the broad discretion of the trial court. *Amoco Prduction Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.*, 455 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), *writs denied*, 459 So.2d 542, 543 (La. 1984). Absent a clear showing of abuse, the court's rulings on discovery will not be distrubed. *John Jay Esthetic Salon Inc. v. Woods*, 422 So.2d 456 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982).

Defendants maintain that the physical examinations were necessary because plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Watermeier, had only recently made any mention of his carpal tunnel syndrome and they had to respond to this. However, Dr. Watermeier stated in a November 1987 deposition that he had made a "working diagnosis" that plaintiff was suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome, though further tests were needed to confirm this diagnosis. Thus, ENSIDESA was alerted to the possibility of a claim for carpal tunnel syndrome some 16 months before the date set for trial. If it wished to rebut such a claim, it should

have had plaintiff examined by its physician at an earlier date. Considering this evidence, we are unable to say that the trial clearly abused its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion to cancel the medical examinations which has been scheduled by ENSIDESA.

We are also unable to say that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant ENSIDESA's alternative motion for a continuance. See LA. C.C.P. arts. 1972, 1973, and discussion *supra*.

STRIKING OF ENSIDESA'S LIABILITY EXPERT

In addition to learning on March 30, 1989 of the two scheduled medical examinations, plaintiff also learned that ENSIDESA planned to call Peter Duffy as an expert on the issue of liability. His testimony would have concerned the alleged dangerousness of the stow aboard the M/V LORENA. Plaintiff objected to the admissibility of this expert's testimony of the grounds that it was too close to trial to add an expert whose testimony would go to the issue of liability. The trial court struck the witness and ENSIDESA applied for writs of certiorari or review to this court. A divided panel of this court denied ENSIDESA's application for writs.[5]

Plaintiff filed his original petition in October 1984,

---

[5] A denial of an application for writs of certiorari or review does not preclude reconsideration of the same issue on appeal, and there, reaching a different conclusion as to it. *State v. Fontenot*, 550 So.2d 179 (La. 1989); *State v. Jenkins*, 558 So.2d 800 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). See also, *Gulf Utilities Co. v. Dixie Elec. Mem. Corp.*, 248 La. 458, 179 So.2d 637 (1965).

naming ARCASA as a defendant. In August 1985 he filed an amended petition naming ENSIDESA as a party defendant. This was almost four years before trial, and ENSIDESA's notification that it would call Peter Duffy as an expert on the issue of liability. Plaintiff apparently had no knowledge of this witness until March 30, 1989, less than three weeks before trial. Under these circumstances, we are unable to say that the trial court abused its inherent and wide discretion in refusing to allow Duffy to testify.

In addition, defendants presented the substance of Duffy's testimony through other witnesses, albeit fact witnesses, not opinion witnesses. Thus, it does not appear that they were substantially prejudiced by the exclusion of his testimony.

TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S LIABILITY EXPERT

ENSIDESA and ARCASA filed motions in limine to strike the testimony of plaintiff's liability expert, A.A. Ross, a marine surveyor, who testified extensively about the conditions of the stow. The trial court denied the motions, and defendants raise the denial as an assignment of error.

Defendants maintain that Ross testified beyond his expertise; that he was not qualified to testify to the matters he did. Ross was a "marine surveyor," and had been one since 1977. He was hired by Cooper to inspect the cargo of steel beams aboard the M/V LORENA for damage before offloading operations began. He was a graduate of the Nautical College of Scotland and had sailed on ocean going general cargo vessels for fifteen years, rising to com-

manding officer. He had been a "port captain" for a company that chartered ships and loaded steel out of Antwerp, Belgium. His duties as a port captain included planning the loading of the vessel and working with the master of the vessel loading the ship. He testified that he had supervised both the loading and offloading of steel beams. Ross had previously testified as an expert regarding safety considerations in the handling, loading, and offloading of cargo.

La. C.E. art. 702 states:

> If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto, in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

The trial court accepted Ross as an expert in the area of marine surveying and in safety regarding stevedoring operations. Defendants object to Ross's qualifications because he had never been a stevedore or a longshoreman, and had not testified as a "safety expert" before. Also, he was hired only to inspect the condition of the cargo. A trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining the competency and qualification of expert witnesses. *Denton v. Mammelli*, 447 So.2d 75 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984). Its decision will not be disturbed absent a finding that it clearly wrong as a matter of law. *Frank L. Beier Radio, Inc. v. Brown*, 453 So.2d 656 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984), *writ denied*, 458 So.2d 121 (La. 1984).

Ross's experience as a port captain, loading and offloading ships, qualified him as an expert regarding stevedoring operations. Considering Ross's qualifications, we are unable to say that the trial court abused its wide discretion in qualifying him as an expert in the area of marine surveying and safety regarding stevedoring operations. Also, for the previously discussed reasons, we find no merit to ARCASA and ENSIDESA's argument that the trial abused its discretion by refusing to allow them to present Peter Duffy's testimony to rebut that given by Ross.

SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES

ENSIDESA claims that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff to cross-examine its liability witnesses about a change in the way ENSIDESA loaded steel beams after plaintiff's accident. Several ENSIDESA witnesses, foreign employees of the company, testified that in 1983 ENSIDESA began loading steel beams on the "H" at the request of customers, notably U.S. and Canadian companies.

La. Code of Evidence art. 407 states:

> In a civil case, when, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This Article does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, authority, knowledge, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, *or for attacking credibility.* (emphasis added)

Comment (b) to La. C.E. art. 407 states that this article applies if the substantive law underlying the case is based on some concept of negligence or culpable conduct. Thus, as ENSIDESA submits, the article governs the admissibility of this evidence. In questioning its witnesses, ENSIDESA brought out that there had never been a complaint by a customer about beams stowed on the "H." It was also brought out that ENSIDESA continues to use an "H" stow today, which is true. However, the questions on direct were asked, and the answers given, without mention of the routine loading of steel beams on the "I" since 1983 for U.S. and Canadian bound vessels. The cross examination of these witnesses on the issue of the post-1982 loading of bems on the "I" was directed to the credibility of these witnesses.

We find no merit to ENSIDESA's argument that this evidence was prohibited under La. C.E. art. 407.

OPINION TESTIMONY OF LAY WITNESSES

ENSIDESA raises as an assignment the giving of opinion testimony by plaintiff's lay witnesses, fellow longshoremen, as to the safety of the stow. Plaintiff points out that several law defense witnesses testified as to the same issue. La. C.E. art. 701 provides that a lay witness may give an opinion if it is:

> (1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and
>
> (2) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

The opinion testimony of plaintiff's lay witnesses meets the criteria set forth in La. C.E. art. 701. Their opinions as to the safety of the stow were rationally based on their perceptions and their experience as longshoremen. Their opinion testimony was helpful to the determination of the primary fact in issue with regard to liability, the safety of the stow.

EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CRIMINAL RECORDS

ENSIDESA raises as an assignment of error, the trial court's refusal to allow plaintiff's criminal records into evidence. This assignment of error is raised but not briefed.

Under La. C.E. art. 609 evidence of the conviction of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than six months is admissible for impeachment purposes if the trial court determines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party. Only the date of the conviction and the name of the crime for which the witness was convicted is admissible under the article. Evidence of the arrest, indictment, or prosecution of a witness is not admissible for impeachment purposes.

Plaintiff's criminal records proffered by ENSIDESA reflect that he had been convicted of first offense possession of marijuana and first offense carrying of a concealed firearm, both punishable by imprisonment for up to six months. Also proffered was an application for a search warrant to search plaintiff's residence for stolen property, and an inventory form listing a number of items recovered in the search. However, there is no record of plaintiff having been convicted of any crime in connection with the stolen

property. Therefore, nothing about plaintiff's criminal history as reflected by the proffered records was admissible under La. C.E. art. 609.

JURY MISCONDUCT

ENSIDESA claims that the trial erred in failing to grant its motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct. La. C.C.P. art. 1972(3) mandates the granting of new trial where the jury has "misbehaved improperly so that impartial justice has not been done." La. C.C.P. art 1972 allows the trial court to grant a new trial if there "is good ground therefor."

Following trial, ENSIDESA obtained affidavits by three jurors who stated that during deliberations one juror urged a verdict on grounds other than the evidence adduced at trial. The juror allegedly stated that plaintiff should prevail because he was a lone individual fighting corporations. Some of his remarks also allegedly appealed to racial bias and prejudice. One juror-affiant stated that after deliberating almost ten hours, the jurors finally "gave in" to this particular juror out of frustration, and "more than doubled the amount of what would have been their verdict."

La. C.E. art. 606(B) states:

> Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any manner or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or

> emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether any *outside influence* was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, ... Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. (emphasis added)

Under La. C.E. art. 606(B), the affidavits of these three jurors as to matters or statements made by this particular juror during deliberations are clearly inadmissible to question the validity of the jury verdict.

Prior to Louisiana's adoption of the Code of Evidence, a body of law allowed affidavits such as those offered by ENSIDESA for the limited purpose of showing that a juror responded untruthfully on voir dire. *Bennett v. Sedco Maritime,* 520 So.2d 894, 904 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987); *Rains v. Diamond M. Company,* 396 So.2d 306, 315 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1981), *writ denied,* 399 So.2d 623 (La. 1981), *cert denied,* 455 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1427, 71 L.Ed.2d 648 (1982).

ENSIDESA argues that the affidavits are admissible to show that the juror in question violated his "oath of impartiality." However, the exception cited is not to be employed where the alleged untruthful statement was a general one that the juror could render an impartial verdict. *Bennett, supra; Ryals v. Home Insurance Company,* 410 So.2d 827 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1982), *writs denied,* 414 So.2d 375, 376 (La. 1982).

ENSIDESA's argument is directed only to an alleged general statement by the juror that he could be impartial. Thus, the affidavits cannot be considered. ENSIDESA makes no other allegation of jury misconduct. Therefore, we find no error by the trial court in denying ENSIDESA's motion for a new trial based upon jury misconduct. We are also unable to say that the trial court abused its discretion under La. C.C.P. art. 1973 in failing to grant a new trial on discretionary grounds based on conduct by the jury, or in failing to annul the judgment because it was obtained by ill practice.

FAULT OF PLAITNIFF'S EMPLOYER

ENSIDESA claims that the trial court erred in failing to submit an interrogatory as to the fault of plaintiff's employer, Cooper Stevedoring Company.

In the instant case, plaintiff was receiving benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, (LHWCA) 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 *et seq.* His exclusive remedy against Cooper was under the provisions of the LHWCA. There is no provision under the LHWCA providing for the apportionment of fault to an employer. In fact, it has been held that in an action under 33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b), the issue of an employing stevedore's negligence should be submitted to the jury. *Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Martimas Argentinas*, 573 F.2d (5th Cir. 1978).

La. C.C.P. art. 1812(2) provides that a trial court may submit an interrogatory to a jury inquiring whether any person other than the plaintiff was at fault, and if so the percentage of fault. See *Lemire v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.*, 458 So.2d 1308 (La. 1984). However, In both *Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co.*, 579 So.2d 947 (La. 1991), and *Melton v. General Electric Co., Inc.*, 579 So.2d 448 (La.

1991), the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the idea that in a suit by an employee against a third-party tortfeasor, La. C.C.P. art. 1812(2) allowed a trial court to submit an interrogatory to a jury regarding an employer's fault. The court held that consideration of an employer's fault would offend a basic principle of the worker's compensation scheme, that an employer is liable only for compensation benefits, not tort damages. The principles underlying both the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act and the LHWCA are the same regarding employer fault. La. C.C.P. art. 1812(2) does not require the submission of an interrogatory to the jury as to the fault of an employer in a suit against third-party tortfeasors under the LHWCA.

ENSIDESA next submits that the trial court erred in failing to disclose Cooper's interest to the jury that it could weigh the credibility of its employees who testified at trial. The record reflects that the trial court instructed the jury as to the relevance of Cooper's fault. The Cooper employees who testified at trial had nothing to personally gain from their testimony, although Cooper itself was seeking to recoup compensation benefits it had paid plaintiff. The jury was well aware that these men were plaintiff's fellow workers, a fact seemingly much more indicative of possible bias than that their employer had a monetary interest in the outcome of the trial. Any evidence as to Cooper's claim for reimbursement was properly excluded on the ground that its probative value on the credibility of the witnesses was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the plaintiff. La. C.E. art. 403.

CLOSING ARGUMENT

ENSIDESA submits that the trial court erred in fail-

ing to grant a new trial on the ground that the jury was "inflamed by plaintiff's counsel's clear breach of the 'Golden Rule' " during closing argument.

The "Golden Rule [Amendment]" refers to an argument exhorting that the jury place itself in a party's shoes *with respect to damages. Deurden v. PBR Offshore Marine Corporation,* 471 So.2d 111 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1985), *writ denied,* 476 So.2d 355 (La. 1985); *Burrage v. Harrell,* 537 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1976). The "Golden Rule" is limited to application in those cases where the exhortation is with respect to damages.

We first note that the record does not contain a transcript of the closing arguments of counsel. The record does reflect that counsel for ENSIDESA made an objection to remarks made by opposing counsel during closing arguments. However, even at the time he made the objection, counsel for ENSIDESA stated that he couldn't recall exactly what was said. In its brief on appeal, counsel for ENSIDESA uses partial quotations of what opposing counsel allegedly stated. None of these partial statements directly implore jurors to put themselves in plaintiff's shoes vis-a-vis his medical condition. The partial statements, even considering the context in which counsel for ENSIDESA places them, are not the type that would incite jurors to render a verdict based upon their emotions rather than the evidence. In addition, the trial court carefully instructed the jury that the statements of counsel were not evidence.

We find no merit to this assignment of error.

LIMITATION OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE

ENSIDESA claims that the trial court erred in refusing to allow it "to call Dr. Bogran to testify," and in prohibiting it from "using Dr. Bogran's report to properly cross-examine other physicians." Dr. Bogran treated plaintiff following a 1987 automobile accident.

The record does not substantiate ENSIDESA's assertion that the trial court refused to allow Dr. Bogran to testify. The issue of Dr. Bogran's treatment of plaintiff arose during the direct examination of ENSIDESA's expert psychiatric witness, Dr. Culver. Counsel for ENSIDESA sought to have Dr. Culver give an opinion as to the possibility of plaintiff malingering, based upon medical information contained in a report by Dr. Bogran. The court asked if Dr. Bogran was going to be called as a witness. Counsel for ENSIDESA responded that he was under subpoena, and indicated that he would be called "if necessary." The court responded that Dr. Culver might need to be recalled. The import of this colloquy was that the trial court was not going to allow questions of Dr. Culver regarding Dr. Bogran's report unless Dr. Bogran would be called as a witness. Nowhere is there an indication that Dr. Bogran was not going to be allowed to testify.

The trial court allowed liberal examinations of witnesses by both sides concerning findings and opinions of physicians who were not called to testify at trial. The trial court apparently felt that, because Dr. Bogran was under subpoena and available to testify, evidence as to his report would not be allowed. Dr. Bogran's report was technically heresay, and therefore inadmissible as evi-

dence. See *Jackson v. Tyson,* 526 So.2d 398 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); *Hoofkin v. Bourne,* 469 So.2d 24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985). Under these circumstances we find no error with the trial court's decision not to allow questions by ENSIDESA of its own witness as to findings of Dr. Bogran as reflected in his report. Nor do find error in the trial court's refusal to allow into evidence Dr. Bogran's report without his testimony.

EVIDENCE OF UNRELATED PRIOR LAWSUIT

ENSIDESA next claims that the trial court erred in refusing to allow into evidence a petition filed by plaintiff, or his attorney, in connection with a 1987 accident. The suit, filed in First City Court for the Parish of Orleans, purportedly sought damages for personal injuries and property damage. Plaintiff was cross-examined as to the suit, and maintained that all he wanted out of the action was recovery for property damage to his vehicle. He said he knew nothing of a claim for personal injuries. ENSIDESA sought to introduce the petition at the same time it tried to admit Dr. Bogran's report.

We are unable to say the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing the petition on the grounds that its relevancy was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect to plaintiff. La. C.E. art. 403.

TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S ECONOMIST

ENSIDESA next claims that the trial court erred in failing to strike the testimony of plaintiff expert economist. ENSIDESA submits that the expert, Dr. Philip

Jeffress, incorrectly included vacation and holiday benefits twice in his calculations of future and past wage loss. ENSIDESA cites further errors on the expert's part, such as "ignor[ing] the downturn in the local economy", "us[ing] an unrealistically low discount rate," and using "a legally improper work life expectancy."

A trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining the competency and qualification of expert witnesses. *Denton v. Mammelli*, 447 So.2d 75 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984). Its decision will not be disturbed absent a finding that it clearly wrong as a matter of law. *Frank L. Beier Radio, Inc. v. Brown*, 453 So.2d 656 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984), *writ deneid*, 458 So.2d 121 (La. 1984).

Dr. Jeffress was cross-examined extensively as to his calculations. Any alleged inaccuracies were brought to the attention of the jury. Under these circumstances, and considering the discretion vested in the trial court in these matters, we are unable to say that it was error to refuse to strike the economist's testimony.

DAMAGES

Both ARCASA and ENSIDESA raise issues concerning the amount of damages awarded by the jury. Both ENSIDESA and ARCASA raise as an assignment of error, the trial court's failure to grant a remittitur. La. C.C.P. art. 1814. We will treat this as an assignment of error as to the excessiveness of the jury award. We have all of the facts before us to amend the verdict with respect to damages. The assignment of error as to remittitur is, for practical purposes, moot. If we found that the trial court erred in de-

nying the motion for remittitur, it would offend the principles enunciated in *Gonzales v. Xerox Corporation*, 320 So.2d 163 (La. 1975), to remand for a new trial on the issue of damages when the facts are before us.

The jury awarded plaintiff $1,700,000.00 in damages, itemized as follows:

Future medical expenses;[6]	$ 300,000.00
Past physical and mental pain and suffering and disability from date of accident to date of trial;	$ 325,000.00
Future physicial and mental pain and suffering and disability;	$ 450,000.00
Past loss of earnings or earning capacity for date of accident to date of trial;	$ 175,000.00
Future loss of earnings or earning capacity.	$ 460,000.00
TOTAL	$ 1,700,000.00

1. *Casusation:*

We first address the issue of causation. The jury determined that the fault of ARCASA and ENSIDESA contributed to plaintiff's damages. This is a question of fact. The finding of the jury as to causation of damages may not be disturbed by this court unless (1) the record

---

[6] The issue of past medical expenses was not submitted to the jury and is not at issue on appeal.

evidence does not furnish a basis for such a finding, or (2) that finding is nevertheless clearly wrong. *Rosell v. Esco*, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989); *Arceneaux v. Domingue*, 365 So.2d 1330 (La. 1978); Canter v. Koehring, Co., 283 So.2d 716 (La. 1973).

Plaintiff claimed both psychic and physical injuries. Dr. Watermeier, and orthopedist, testified on behalf of plaintiff. Plaintiff had previously been seen by one of Dr. Watermeier's assoicates. Plaintiff's history reflected the November 1982 work-related injury and resulting hospitalization. Plaintiff apparently underwent diagnostic tests and conservative treatment following the accident, with no improvement, and Dr. Watermeier subsequently took over his treatments in April 1983.

Upon examination, plaintiff complained of "a lot of pain." Had pain in his back radiating down his leg. His objective findings were muscle spasm and limited range of motion in his back. Dr. Watermeier felt that the most probable cause of plaintiff's pain was a symptomatic or bulging disc in the lower back. He gave plaintiff a chemopapain injection in April 1983, which appeared to have provided some relief for a week or so. In June 1983 plaintiff continued to complain of back and leg pain. He walked with a severe limp and severe straight leg raising signs. Dr. Watermeier performed a lumbar laminectomy on June 24, 1983. He found a bulging disc irritating a nerve. Following discharge on June 28, plaintiff appeared to be doing better, although he still complained of back pain. Dr. Watermeier subsequently performed a spinal fusion on plaintiff in 1985.

It was Dr. Watermeier's opinion that the cause of

plaintiff's low back pain was his November 1982 accident aboard the M/V LORENA. He said a prior back injury sustained by plaintiff in 1980, for which he was apparently treated over a course of several months, was not the cause of his post-November 1982 problems. Dr. Watermeier stated that plaintiff would not have been able to work from 1980 to November 1982 with a herniated disc. He further stated that plaintiff had not complained of any leg pain in connection with the 1980 treatment, but did after the November 1982 accident. Plaintiff had also been treated over the years, as far back as 1968, for other minor injuries. Dr. Watermier felt these injuries were not the cause of plaintiff's post-November 1982 problems. He also admitted that plaintiff had degenerative changes in his spine dating as far back as 1968, but again, this fact did not affect his opinion. Nor did he believe that a contusion to the cervical spine from a 1986 gunshot wound was the cause of plaintiff's current problems. Finally, told of plaintiff's September 1987 automobile accident, of which Dr. Watermeier was unaware, he stated that he saw plaintiff approximately two weeks after the 1987 accident and plaintiff had the same complaints as before. His opinion as to causation was primarily based upon the history given by plaintiff.

Dr. Watermeier stated that in September or December 1983 plaintiff complained of pain in his left wrist and left forearm. He admitted, however, that he didn't have much concern about the arm and wrist pain until October 1987. Dr. Watermeier stated that a review of plaintiff's records showed some injury to plaintiff's arm at the time of the November 1982 accident. He had made a "clinical diagnosis" of carpal tunnel syndrome, but not a

"definitive diagnosis." On cross-examination he admitted that it was *not* his diagnosis that plaintiff has carpal tunnel syndrome.

In early 1984 Dr. Watermeier began giving plaintiff injections of Marcaine, a long-lasting anesthetic. These administered monthly or bi-weekly. He also prescribed plaintiff 30-40 Percodan pain medication pills a month. In addition, plaintiff has been hospitalized several times for morphine epidurals. All of these were for treatment of plaintiff's complaints of pain. Dr. Watermeier saw plaintiff as continuing to suffer from pain in the furure. He believed plaintiff will have to live with pain the rest of his life.

Dr. Watermeier testified that from 1983 when he first saw plaintiff, until July 1986, he considered plaintiff totally diabled. As of July 1986, he felt that plaintiff could work at some "light activity," but not as a longshoreman. On examination in May 1987 he found plaintiff totally disabled. From February 1988 until the time of trial he said plaintiff was totally disabled. As of the time of trial, he thought plaintiff would have trouble even doing light duty work, but might be trained to perform some type of sedentary work.

Dr. Robert Newman, a phychiatrist, testified on behalf of plaintiff. Dr. Newman first saw plaintiff in April 1988. He treated plaintiff on a regular basis between April 1988 and September 1988. He didn't see plaintiff from late September to late January 1989, when he began treating him again. He continued to treat him at the time of trial, April 1989.

Dr. Newman diagnosed him as suffering from an adjustment disorder with depression; he also had a dependent personality, and a psychogenic pain disorder. The dependant personality was not something that, in Dr. Newman's opinion, resulted from the November 1982 accident. Based upon the history given him by plaintiff, Dr. Newman felt that plaintiff was depressed because he can no longer do longshoreman work. As a result of being unable to work because of his back problem, he said plaintiff suffers from a lack of self-esteem. His sense of self-worth was based upon his ability to do heavy manual labor as a longshoreman. Thus, his psychological condition is a direct result of his 1982 accident aboard the M/V LORENA.

Dr. Newman believed that plaintiff's complaints of pain and numbness in his arm had psychological basis. They were psychogenic in nature. He said he was not sure whether the low back pain was psychogenic. There were no objective symptoms accounting for the pain. Dr. Newman testified that he considered but rejected the possibility that plaintiff was malingering, even though plaintiff appeared to meet several criteria of a person malingering. Dr. Newman felt that plaintiff would not recover from the psychogenic pain dosorder. He didn't believe working would "really help" plaintiff unless he could do the type of work he had done before the accident. The self-esteem he had achieved before the accident was largely built aroung a laboring job. Dr. Newman admitted, however, that it would help plaintiff if he found some employment. This was apparently not limited to work involving heavy manual labor.

Dr. Newman believed that plaintiff's complaints of pain and numbness in his arm had a psychological basis. They were psychogenic in nature. He said he was not sure

whether the low back pain was psychogenic. There were no objective symptoms accounting for the pain. Dr. Newman testified that he considered but rejected the possibility that plaintiff was malingering, even though plaintiff appeared to meet several criteria of a person malingering. Dr. Newman felt that plaintiff would not recover from psychogenic pain disorder. He didn't believe working would "really help" plaintiff unless he could do the type of work he had done before the accident. The self-esteem he had achieved before the accident was largely built around a laboring job. Dr. Newman admitted, however, that it would help plaintiff if he found some employment. This was apparently not limited to work involving heavy manual labor.

Defendants presented an expert in the field of orthopedics, Dr. James Laborde. He evaluated plaintiff on behalf of ENSIDESA on December 7, 1987. Dr. Laborde took a history from plaintiff, took x-rays, and evaluated x-rays of plaintiff taken by others. He stated that the history and clinical diagnosis both pointed to nonorganic or psychogenic pain. However, he said that this diagnosis of nonorganic paid did not rule out an underlying problem. He also found degenerative changes, arthritis, in plaintiff's spine. These were present in 1983-84 x-rays. He found no evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome in plaintiff's wrist. He felt that plaintiff could return to light-duty work.

On cross-examination by counsel for plaintiff, Dr. Laborde admitted that ordinary x-rays will not directly show a nerve or disc problem. He went on to say, however, that it was his opinion that even if there is an actual herniated disc or nerve impingement, you cannot tell whether that is causing pain. Dr. Laborde said that all lumbar discs bulge to some extent, with the degree of bulging gradually

increasing with age as a part of the degenerative process. He said that there is no way to objectly determine whether a herniated disc is the result of a specific injury or a consequence of the normal degenerative process.

Dr. Rennie Culver, a psychiatrist, testified on behalf of defendants. Dr. Culver evaluated plaintiff on September 14, 1988. Dr. Culver, as did Dr. Laborde, saw plaintiff only once for examination in connection with this litigation. Neither of them ever treated plaintiff. Dr. Culver took a history of plaintiff and did a standard mental status examination. Dr. Culver stated that plaintiff only informed of the November 1982 accident and the 1986 gunshot wounds. Dr. Culver's impressions were that plaintiff was suffering form depression, had a psychogenic or somatoform pain disorder, and had a dependant personality. This was the exact same diagnosis Dr. Newman made. Dr. Culver did not render an opinion regarding the possibility of plaintiff's malingering. A diagnosis of malingering would have been inconsistent with Dr. Culver's diagnosis of somatoform or psychogenic pain disorder, which presupposes genuine symptoms of pain.

Dr. Culver testified that based upon the history given by plaintiff, the somatoform pain disorder first arose after plaintiff's November 1982 accident. But, he said he couldn't be certain; it could have arisen at any time. It was his opinion that the somatoform or psychogenic pain disorder resulted from plaintiff's depression. It was, he said, part of the depressive symptomatology. He also said that persons with dependent personalities were inclided to have psychogenic pain and were predisposed to depression. However, Dr. Culver agreed that the November 1982 injury was a cause of plaintiff's depression. He said that it appeared that following the injury, the quality of his fuc-

tioning "decreased significantly," and he became more depressed.

Defendants directed their attack to plaintiff's credibility and the testimony of medical experts whose opinions rested largely on histories given them by plaintiff.

The jury had before it much evidence upon which to evaluate plaintiff's credibility on the issues of causation as to damages. The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the role of an appellate court in reviewing factual determinations by juries made primarily on the credibility of witnesses in *Rosell v. Esco, supra.* The court stated:

> When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of facts' findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said. Where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may well find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. But where such factors are not present, and a factfinder's finding is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

Although the evidence showed that plaintiff had some minor injuries prior to his 1982 accident, including at least one to his back, the jury had before it evidence that

his current condition was the result of the 1982 accident. Even if they had some effect, such as rendering plaintiff more susceptible to a subsequent injury, it is well-settled that a tortfeasor is responsible for the consequences of its tort even though those damages are greter because of pre-existing conditiion. *Reck v. Stevens*, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979); *Kuck v. City of New Orleans*, 531 So.2d 1142 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).

Similarly, though there was evidence that plaintiff received three gunshot wounds in 1986, and was involved in an automobile accident in 1987 in which he may have received injuries, the evidence as a whole furnishes a basis for a finding that neither of these incidents was the cause of plaintiff's physical or psychogenic problems.

While the testimony of the medical experts conflicts in some areas, again we are unable to say that the evidence as a whole does not furnish a basis for the finding that the negligence of ARCASA and ENSIDESA caused damage to plaintiff, or that such a finding was clearly wrong. The issue for our consideration is the extent of damages.

However, while there is some evidence that plaintiff experiences pain in his arm, and that this pain could be related to his 1982 accident, the evidence does not furnish a finding that plaintiff has carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Watermeier, plaintiff's treating orthopedist, could state only that he had "an impression" that plaintiff was suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome. He had not made a definitive diagnosis. Also, Dr. Laborde, defendants' orthopedist, ruled out carpal tunnel syndrome. There was no other evidence that plaintiff was suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome. Therefore, the jury would have been clearly wrong in awarding any damages related to carpal tunnel syndrome.

2. *SPECIAL DAMAGES:*

A. *Future Medical Expenses:*

Future medical expenses must be established with some degree of certainty. *Wilson v. Magee,* 359 So.2d 315 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), modified on other grounds, 367 So.2d 314 (La. 1979). However, an award of future medical expenses is in great measure highly speculative and not susceptible of calculation with mathematical certainty. *Edwards v. Sims,* 294 So.2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), *reversed on other grounds* by *Harris v. Tenneco Oil Co.,* 563 So.2d 317 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).

Insofar as future medical expenses were concerned, Dr. Watermeier, plaintiff's treating orthopedist, saw a "possible" disc removal and bone graft fusion costing from $15,000.00 to $20,000.00. Another option, he said, were the $2,000.00 morphine epidurals every two months. He mentioned the Marcaine injections which he said plaintiff had been receiving, as of the time of trial, almost every month. He predicted plaintiff would need to continue receiving the Marcaine injections at $22.00 per injection. The jury could have reasonably awarded plaintiff future medical expenses in the amount of $20,000.00 for surgery, $22.00 per month for the future monthly Marcaine injections, and $2,000.00 every two months, or $12,000.00 per year, for morphine epidurals.

Dr. Watermeier testified that he expected that plaintiff would need to continue to see him every month or two at $34.00 a visit. He said that plaintiff's Percodan pain medication costs about $15.00 per month. Presumably, Dr. Watermeier felt that plaintiff would continue to need Percodans for the rest of his life, and continue to see him for the rest of his life. Dr. Watermeier did not personally give

an opinion as to plaintiff's life expectancy.

Dr. Newman stated that plaintiff would need to be treated in the future. The only specific course of treatment mentioned was relaxation therapy at intervals of perhaps every two weeks for one-half hour at a time. The cost would be $82.50 per half hour. Presumably, this would be for the rest of plaintiff's life.

We will assume that plaintiff needs to continue seeing Dr. Watermeier every month at $34.00 per month, or $408.00 per year; that he will continue to need Percodans at $15.00 per month or $180.00 per year; that he will need Marcine injections once a month at $22.00, or $264.00 per year; and that he would need threapy form Dr. Newman every two weeks for one-half hour at $82.50 a session or $2,145.00 per year. Add in the future morphine epidurals at $12,000.00 per year for a total annual expense of $14,997.00.

An expert economist presented by plaintiff testified that his work life expectancy was 10.1 years. The jury could have reasonably set his life expectancy at 70 years. Plaintiff was fifty-three years old at the time of trial, leaving 17 years of future medical expenses. His total annual future medical expenses for 17 years amounted to $254,949.00. Add to this the $20,000.00 for future surgery, for a total of $274,949.00. The jury awarded plaintiff $300,000.00. The award will be reduced to $274,949.00.

B. *Past Loss of Earnings:*

The jury awarded plaintiff $175,000.00 for past loss of earnings. Special damages for loss of earnings up to the time of trial should be calculated with a certain degree of mathematical certainty, and such awards are not subject to

the much discretions rule applicable to general damages. See *Cookmeyer v. Langston*, 487 So.2d 525 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); *Eddy v. Litton*, 586 So.2d 670 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); *writ denied*, 590 So.2d 1203 (La. 1992).

Dr. Philip Jeffress testified as an expert economist for plaintiff. Dr. Jeffress calculated that plaintiff's total past lost wages were $203,746.00. This figure was broken down into $141,365.00 for after tax wage lossses, and $62,381.00 for non-wage benefits. The figure was based on an annual income of $25,585.00 per year, based upon plaintiff's 1980, 1981 and 1982 earnings as reflected by plaintiff's W-2 forms. Dr. Jeffress also stated that he considered what other similarly situated longshoremen were earning. He said he did not consider any type of pay raise in making his calculations.

The estimate was also based on a work-life expectancy of 10.1 years, a figure derived from Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor. In arriving at these figures Dr. Jeffress assumed that longshoring work would be available to plaintiff. The figures did not take into account any slowing of port activity at the Port of New Orleans. Finally, Dr. Jeffress admitted that his figures and calculations were based upon the assumption that plaintiff could not ever return to work of any kind. He stated that if plaintiff had worked, that income would be deducted from his figures.

The lost fringe benefits were calculated by considering collective bargaining agreements for a per hour based amount that the employer sets aside or contributes in fringe benefits for longshoremen. He then simply calculated the number of hours plaintiff would have worked and multiplied it times the fringe benefit hourly figure.

However, when asked whether plaintiff's W-2 forms reflected vacation and holiday pay as earnings, Dr. Jeffress admitted that it looked like these amounts were included. He stated that if that was the case, his figures would have to be revised to take that into account. As will be discussed below, defendants' presented testimonial evidence that holiday and vacation pay were included as earnings. However, Dr. Jeffress made no amended calculations taking that factor into consideration.

The defense presented a witness, Win Niemand, who was then employed by the New Orleans Steamship Association on its labor relations staff. In his position, Niemand negotiated with the International Longshoremans' Association in collective bargaining. Niemand testified that vacation and holiday pay appear as earnings on a longshoreman's W-2 form, and that plaintiff's 1982 W-2 form reflected just such a figure.

Niemand also testified concerning welfare (medical) pension benefits. The welfare benefits covered plaintiff and his dependents. Niemand testified that someone such as plaintiff, who had been a longshoreman since 1968 and worked a certain number of hours, would be entitled to contributions towards his welfare and pension plans after a November 1982 injury. These contributions to the welfare and pension funds would be made for a maximum of 400 weeks, 7.6 years, as long as the injured person is receiving worker's compensation benefits. His coverage under the welfare plan for he and his dependents would be the same, excluding payment of any medical expenses related to the injury, as if he were working full time. His pension benefits would continue to accrue as if he were working full time.

Niemand also computed the amounts plaintiff would have earned between the time of his accident and the time

of trial based upon average hours worked by longshoremen in general, and average hours worked by plaintiff in previous years. Niemand's calculations were significantly lower than those by Dr. Jeffress. For instance, using contract years running from October through September, he calculated that plaintiff would have earned $12,000.00 in 1986-87, and $13,000.00 in 1987-88. He said these figures took into account low port activity and fewer average hours worked by longshoremen.

Defendants also presented an expert economist, Dr. Kenneth Boudreaux, who testified that plaintiff's past loss earnings amounted to $53,373.80. His figures included a reduction in the number of hours worked by longshoremen.

The jury could have reasonably found sufficient evidence to accept the figure supplied by Dr. Jeffress as to plaintiff's past lost wages in the amount of $141,365.00. We are unable to say that such a determination would be clearly wrong. However, it was established that Dr. Jeffress incorrectly included as lost fringe benefits holiday and vacation pay. Because he failed to amend his calculations to reflect this fact, the jury was clearly wrong in awarding the full amount of lost benefits which included holiday and vacation pay. the jury did not have sufficient evidence to determine what portion of Dr. Jeffress calculations for fringe benefits represented holiday and vacation pay. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish the amount of lost benefits with any reasonable degree of mathematical certainty, and the jury erred in awarding any amount of damages for this loss. We will amend the judgement to subtract the amount of $62,381.00 for loss of fringe benefits.

C. *Future Loss of Earnings:*

The jury trial found that plaintiff was entitled to $460,000.00 in damages for loss of future earnings. Before he can recover damages for future lost wages, a plaintiff must prove the loss with reasonable certainty. *Whatley v. Regional Transit Authority,* 563 So.2d 1194 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990), *writ denied,* 569 So.2d 965 (La. 1990). *See also, McGowan v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans,* 555 So.2d 472 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989). However, such damages need not be proven with mathematical certainty. *Whatley v. Regional Transit Authority, supra.* Generally, a reviewing court should affirm the award if it can be reasonably supported under an interpretation of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff. See *Bailes v. U.S.F. & G., Co.,* 512 So.2d 633 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff's own expert economist, Dr. Jeffress', only calculated plaintiff's future lost earnings to be $281,475.00, $189,732.00 in lost wages and $91,743.00 in lost fringe benefits. There was no evidence to substantiate a greater award, and any jury award above that must be considered as unsupported by the evidence. In addition, Dr. Jeffress' calculation regarding fringe benefits were again incorrectly based on holiday and vacation pay not being included as wages on plaintiff's W-2 form.

Defendants' expert, Dr. Boudreaux, calculated plaintiff's future lost earnings to be $4,748.00. Dr. Boudreaux arrived at his calculations based on plaintiff having a shorter work life expectancy than projected by Dr. Jeffress. Dr. Boudreaux also factored in plaintiff's being able to work at a job paying $4.10 per hour. This was apparently

based on the testimony of Jennifer Palmer, a vocational rehabilitation counselor presented as a witness by defendants. Ms. Palmer felt that plaintiff would be qualified to work as a cashier or a bank messenger.

Again, as in reviewing the award for past loss of earnings, we believe the jury could have reasonably accepted Dr. Jeffress' testimony and awarded plaintiff $189,732.00 for future lost wages, but not the $91,743.00 for future lost fringe benefits. Dr. Jeffress made no amended calculations to account for holiday and vacation pay being included in plaintiff's W-2 wages. His original calculations were incorrect. The jury could not have speculated as to what percentage of the total amount for lost future fringe benefits was represented by the holiday and vacation pay improperly included in the total amount. There was insufficient evidence to award anything greater than $189,732.00 for future loss of earnings. The jury was clearly wrong in awarding more than that amount.

We will amend the judgment of the trial court to reduce the damages for future loss of earnings to $189,732.00.

3. *GENERAL DAMAGES:*

The jury awarded plaintiff $325,000.00 in damages for past physical and mental pain, suffering and disability, and $450,000.00 for future physical and mental pain, suffering and disability. Defendants claim these damages are excessive and contrary to the law and evidence.

Before an appellate court can disturb a trial court's

award of general damages, the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making the award. Only after finding that the record shows that the trial court abused its discretion can the appellate court disturb the award, and then only to the extent of raising or lowering it to the highest or lowest point which would have been within the discretion afforded the trial court. *Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc.*, 341 So.2d 332 (La. 1977); *Reck v. Stevens*, 373 So.2d 498 (La. 1979); *Burton v. Berthelot, supra.* Before an appellate court questions a trial court award as inadequate or excessive, it must look not to prior awards, but to the individual circumstances of the instant case. *Reck v. Stevens* 373 So.2d at 501.

As a result of the accident plaintiff underwent a lumbar laminectomy and a spinal fusion. He has suffered significant pain since the accident and will continue to experience that pain the rest of his life. He takes pain medication prescribed by Dr.Watermeir and gets monthly injections to further relieve his pain symptoms. He has also had morphine epidurals, injections of morphine directly into his spine, to relieve pain. Dr. Watermeir testified that plaintiff cannot return to work as a longshoreman and would have trouble doing even light duty work because of his injuries. Dr. Newman's testimony supports the view that the accident and resulting injuries and complications have adversely impacted plaintiff's mental health, and will continue to do so the rest of his life. According to Dr. Newman, plaintiff's sense of self-worth was directly tied to his ability to earn a living as a longshoreman and provide for his family.

Plaintiff testified that he worked as a longshoreman for 1968 until his 1982 injury. He said he loved his job.

After the accident he stopped getting along with his wife. He felt as if he could not get himself back together after the accident. Despite his two surgeries he still experiences pain.

Considering all of the evidence, however, we find the awards for both past and future general damages are a clear abuse of discretion. After reviewing awards made for similar injuries, we reduce both awards to $250,000.00, which we believe are the highest amounts that would have been within the discretion of the jury to award.

INDEMNIFICATION

The cross-claims of ARCASA, the owner of the vessel, and ENSIDESA, the charterer of the vessel, were severed and tried before the court without a jury. The trial court dismissed the claims of both parties. Both parties now appeal. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the cross-claim filed by ENSIDESA, but reverse the dismissal of the cross-claim filed by ARCASA.

In support of its cross-claim for indemnity, ENSIDESA argues that ARCASA had officers and crew present during the offloading and submits that, if the discharge was unsafe, one of the ARCASA personnel had the opportunity and the duty to stop it. We reject this argument. The evidence shows that the cause of the accident was not the unsafe offloading of the cargo, but the loading and stowing of the cargo, for which the jury found ENSIDESA 85% at fault and ARCASA 15% at fault. The evidence further showed that the cargo was being offloaded as safely as possible by the only means available. The trial

court judgment dismissing ENSIDESA's cross-claim is therefore affirmed.

ARCASA, the owner of the vessel, bases its cross-claim for indemnity on the contract or standard GENCON charter party entered into by ENSIDESA and ARCASA. Part I, § 15 of the charter party agreement states, in pertinent part:

> Loading and discharging costs (state alternative (a) or (b) of Cl. 5; also indicate if vessel is gearless)

In the box provided in Part I § 15 was typed "See clause 5 (b)," indicating that the parties chose clause 5 (b) of Part II of the charter party to govern their contractual rights and responsibilities insofar as the "loading and discharging costs." Clause 5 of Part II of the charter party provides:

> **5. Loading Discharging Costs**
> (b) F.i.o. and free stowed trimmed
> The cargo shall be brought into the holds, loaded, stowed and or trimmed and taken from the holds and discharged by the Charterers or their agents, *free of any risk, liability and expense whatsoever to the owners.* (Emphasis added.)

The contract language quoted above unequivocally relieves ARCASA from any liability for injuries incurred during the loading or offloading of the cargo in question. ENSIDESA nevertheless argues that the agreement should not relieve ARCASA from liability for the plaintiff's injuries in this case, citing *Woods v. Sammisa Co.*,

Ltd., 873 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), in which a charterer was held liable for injuries despite the following contract language based on Clause 8 of the New York Produce Exchange party:

> The Captain (although appointed by the Owners) shall be under the orders and directions of the charterers as regards employment and agency; and the charterers are to load, stow, trim and discharge the cargo *at their expense* under the supervision of the Captain who is to sign Bills of lading for Cargo as presented in conformity with the Mate's or Tally Clerk's receipts without prejudice to this Charter Party. (Emphasis added).

We hold that the result in this case is not governed by *Woods* because the two agreements in question are vastly different on the question of liability for injuries incurred in loading and unloading cargo. The agreement in the instant case expressly provides that ARCASA is to be completely free of "risk, liability and expense," while the New York agreement in *Woods* refers only to expense, without making any reference to risk or liability. The different language demands a different result. ARCASA is entitled to indemnity from ENSIDESA for the 15% of the liability imposed by the jury for plaintiff's injuries.

Accordingly, the trial court judgment dismissing ARCASA's cross-claim against ENSIDESA is reversed. ENSIDESA is ordered to provide indemnity to ARCASA for its portion of the plaintiff's damages.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment

of the trial court in part, and amend it to order ENSIDESA to indemnify ARCASA for ARCASA's proportionate share of the damages awarded to plaintiff. We further amend the judgment of the trial court to award damages, excluding past medical expenses, as follows:

Future medical expenses;	$ 274,949.00
Past physical and mental pain and suffering and disability from date of accident to date of trial;	$ 250,000.00
Future physicial and mental pain and suffering and disability;	$ 250,000.00
Past loss of earnings or earning capacity from date of accident to trial;	$ 141,365.00
Future loss of earnings or earning capacity.	$ 189,732.00
TOTAL	$ 1,106,046.00

We affirm the judgment as amended and in all other respects.

REVERSED IN PART; AMENDED; AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

APPENDIX B

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

JERRY YOUNG	NO. 90-CA-1107
versus	COURT OF APPEAL
ARMADORES de CABO-TAJE, S.A. AND K & B EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.	FOURTH CIRCUIT
	STATE OF LOUISIANA

Clerk's Office, New Orleans, **MAY 12 1993**

DEAR SIR:

REHEARING WAS THIS DAY REFUSED.

APPENDIX C

Jerry YOUNG

v.

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A. and K & B Equipment Company, Inc.

No. 93-C-1592.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 1, 1993.

Prior report: La.App. 617 So.2d 517.

In re Young, Jerry;—Plaintiff(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 90CA-1107; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. "I", No. 84—17780.

Denied.

DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.

MARCUS, J., not on panel.

Jerry YOUNG

v.

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A. and K & B Equipment Company, Inc.

No. 93-C-1607.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 1, 1993.

Prior report: La.App. 617 So.2d 517.

In re Empress Nacional Siderurgica SA;— Defendant(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 90CA-1107; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. "I", No. 84-17780.

Denied.

MARCUS, J., not on panel.

Jerry YOUNG

v.

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A. and K & B Equipment Company, Inc.

No. 93-C-1614.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 1, 1993.

Prior report: La.App. 617 So.2d 517.

In re Armadores de Cabotaje S.A.;—Defendant(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 90CA-1107; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. "I", No. 84-17780.

Denied.

MARCUS, J., not on panel.

APPENDIX D

CIVIL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS
STATE OF LOUISIANA

DIVISION "I"

NO. 84-17780 **DOCKET NO.4**

JERRY YOUNG

VERSUS

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A., ET AL

FILED
APR 26 1989

FILED: _____ _____
DEPUTY CLERK

INTERROGATORIES TO THE JURY

INTERROGATORY NO. 1

Was Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. ("ARCASA"), owner of the vessel negligent?

YES ✓ 9 **NO 2**

If your answer is "Yes" , proceed to Interrogatory No. 2. If your answer is "No", then skip No. 2 and proceed

to Interrogatory No. 3.

INTERROGATORY NO. 2

If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages?

YES 9 NO 2

Proceed to Interrogatory No. 3.

INTERROGATORY NO. 3

Was Expresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. ("ENSIDESA"), as charterer of the vessel and/or the loading stevedore, negligent?

YES 9 NO 2

If your answer is "Yes", proceed to Interrogatory No. 4. If your answer is "No", and your answer to either Interrogatory No. 1 or Interrogatory No. 2 is also "No", then proceed no further, date and sign this form on the last page and notify the Clerk that you have a verdict.

If your answer to Interrogatory No. 3 is "Yes", then proceed to Interrogatory No. 4.

INTERROGATORY NO. 4

If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages?

YES ✓ 9 NO

If your answer to Interrogatory No. 4 is "No", and your answer to either Interrogatory No. 1 or Interrogatory No. 2 is also "No", proceed no further, date and sign the form on the last page and notify the Clerk that you have a verdict.

If your answer to Interrogatory No. 4 is "Yes", then proceed to Interrogatory No. 5.

INTERROGATORY NO. 5

What percentage of negligence do you assign to the following parties (if any)?

Answer in terms of percentages (from 0 to 100):

ARCASA:	15%
ENSIDESA:	85%
JERRY YOUNG:	0%

NOTE: the total of the percentages given in your answer should equal 100%. If your answer to Interrogatory No. 1 is "No", then you should answer ARCASA's percentage of negligence as "O". If your answer to Interrogatory No. 3 is "No", then you should answer ENSIDESA's percentage of negligence as "0".

INTERROGATORY NO. 6

What monetary award, if any, do you award to Jerry Young, for the following (without adjustment or reduction

by application of any percentage you may have given in answer to Interrogatory No. 5)?

Answer in dollars: 1,700,000

a. Future medical expenses;	$ 300,000.00
b. Past physical and mental pain and suffering and disability from date of casualty to date of trial;	$ 325,000.00
c. Future physicial and mental pain and suffering and disability;	$ 450,000.00
d. Past loss of earnings or earning capacity from date of casualty to date of trial;	$ 175,000.00
e. Future loss of earnings or earning capacity.	$ 460,000.00
TOTAL	$ 1,700,000.00

INTERROGATORY NO. 7

If you have awarded plaintiff any damages:

(a) Do you find that there are any special circumstances why he should *not* recover prejudgment interest?

YES NO ✓

(b) If your answer to the foregoing is "NO", what interest rate is proper, expressed in percentages? 5%

SIGN AND DATE THIS FORM AND RETURN IT TO THE COURTROOM.

New Orleans, Louisiana
April 26, 1989.

/s/ Illegible
Foreperson

/s/ Bernette J. Johnson
JUDGE

APPENDIX E

CIVIL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS
STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 84-17780 DIVISION "I" DOCKET #4

JERRY YOUNG

versus

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A., and
K & B EQUIPMENT COMPANY

FILED:
MAY 24 1989

PARTIAL AND FINAL JUDGEMENT

This case was tried before a jury on April 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25 and 26, 1989. Present: Fredericka Homberg Wicker, attorney for the plaintiff; Gerard T. Gelpi, Randall C. Coleman, III, and Brian L. Thompson for defendant Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. ("ARCASA"); Miles P. Clements, Andrew S. de Klerk for defendant Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. ("ENSIDESA").

The Petition of Intervention pursuant to the provisions of 33 U.S. CA§901 et seq. for reimbursement of sums paid by Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc. and the Home Indemnity Company under the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act as well as the Cross Claim of Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. (ARCASA) against Empresa

Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. (ENSIDESA) and the Cross Claim of Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. (ENSIDESA) against Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. (ARCASA) have been severed and will be tried later by the Court in a separate proceeding, thus having no effect on the finality of the instant judgement;

The Court, concluding that the jury's verdict is consistent with the law and the evidence:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that:

1. On the main demand there be judgement rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Jerry Young, and against the defendants, Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. ("ARCASA") and Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. ("ENSIDESA"), jointly and *in solido*, for One Million Seven Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,700,000), with 11.5% annual interest thereon from April 26, 1989, until paid, and for all costs of the main demand; and

2. Further, prejudgment interest is awarded to the Plaintiff at the rate of 5% per annum on the amount of $500,000, the amount awarded by the jury for accrued damages, to run from October 25, 1984 until April 26, 1989, totalling $112,500 which the aforesaid defendants are condemned to pay jointly and *in solido*.

Judgement signed in New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23rd day of May, 1989.

/s/ Bernette J Johnson

JUDGE BERNETTE JOHNSON

VERIFIED

A TRUE COPY

/s/ L. Lewis

DEPUTY CLERK, CIVIL DISTRICT
PARISH OF ORLEANS
STATE OF LA.

APPENDIX F

CIVIL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS
STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 84-17780 **DIVISION "I"** **DOCKET #4**

JERRY YOUNG

versus

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A., and
K & B EQUIPMENT COMPANY

FILED: _____ _____
DEPUTY CLERK

AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT

This case was tried before a jury on April 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25 and 26, 1989. On August 18, 1989, the Court heard the following motions filed by the parties: Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial filed by defendants, Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. (ENSIDESA) and Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. (ARCASA); Motion of ARCASA to Amend the Form of the Judgment; motions of the intervenors, Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc. and the Home Indemnity Company, to recognize their lien. Having concluded that the jury's verdict is consistent with the law and the evidence, and having considered the memoranda and argument of counsel.

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that:

1. In accordance with the finding of the jury that ARCASA was 15% at fault and ENSIDESA was 85% at fault, further in accordance with the court's finding that medical expenses incurred by petitioner from date of injury until April 26, 1989 total $62,959.60, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Jerry Young, and against the defendants, ARCASA and ENSIDESA, jointly and *in solido*, for ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE AND 60/100 ($1,762,959.60) DOLLARS, with legal interest thereon from April 26, 1989, until paid, and for all costs of the main demand; and

2. Prejudgment interest is awarded to plaintiff at the rate of 5% per annum on the amount of $500,000.00, the amount awarded by the jury for accrued damages, to run from October 25, 1984 until April 26, 1989, totaling $112,500.00 which the aforesaid defendants are condemned to pay jointly and *in solido;* Further, prejudgment interest is awarded to the intervenor at the rate of 5% per annum on the past medical bills paid by the intervenor on the plaintiff's behalf totalling $62,959.60, such interest to accrue as each bill was paid.

3. The motions of ARCASA and ENSIDESA for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, for new trial, are hereby denied.

4. Judgement is rendered in favor of Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc. (now known as Cooper/T.

Smith Stevedoring, Co., Inc.) and the Home Indemnity Company, intervenors in this action, said intervenors hereby having a lien on the proceeds of the plaintiff's net recovery in this case, which lien includes $62,959.60 in medical expenses and $89,530.94 in weekly compensation benefits, for a total of $151,489.54 paid to and/or on behalf of the plaintiff as of April 14, 1989; and

5. The intervenors' lien shall also include all other compensation and medical benefits paid to and/or on behalf of the plaintiff since April 14, 1989, until the date said lien is collected, together with legal interest to accrue as each payment is made; and

6. The cross-claims of ARCASA and ENSIDESA seeking indemnity and/or contribution from each other be dismissed, each party to bear it's own costs.

Judgement signed in New Orleans, Louisiana, this 1st day of September, 1989

/s/ Bernette Johnson

JUDGE BERNETTE JOHNSON

APPENDIX G

CIVIL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
PARISH OF ORLEANS
STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 84-17780 DIVISION "I" DOCKET NO. 4

JERRY YOUNG

VERSUS

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A. and
K&B EQUIPMENT COMPANY

FILED: _____ _____
DEPUTY CLERK

FINAL JUDGMENT

On October 6, 1989 the Motion To Reconsider And For Remittitur was heard by the Court. Defendant, Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. ("ARCASA"), had also joined in the motion of Empresa Nacional Siderugica, S.A. ("ENSIDESA"). The Motion To Reconsider And For Remittitur was set for hearing on motion of plaintiff, Jerry Young.

Having considered the pleadings and the argument of counsel;

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion To Reconsider And For Remittitur is denied. No further motions will be considered by this Court and this judgment of the Court is final.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 6th day of October, 1989.

VERIFIED

/s/ Bernette J. Johnson

JUDGE BERNETTE JOHNSON¢

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that I have on this 6th day of October, 1989, served a copy of the foregoing pleading on counsel for all parties to this proceeding, by hand delivery.

/s/ Miles P. Clements

MILES P. CLEMENTS

(2) (3)

No. 93-1040 and No. 93-1068

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JAN 27 1994
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1993

NO. 93-1040

EMPRESA NACIONALE SIDERURGICA, S.A.,

Petitioner,

versus

JERRY YOUNG,

Respondent.

NO. 93-1068

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A.,

Petitioner,

versus

JERRY YOUNG,

Respondent.

Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

LAWRENCE S. KULLMAN (#7884)
LEWIS & KULLMAN
2615 Pan American Life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: 504/588-1500
Counsel of Record

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER (#6977)
434 Bellaire Drive
New Orleans, Louisiana 70124
Telephone: 504/482-1887

Attorneys for Respondent, Jerry Young

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

127 pp

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1

II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10

III. ENSIDESA'S WRIT APPLICATION SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BY THE APPLICATION OF LOUISIANA CODE OF EVIDENCE ARTICLE 606B. 11

IV. ARCASA'S WRIT APPLICATION SHOULD ALSO BE DENIED 22

A. The holding below does not conflict with *Derr* as properly interpreted 22

B. Granting this writ would not serve the interests of uniformity 25

C. Your Honors should refuse to grant the writ because the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal properly interpreted the duties owed under 33 United States Code section 905(b) and found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict 26

V. CONCLUSION 30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

Carpenter v. Universal Star Shipping SA, 924 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1991) 29

Coody v. Richardson, 569 So. 2d 1012 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), *cert. den'd*, 572 So. 2d 90 (1991) 23

Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K., 835 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1987), *cert. den'd*, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988) 22-25, 26

Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1975), *cert. den'd*, 424 U.S. 917 (1976) 18

Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, S.A., 730 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1984) 22, 25, 26

Kirsch v. Plovidba, 971 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1992) 24

Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd., 656 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1983) 22, 25, 26

Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969) 26

Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981) 18

McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915) 13-15

Riggs v. Scindia Steam Nav. Co., 8 F.3d 1442 (9th Cir. 1993) 22, 27-29

Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981) 8, 24, 26-27, 30

Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) 19

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

State v. Shillcutt, 341 N.W.2d 716 (Wis. App. 1983) 19

State v. Shillcutt, 350 N.W.2d 686 (Wis. 1984) 19

Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) ... 13, 16, 21

Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981), *cert. den'd*, 459 U.S. 967 (1982).. 22, 27, 28, 29

United States v. Casamayor, 837 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir. 1988), *cert. den'd sub nom. Barker v. United States*, 488 U.S. 1017 (1989) 18

United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1980), *cert. den'd*, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980) 17-18, 21

Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd., 873 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), *cert. den'd*, 493 U.S. 1050 (1990)..... 22

Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A., 617 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) 9, 12, 25

Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A., 625 So. 2d 171 (La. 1993) 12

OTHER:

33 U.S.C. § 901, *et seq.* (Longshore & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act)..... 1, 27, 29

33 U.S.C. § 905(b) 1, 22, 23, 24, 29

House Report, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4704..... 27-28

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1793..... 23

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 606B 10, 11, 13

LSA – R.S. § 22:655, *et seq.* (Louisiana's Direct Action Statute) 9

Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 606(b) ... 11, 15, 18, 21

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent, Jerry Young, a longshoreman, brought suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, seeking damages for injuries he sustained while off-loading steel beams from a vessel, the M/V LORENA, in the Port of New Orleans, Louisiana. The defendants were Empresa Nacionale Siderurgica, S.A., (Ensidesa), a Spanish steel manufacturer that had loaded the cargo in Aviles, Spain, and chartered the vessel for the voyage from Spain to New Orleans; and Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A., (Arcasa), the owner and operator of the vessel. The plaintiff claimed that Arcasa and Ensidesa were both liable for negligence under section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. § 901, *et seq.*; 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), hereinafter referred to as "905(b)") and, additionally, that Ensidesa, as the stevedoring company that had loaded the vessel, was liable for negligence under the general maritime law.

On November 22, 1982, Jerry Young, then a 46-year-old experienced longshoreman employed by Cooper Stevedoring, was working with his gang in the No. 2 hold of the M/V LORENA, off-loading steel beams. Young App. 43a.

The beams could have been stowed on either the edges (the "H" position) or on the flanges (the "I" position). When the beams are stowed in the "H" position, the

edges of the beams cut into dunnage placed to separate the layers of beams. The extent of the damage to the dunnage depends on the weight of the stow (that is, how high the steel beams are loaded within the hold of the vessel) and the quantity and quality of the wood dunnage used. Stowage in the "H" position also creates an uneven surface on which the men have to walk while off-loading the cargo. Young App. 44a.

In contrast, stowage in the "I" position results in the dunnage resting on the beams' flat flanges, thus preventing the dunnage from being cut. Stowage in this manner also gives the longshoremen a flat surface upon which to walk and work. Young App. 44a.

Ensidesa clearly knew that use of the "H" method to stow the steel beams tends to cut and crush the dunnage between the tiers of steel beams. Ensidesa further knew that, when the dunnage was crushed, it made safe off-loading with standard rigging very difficult, if not impossible.[1] Young App. 45a.

Indisputedly, the master of the M/V LORENA (an Arcasa employee) was the person ultimately responsible for the manner in which the cargo was stowed and was a

---

[1] When Ensidesa's own longshoremen, in Spain, encountered crushed dunnage, they used a giant clamp to lift the beams sufficiently to replace the crushed dunnage, thereby permitting the placement of chains for off-loading. Ensidesa's director of the Port of Aviles had been to the United States and observed American stevedoring operations and knew that the giant clamps used by Ensidesa in Spain were not utilized by stevedores in the United States, who were unaware of their existence. Young App. 45a.

co-participant with Ensidesa's port captain in preparing, approving and ultimately accepting the stowage.

Serafin Garcia testified in pertinent part as follows:

> Q. Mr. Garcia, it's my understanding that you are employed by Ensidesa as the director of the Port of Aviles?
>
> A. Yes.
>
> . . .
>
> Q. As port director, you supervise all activity carried on at the port?
>
> A. Yes.
>
> Q. Does that include responsibility for the manner in which vessels are stowed?
>
> A. Yes.

(R. Vol. V at 350-51.)

> Q. The master of the vessel works with Captain Cazon as operations director of the port to work out a stowage plan prior to loading any vessel; is that right?
>
> A. Yes.

(R. Vol. V at 352.)

> Q. In 1982 all steel beams being loaded from the port of Aviles were loaded in the H method; is that right?
>
> A. Yes.

(R. Vol. V at 353.)

> Q. In 1982 Ensidesa chartered the M/V Lorena from the company Arcasa; is that right?

A. Yes.

(R. Vol. V at 354.)

Q. If you know, is the master of the Lorena employed by the owner of the Lorena?

A. The captain in 1982 of the vessel as well as the captain in 1989 to date wherever the vessel may be is always an employee of the owners of the vessel, whoever they may be.

(R. Vol. V at 356.)

Q. And it is Ensidesa and the master of the vessel who prepare the stowage plan, correct?

A. Yes.

(R. Vol. V at 361.)

Q. Do you know, Mr. Garcia, after the vessel is loaded and before it leaves the Port of Aviles, does the captain of the vessel have to accept the vessel from Ensidesa?

A. Yes, correct, because the captain of the vessel is personally all the time the responsible person of the cargo, since he is responsible for the delivering the merchandise to designation in the best possible conditions.

(R. Vol. V at 364.)

Florentino Cezon Cuiroz testified further as follows:

Q. By whom are you employed, sir?

A. By Ensidesa.

Q. What is your job, sir?

A. Chief of port operations for Ensidesa in Aviles.

Q. Do you supervise stevedoring operations in the port?

A. Yes. . . .

Q. Did you use the same stowage method for voyages as for the voyage in 1982 for the M/V Lorena?

A. Yes, exactly the same.

Q. Have you loaded many other vessels in the past in the same manner you loaded the Lorena?

A. Yes, and it's still being done the same way today.

(R. Vol. V at 406-07.)

Q. And you always review those plans with the master or captain of the vessel?

A. Yes.

Q. And the captain or master of the vessel must approve those plans, correct?

A. Yes, because he's the responsible person.

. . .

Q. When you prepare the plans to load the vessel, is it your responsibility to take into consideration the safety of the stow?

A. Yes.

. . .

Q. As part of your job when you prepare the stowage plan, is it part of your responsibility to prepare a stow so that the cargo is stowed in a safe manner?

A. Yes.

(R. Vol. V at 410-12.)

Q. Who has the last word with regard to the manner of a stow?

A. The captain.

(R. Vol. V at 415.)

After the M/V LORENA arrived at the Port of New Orleans, Cooper Stevedoring began the off-loading process. Captain Ross, a marine surveyor employed by Cooper, the off-loading stevedore, to monitor the off-loading, found that the dunnage between the tiers of beams had become compressed and/or broken up, creating a dangerous stow. Young App. 47a.

As the longshoremen removed cargo from the hold of the LORENA and reached lower tiers of beams, the dunnage was found to be more and more crushed until the steel beams virtually rested on top of each other, without any separation at all. Young App. 46a-47a.

In these circumstances, it became impossible for the longshoremen to insert the wires far enough onto the beams to lift them and place the chains. The longshoremen had to "nip" the ends of the beams; that is, someone managed to lift one end of a beam a short distance while fellow longshoremen threw wood chunks under the beam and then forced the wire back farther. In effect, the longshoremen were having to put in dunnage after the cargo had been stowed. Young App. 48a.

Captain Ross testified that he had never seen a stow of steel beams as bad as the one he observed on the M/V LORENA in November 1982. Young App. 47a.

Mr. Young's longshore gang had no alternative but to continue to off-load the vessel as carefully as they could.

In due course, while the longshoremen were attempting to "nip the beams," a wire slipped off a beam and a T-bar, part of the lifting tackle, began swinging wildly through the hold and, in the process, it hit Jerry Young in the head and knocked him unconscious and caused him to fall onto the steel beams, suffering severe injuries to his back. Young App. 49a.

As of the time of trial, about seven years later, Mr. Young had been hospitalized eight times; he had had three surgical procedures on his back; he had received anesthetic injections into the muscles around his spine on approximately 40 occasions; he had been hospitalized to have morphine injected into his spine on at least three occasions; he was regularly taking an oral narcotic pain medication; and he was permanently and totally disabled. Young App. 49a-51a, 64a.

The medical testimony established that Mr. Young would probably continue to suffer to the same extent for the remainder of his life and he would continue to require significant ongoing treatment for the relief of his symptoms, including, *inter alia*, hospitalization and probably additional surgery. Young App. 64a.

In addition, Mr. Young suffered substantial psychological injury as a result of his injuries and resulting inability to work. As Dr. Robert Newman, his treating psychiatrist testified, Mr. Young's whole sense of self was tied up in his ability to do his job and do it well. Young App. 65a. The combination of the physical disability and pain coupled with the vocational disability caused Mr.

Young to suffer severe depression and anxiety. According to Dr. Newman, he had difficulty in sleeping, loss of appetite and decreased interest in sex. Young App. 65a.

In January 1989 Mr. Young's depression got worse, and he told Dr. Newman that he had no hope and saw no future for himself, and he was seriously thinking about suicide. Young App. 65a.

As Dr. Newman testified at trial, Mr. Young's "image of himself had been damaged beyond repair" by his injury and resulting disability. Young App. 65a.

The matter went to trial in May, 1989.

The trial court charged the jury on the applicable law in accordance with the decision of this Court in *Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De Los Santos*, 451 U.S. 156 (1981). *See* Young App. 21a-25a.

After the jury had retired for its deliberations, it returned to the courtroom at about 8:30 p.m. reporting that it had not reached a decision. R. Vol. VII at 48. At that time no juror gave any indication that any other juror was acting improperly or deliberating in a biased or prejudiced manner.

At 10:30 p.m. the jury returned for the second time and returned its verdict, voting 9 to 2 in Mr. Young's favor, awarding $1.7 million in damages and holding defendant Ensidesa 85 per cent liable and defendant Arcasa 15 per cent liable. R. Vol. VII at 50-51.

The jury was polled and confirmed its verdict. Again, no juror voiced any objection to the manner of the deliberations or as to any prejudice or bias that had affected the jury's decision-making. R. Vol. VII at 51-54.

At no time subsequent to the jury's rendering its verdict did any juror approach the court with any comment regarding the manner of the deliberations.

Later, Ensidesa moved for a new trial and, in support thereof, attached an affidavit from one of the dissenting jurors. Ensidesa App. 81a-83a. Ensidesa subsequently supplemented this memorandum with two additional affidavits. Ensidesa App. 89a-91a, 92a-94a.

Ensidesa's position was that the affidavit testimony was sufficient to warrant the granting of a new trial. *At no time did Ensidesa request that the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing, and its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial were submitted to the court for decision after full argument in open court.*

Ensidesa and Arcasa both appealed from that judgment.[2]

The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment against both defendants, but reduced the plaintiff's award from $1,700,000 to $1,106,000 plus medical expenses. The court of appeal found Arcasa was entitled to complete contractual indemnity from Ensidesa. *Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.*, 617 So. 2d 517, 545 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).

---

[2] Neither Arcasa nor Ensidesa have ever paid the judgment or posted bond for their various appeals. Arcasa is "defunct," but was covered by a policy of "reinsurance," which is alleged to be not subject to Louisiana's Direct Action Statute. LSA – R.S. § 22:655, *et seq.* Ensidesa still sells steel to United States customers, but claims it has no assets in this country subject to seizure and so is "judgment proof" in this country.

II.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Ensidesa contends that it was denied due process of law by the application of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 606B. Ensidesa is mistaken. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision is consistent with the decisions of this Court prohibiting the admissibility of testimony by jurors about jury deliberations to impeach the validity of a jury verdict. The jurors had ample opportunity to object to any bias or misconduct. The kinds of complaints made here against Juror Granderson's statements during deliberations have been consistently held inadmissible as competent evidence to impeach a jury verdict. Moreover, Ensidesa never asked the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue, and should not now be heard to complain.

Arcasa seeks writs to correct what it perceives as a split in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals concerning the duties owed by a vessel owner to a discharging stevedore. But the holding of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal below does not present the conflict that Arcasa contends exists by reason of other United States Court of Appeals decisions.

For these reasons, the decision of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal should not be disturbed.

III.

ENSIDESA'S WRIT APPLICATION SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BY THE APPLICATION OF LOUISIANA'S CODE OF EVIDENCE ARTICLE 606B.

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 606B, like its counterpart, Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, prohibits a juror from offering testimony concerning jury deliberations to impeach the validity of a verdict.

In this regard, Louisiana Code of Evidence article 606B states as follows:

> Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror . . . Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.

After the verdict was rendered, counsel for Ensidesa, without leave of court, obtained the affidavits of three jurors concerning statements made by another juror, Mr. Granderson, during the course of the jury's deliberations.

Ensidesa states at page 12 of its Application for Writ of Certiorari that it requested a hearing before the trial

court on its motion for a new trial on the issue of juror misconduct, arguing, " 'This court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.' *Smith v. Phillips*, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982)." **But, in fact, Ensidesa at no time moved for an evidentiary hearing with regard to its allegation of juror misconduct. Ensidesa App., Motion for a New Trial, 71a-77a; 78a-80a; 84a-88a.** The trial court set Ensidesa's motion for a new trial for hearing (Young App. 26a), and a hearing was had in open court. Ensidesa did not attempt to call jurors to testify, choosing to rely upon the three affidavits it had submitted, which were, of course, not subject to cross-examination by respondent.

At the hearing on Ensidesa's motion for a new trial, the trial court considered the affidavits of the three jurors, but denied Ensidesa's motion.

On appeal, Ensidesa contended that the trial court had erred in refusing to grant its motion for a new trial because of the "evidence" of jury misconduct.[3] The court of appeal rejected this argument, holding the affidavits of these three jurors "as to matters or statements made by . . . [Mr. Granderson] during deliberations are clearly inadmissible to question the validity of the jury verdict." *Young*, 617 So. 2d at 534.

---

[3] Ensidesa first complained of an alleged failure to grant an evidentiary hearing in its writ of certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court (Ensidesa App. 107a), which writ was denied. *Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.*, 625 So. 2d 171 (La. 1993).

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 606B, the trial court's reliance thereon to deny Ensidesa's motion for a new trial, and the court of appeal's decision are all entirely consistent with the decisions of this Court prohibiting the admissibility of testimony by jurors about jury deliberations to impeach the validity of a jury verdict. *McDonald v. Pless*, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); *Tanner v. United States*, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).

In *McDonald v. Pless*, 238 U.S. 264, the plaintiffs brought suit to recover $4,000 allegedly owed for legal services. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in the plaintiffs' favor for $2,916. The defendant moved to set aside the verdict on the basis that the jury had not deliberated about the evidence, but rather had agreed to a quotient verdict by dividing what each of them individually thought the verdict should be by 12. Further, it was alleged that one juror had voted to give the plaintiff nothing and three had voted for $5,000, obviously more than the plaintiffs' demand. After the quotient was calculated, some jurors objected because of the inclusion of the three $5,000 votes, but, ultimately, the protesting jurors finally yielded to the argument that they were bound by the previous agreement, and the quotient verdict was rendered accordingly.

At the hearing on the motion to set aside the verdict, the defendant called to the stand one of the jurors who was sworn to testify as a witness. The trial court refused to allow the juror to testify on the grounds that he was "incompetent to impeach his own verdict." 238 U.S. at 266.

This Court was then called upon to decide whether the trial court had erred in refusing to consider the proffered testimony and whether the defendant had been

denied due process of law. In holding that the trial court had not erred and that the defendant was not entitled to relief, Your Honors reasoned as follows:

> [T]he weight of authority is that a juror cannot impeach his own verdict. The rule is based upon controlling considerations of a public policy which in these cases chooses the lesser of two evils. When the affidavit of a juror, as to the misconduct of himself or the other members of the jury, is made the basis of a motion for a new trial the court must choose between redressing the injury of the private litigant and inflicting the public injury which would result if jurors were permitted to testify as to what had happened in the jury room.
>
> These two conflicting considerations are illustrated in the present case. If the facts were as stated in the affidavit, the jury adopted an arbitrary and unjust method in arriving at their verdict, and the defendant ought to have had relief, if the facts could have been proved by witnesses who were competent to testify in a proceeding to set aside the verdict. But let it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private

> deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation – to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.

238 U.S. at 267-68.

Your Honors went on to state that:

> [T]here might be instances in which such testimony of the juror could not be excluded without "violating the plainest principles of justice." This might occur in the gravest and most important cases; and without attempting to define the exceptions, or to determine how far such evidence might be received by the judge on his own motion, it is safe to say that there is nothing in the nature of the present case warranting a departure from what is unquestionably the general rule, that the losing party cannot, in order to secure a new trial, use the testimony of jurors to impeach their verdict.

238 U.S. at 268-69.

The policy considerations underlying this Court's decision in *McDonald v. Pless* were ultimately codified in Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides as follows:

> Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . . a jury may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict . . . or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or

> whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. . . .

This rule has been consistently interpreted by the courts to exclude any offer of testimony by jurors with respect to their internal deliberations for the purpose of setting aside their verdict. In *Tanner v. United States*, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), Your Honors refused to allow testimony concerning juror intoxication and marijuana and cocaine abuse that the defendant contended had deprived him of his Sixth Amendment guarantee of a "competent jury." This Court wrote as follows:

> [L]ong-recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry. Petitioners' Sixth Amendment interests in an unimpaired jury, on the other hand, are protected by several aspects of the trial process. The suitability of an individual for the responsibility of jury service, of course, is examined during *voir dire*. . . . Moreover, jurors are observable by each other, and may report inappropriate juror behavior to the court *before* they render a verdict. . . . Finally, after the trial a party may seek to impeach the verdict by non-juror evidence of misconduct. . . .
>
> In light of these other sources of protection of petitioners' right to a competent jury, we conclude that the District Court did not err in deciding, based on the inadmissibility of juror testimony . . . that an additional postverdict evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.

483 U.S. at 127 (citations omitted).

The seriousness of the allegations at issue in *Tanner* shows the great importance the Supreme Court has

attached to the policy of prohibiting postverdict intrusions into juror deliberations in the absence of information as to any *extraneous* or *outside* influence on their decision-making. Here, the allegations raised by the three juror affidavits are entirely directed at matters inherent in the jury's decision-making process and deliberation and in no way suggest that any "extraneous" or "outside" influence was brought to bear within the jury room to affect the jury's verdict.

Rather, it is alleged that the jury was corrupted by the presence and statements of Mr. Granderson, who argued for a higher verdict than others thought appropriate and supported his arguments in terms that some other jurors interpreted as being racist in favor of the plaintiff (who is black). One juror stated that, as the deliberations continued, she and others simply wanted to end the matter and thus agreed to a compromise with Mr. Granderson, in an amount greater than this juror otherwise believed was appropriate.

Allegations of jury bias were made in a criminal case, *United States v. Duzac*, 622 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1980), *cert. den'd*, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980). There, *during the course of deliberations*, the jury sent the court a note saying that, because of certain "prejudices" among the jury due to prior personal experiences, they were hung and could not reach a unanimous decision. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. After the jury was instructed to continue the deliberation, they returned with a unanimous verdict *against the defendant*, who was black.

The court of appeal affirmed the verdict, reasoning as follows:

> [T]here is *no evidence that any external influence* was brought to bear on members of the jury. The prejudice complained of is alleged to be the product of personal experiences unrelated to this litigation. . . . Although the jury is obligated to decide the case solely on the evidence, its verdict may not be disturbed if it is later learned that personal prejudices were not put aside during deliberations.

622 F.2d at 913 (emphasis added).

In *Martinez v. Food City, Inc.*, 658 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981), the defendant contended that a verdict against it should be set aside because of a juror affidavit stating that, during the deliberations, one juror said the defendant "should be taught a lesson." *Id.* at 372. The court of appeals refused to set aside the verdict, finding that this evidence was inadmissible and therefore there was "no competent evidence" to support a new trial. *Id.* at 374.

In *United States v. Casamayor*, 837 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir. 1988), *cert. den'd sub nom. Barker v. United States*, 488 U.S. 1017 (1989), a postverdict affidavit by one juror complained that the jury foreman had used "strong arm tactics." 837 F.2d at 1515. In rejecting the argument that this evidence should be admissible and competent to authorize a new trial, the Eleventh Circuit held that "the alleged harassment or intimidation of one juror by another would not be competent evidence to impeach the verdict under Rule 606(b) . . . " *Id.*

In *Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau*, 523 F.2d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 1975), *cert. den'd*, 424 U.S. 917 (1976), the Court held that "evidence of discussions among jurors, intimidation or harassment of one juror by another, and

other intra-jury influences on the verdict are within the [no impeachment] rule, rather than the exception, and is not competent evidence to impeach a verdict."

In *Shillcutt v. Gagnon*, 827 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1987), the petitioner for *habeas corpus* relief, a black male, had been convicted of soliciting prostitutes. The government's chief witness against him was a young white woman. At trial, the jury had first deadlocked and then returned a guilty verdict after being urged to decide the case by the trial court.

The defendant sought to set aside the verdict based upon evidence that, during the jury's final deliberations, a white male juror had said, "Let's be logical. He's black and he sees a seventeen year old white girl – I know the type." 827 F.2d at 1156. The trial court denied the defendant's request for relief, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the statement of the juror during jury deliberations was not competent evidence to set aside the verdict. *State v. Shillcutt*, 341 N.W.2d 716 (Wis. App. 1983). The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. *State v. Shillcutt*, 350 N.W.2d 686 (Wis. 1984). The defendant then sought *habeas* relief in the federal court, arguing that the racist comment made during jury deliberations violated his constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In rejecting this argument, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal noted that its role was to "inquire whether the state court determination violated any federal constitutional or statutory right of the petitioner." 827 F.2d at 1158. The Court concluded that, even in this context, "applying the no-impeachment rule does not offend fundamental fairness." *Id.* at 1160.

These cases clearly establish that the kinds of complaints made here against Juror Granderson's statements during deliberations have been consistently held inadmissible as competent evidence to impeach a jury verdict.

There is nothing about this case to suggest that this defendant was denied fundamental fairness and due process by the application of this rule here. No juror objected about bias before a verdict was rendered when there was opportunity to do so before the Court. No juror objected about misconduct when the jury was polled at the time the verdict was rendered. The statements were made later only after the dissident jurors were contacted by counsel for the defendant.

Moreover, the affidavits presented, even if considered, fall far short of establishing by clear and convincing evidence either that Mr. Granderson was racially biased or that racial bias prejudiced the jury's verdict against Ensidesa.

According to the jurors' affidavits, Mr. Granderson wanted to award Mr. Young more than $2,000,000. Given the extraordinary severity of Mr. Young's injuries, it simply cannot be said that Mr. Granderson's views must have been animated solely by bias favoring Mr. Young.

Finally, Ensidesa complains that no hearing was held on its motion for a new trial. This is patently untrue. A lengthy hearing was held. No new evidence was introduced at the hearing, but no evidentiary hearing was requested. There is nothing in Louisiana law that prohibited Ensidesa from requesting such a hearing or subpoenaing the jurors. Ensidesa simply chose not to do so.

In *Tanner*, 483 U.S. 107, Your Honors, in response to a similar complaint, held that the "District Court did not err in deciding, based on the inadmissibility of juror testimony and the clear insufficiency of the nonjuror evidence offered by petitioners, that an additional postverdict evidentiary hearing was unnecessary." 483 U.S. at 127. Here, Trial Judge Johnson was not even asked to hold such a hearing.

Similarly, in *United States v. Duzac*, 622 F.2d 911, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant in that criminal proceeding had no constitutional right to an evidentiary hearing on his complaints of jury misconduct since "the only questions that the trial judge might have asked at a hearing would have concerned the jurors' prejudices and, therefore, would have been impermissible." 622 F.2d at 914. This is exactly the same situation that existed here. Even if the trial court had been asked to hold an evidentiary hearing, it would have been error to grant it in the circumstances of this case.

In conclusion, Louisiana's evidentiary rule (virtually identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)) prevents impeachment of a jury's verdict by evidence of the jury's alleged improper deliberations, regardless of whether such evidence suggests bias, intimidation, or compromise. The narrow question presented by Ensidesa's writ application is whether Louisiana's use of its evidentiary rule here violated the defendant's right to due process. Given the allegations made, the ample opportunities available to the jury to object to bias if they had seen fit, and the settled precedent of this court, we respectfully suggest that the answer is "NO" and that Ensidesa's writ of certiorari should be denied.

IV.

ARCASA'S WRIT APPLICATION SHOULD ALSO BE DENIED.

A. The holding below does not conflict with *Derr*[4] as properly interpreted.

Arcasa correctly states that the Fifth Circuit in *Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd.*, 656 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1983), *Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, S.A.*, 730 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1984), and *Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd.*, 873 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), *cert. den'd*, 493 U.S. 1050 (1990), and the Ninth Circuit in *Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd.*, 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981), *cert. den'd*, 459 U.S. 967 (1982), and *Riggs v. Scindia Steam Nav. Co.*, 8 F.3d 1442 (9th Cir. 1993), have clearly held that the vessel owner's 905(b) obligation of reasonable care under the circumstances applies to the ship and its work spaces and that under appropriate circumstances this duty may apply to a dangerous condition in stowed cargo that longshoremen must off-load.[5] The Louisiana

---

[4] *Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K.*, 835 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1987), *cert. den'd*, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988).

[5] Trial Judge Johnson charged the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:

> The shipowner and charterer of the vessel may be liable for a negligently stowed cargo which causes injury where the shipowner or charterer knew or should have known of the dangerous condition . . .

Young App. 23a.

The record reflects that during the charge conference Ensidesa stated that the charge was "superfluous." Young App 2a. Later, Arcasa simply stated that it objected to plaintiff's

Fourth Circuit's decision is certainly consistent with these decisions, as Arcasa allows.

We part with Arcasa's insistence that the decision below is clearly in conflict with the United States Third Circuit's interpretation of the vessel owner's duties under 905(b) in *Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K.*, 835 F.2d 490.

The *Derr* opinion can arguably be construed in two ways, as petitioner Arcasa implicitly acknowledges: (1) broadly, that the vessel owner, despite its failure to exercise reasonable care, may not be found liable for harm caused by dangers arising from cargo because it has no legal duties with respect thereto; or (2) narrowly, that a vessel owner owes a duty of care but can be found liable only if it is shown that its own conduct caused or contributed to the dangerous condition or it had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition.

The first construction (no duty) is refuted by the *Derr* court's holding that "there is no *general* duty on the part of a vessel to supervise or inspect the work of stevedores" and that a vessel owner "can be *deemed* negligent towards a longshoreman injured because of improperly stowed cargo *only if the vessel has breached one of the limited*

---

requested jury charge No. 5 without stating any reasons for the objection. Young App. 19a.

Neither statement is a sufficient objection as a matter of Louisiana law to preserve for appellate review an objection to the court's instructions, which, obviously, were not plainly erroneous. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1793; *Coody v. Richardson*, 569 So. 2d 1012, 1017 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), *cert. den'd*, 572 So. 2d 90 (1991).

duties referred to in Scindia." 835 F.2d at 497. (Emphasis added.)

This is hardly a holding of *no duty* under any circumstances with respect to dangers arising from stowed cargo.

But beyond the words of the *Derr* opinion itself, a "no duty" construction is inconsistent with the vessel's duty of due care imposed by 905(b) as interpreted in *Scindia*. For example, were danger in the cargo the result of the vessel having run aground, or of the captain's instructions, or of vessel crew conduct, liability could certainly be imposed.

Finally, the Third Circuit in *Kirsch v. Plovidba*, 971 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1992), has itself narrowed some of the broad dicta in *Derr*. In *Derr* the court stated, "if the danger in the cargo was indeed readily apparent . . . there can be no liability under *Scindia*," 835 F.2d at 497; but in *Kirsch*, it more narrowly stated that "a shipowner may be negligent for failing to eliminate an obvious hazard that it could have eliminated, but only when it should have expected that an expert stevedore could not or would not avoid the hazard and conduct cargo operations reasonably safely." 971 F.2d at 1031. *See also* discussion at 1031 nn.6-7.

If Your Honors agree that the *Derr* court's "no duty" analysis is subject to clear exceptions that avoid, for example, immunizing vessel employee conduct with respect to stowed cargo, then there is no conflict in fact with the Louisiana decision below.

Here, the evidence showed that Arcasa was a co-participant with Ensidesa in causing and permitting the manner of stow that the jury found presented an unreasonable danger to the off-loading stevedore, and the court of appeal specifically found that *"ARCASA's conduct contributed to plaintiff's accident and resulting injuries."* *Young*, 617 So. 2d at 528. (Emphasis added.)

Accordingly, the holding of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit is not in conflict with a proper reading of the holding of the United States Third Circuit in *Derr*, and Jerry Young respectfully asks that petitioner Arcasa's writ of certiorari be denied.

B. Granting this writ would not serve the interests of uniformity.

Arcasa urges that Your Honors should grant certiorari in the interest of "uniformity" of the maritime law.

Here, both the trial court and the court of appeal followed the clear precedents in the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, in which they sat, *Lemon*, 656 F.2d 110; *Harris*, 730 F.2d 296.

By so doing, the Louisiana courts properly adhered to the principle of uniformity in the application of general maritime law. Arguably, were state courts free to adopt interpretations different from those of the federal circuit in which they sit, uniformity would be utterly destroyed and forum shopping would be the rule. Moreover, this court's work load would be significantly increased because in addition to having to periodically

resolve conflicts of maritime law among the federal circuit courts, Your Honors would necessarily have to also referee and resolve conflicting interpretations of maritime law between state and federal courts and even conflicts between appellate courts in the same state.

Were Your Honors to grant Arcasa's writ and hold that the trial and appellate courts should have followed a broad reading of *Derr* and should have disregarded *Lemon* and *Harris*, the decision, paradoxically, would invite, in the long run, a result that is the opposite of that intended. Accordingly, Jerry Young respectfully requests denial of Arcasa's petition.

C. Your Honors should refuse to grant the writ because the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal properly interpreted the duties owed under 33 United States Code section 905(b) and found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict.

In *Scindia*, 451 U.S. 156, Your Honors, citing *Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co.*, 394 U.S. 404, 415 (1969), defined the "turnover" duty of a vessel owner, vis-a-vis longshoremen who must board the vessel to undertake cargo operations, as follows:

> [T]he vessel owes to the stevedore and his longshoremen employees the duty of exercising due care "under the circumstances." This duty extends at least to exercising ordinary care under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety to persons

> and property, and to warning the stevedore of any hazards on the ship or with respect to its equipment that are known to the vessel or should be known to it in the exercise of reasonable care, that would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations and that are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work. The shipowner thus has a duty with respect to the condition of the ship's gear, equipment, tools, and work space to be used in the stevedoring operations; and if he fails at least to warn the stevedore of hidden danger which would have been known to him in the exercise of reasonable care, he has breached his duty and is liable if his negligence causes injury to a longshoreman.

Scindia, 451 U.S. at 166-67 (citation omitted).

As the Ninth Circuit in *Turner*, 651 F.2d 1300, and *Riggs*, 8 F.3d 1442, has suggested, there are especially strong policy reasons to avoid immunizing the vessel owner from the duty of due care with respect to cargo where the on-loading is done by a foreign loading stevedore not subject to the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, *et seq.*, and not subject to the comprehensive scheme of federal regulations governing longshore operations.

The Ninth Circuit in *Riggs* began with an appreciation of Congress's intent in enacting the 1972 amendments to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. In this regard, it cited the House Report, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4704, which concluded as follows:

> Permitting actions against a vessel based on negligence will meet the objective of encouraging safety because the vessel will still be required to exercise the same care as a land-based person in providing a safe place to work. Thus nothing in this bill is intended to derogate from the vessel's responsibility to take appropriate corrective action where it knows or should have known about a dangerous condition.

8 F.3d at 1444.

With this understanding of congressional intent in mind, the Ninth Circuit explained its view that a vessel owner may be held liable if it negligently fails to correct dangerous conditions arising from the loading of cargo by a foreign stevedore, reasoning as follows:

> *Turner*'s holding that the turn over duties of safe-condition and warning encompass non-obvious dangerous conditions in stowed cargo rested on our conclusion that such a rule would further the Congressional goal of safety that underlies the LHWCA. We reasoned that neither the off-loading longshoreworker nor his stevedore-employer could exercise any control over the on-loading foreign stevedore. Only the vessel could do so, by choosing a reliable foreign stevedore, supervising its work when necessary, and correcting concealed dangers or warning the off-loading stevedore of them. Moreover, we noted that in many cases, the injured worker could not sue the foreign stevedore, who would be beyond the reach of the processes of a federal district court. All of these factors are equally applicable in the case of an open and obvious cargo defect.

> We noted in *Turner* another factor that is also equally applicable to both types of *cargo defects*. We recognized that section 905(b) does not bar a shipowner from recovering against a foreign stevedore, who is not an "employer" within the meaning of the LHWCA, where the stevedore is primarily at fault for the off-loading longshoreworker's injuries. As we recently stated in *Carpenter v. Universal Star Shipping SA* [924 F.2d 1539, 1544 (9th Cir. 1991)], where we reaffirmed our holding and reasoning in *Turner*: "The prospect of vessel-initiated actions against foreign stevedores provides foreign stevedores with an incentive to do their work carefully."

8 F.3d at 1446.

This analysis is especially persuasive under the particular facts and circumstances here since (1) the dangerous condition caused by the foreign on-loading stevedore did not create any risk of harm to them (and therefore they had no incentive to correct it), but did create a significant risk of harm to those longshoremen who would have to off-load the cargo; (2) the on-loading stevedore, Ensidesa, had a dual role since it was also the vessel's charterer; (3) the off-loading longshoremen had no practical alternative to avoid the danger; and (4) the vessel owner was a co-participant in causing and permitting the dangerous condition. This is not like a situation wherein the foreign stevedore spills oil in the hold, presenting a danger to itself as well, which an off-loading stevedore could later simply repair or avoid, and which the vessel had no role in causing.

Finally, here, the jury agreed that the on-loading stevedore/charterer, Ensidesa, was in fact primarily

responsible for the hazard and therefore found Ensidesa 85 per cent at fault and Arcasa 15 per cent at fault. Though the two parties were held solidarily liable to the plaintiff, the court of appeal held that, under the contractual relationship that existed between them, Arcasa had full indemnity against Ensidesa, not only for its liability to the plaintiff, but for its attorney fees as well.

This allocation of fault by the Louisiana courts fully accords with the basic policies providing the underpinnings of Your Honors' decision in *Scindia*, 451 U.S. 156. For that reason as well, we urge that Your Honors refuse to grant Arcasa's writ of certiorari.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for writs of certiorari to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

LAWRENCE S. KULLMAN (#7884)
LEWIS & KULLMAN
2615 Pan American Life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: 504/588-1500

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER (#6977)
434 Bellaire Drive
New Orleans, Louisiana 70124
Telephone: 504/482-1887

No. 93-1040 and No. 93-1068

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1993

NO. 93-1040

EMPRESA NACIONALE SIDERURGICA, S.A.,

Petitioner,

versus

JERRY YOUNG,

Respondent.

NO. 93-1068

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A.,

Petitioner,

versus

JERRY YOUNG,

Respondent.

Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal

APPENDIX TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

APPENDIX CONTENTS

Page

Record, Vol. VII, p. 1 ..... 1a

Record, Vol. VII (Jury Charge Conference) April 25, 1989, at 93-113 ..... 2a

Record, Vol. VII, p. 1 ..... 20a

Record, Vol. VII (Jury Charges), April 26, 1989, at 29-35 ..... 21a

Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans Order setting Ensidesa's post-trial motions for hearing 26a

Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans Order setting Arcasa's post-trial motions for hearing 28a

Original Brief of Appellee, Jerry Young, 90-CA-1107, Fourth Circuit, December 10, 1990 ..... 30a

CIVIL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF ORLEANS

STATE OF LOUISIANA

JERRY YOUNG — NO. 84-17780

VS — DIVISION "I"

ARMADORES DE CABOTAJE, S.A. AND K&B EQUIPMENT COMPANY

Testimony and notes of evidence, taken in the above-entitled, cause, before the HONORABLE BERNETTE J. JOHNSON, Judge Presiding, on the 25th day of April, 1989.

APPEARANCES:

MS. FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER
Representing the Plaintiff

GERARD T. GELPI, ESQ.
BRIAN THOMPSON, ESQ.
Representing ARCASA

MILES P. CLEMENTS, ESQ.
ANDREW S. DE KLERK, ESQ.
Representing ENSIDESA

Reported by:

Barbara A. Burger
Certified Shorthand Reporter

(DISCUSSION OFF THE RECORD).

THE COURT:

Number four.

MR. DEKLERK:

Four is okay if we add in the rest of the paragraph.

THE COURT:

I'll give the entire statement from Lemon against Bank Lines. Number five.

MR. DEKLERK:

I would merely say this is superfluous.

MS. WICKER:

No, it is not. It states that the shipowner and charterer may be liable for negligently stowed cargo which causes injury. That's what this case is about.

THE COURT:

I'll give five. Six, obvious dangers.

MR. DEKLERK:

We would submit that this doesn't apply to a charter. Secondly, ENSIDESA wasn't there; and thirdly, I don't think this applies to the facts.

MR. GELPI:

We don't believe it applies to the facts.

MS. WICKER:

Throughout the trial questions were asked of every longshoreman who took the stand about you didn't complain, you didn't do this, you didn't do that alluding to a duty by the longshoreman to leave their job –

THE COURT:

I'll give it. Number seven.

MR. DEKLERK:

I would have the same objection. There was no evidence of any complaints. That's precisely the point.

MS. WICKER:

They were asked and it was eluded they should have.

THE COURT:

I'll give seven. I'll give eight. Objections to eight.

MR. DEKLERK:

Yes. this comes from a case involving Section 933 of the Act and furthermore we are being sued as the loading stevedore under the general maritime law. I would submit that comparative fault is the root that applies to us.

MS. WICKER:

I gave the Court a memorandum with respect to the Cooper T. Smith question generally speaking and the law is that the shipowner may not assert Cooper T. Smith negligence as a defense and I site [sic] to you Edmonds v. Compagnie –

MR. GELPI:

I think the way it's worded may not assert the defense. We didn't do anything wrong and Cooper did it all.

THE COURT:

I think in the 933 action it is a comparison of fault as between the vessel and the longshoremen. That seems to be the reading of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company against Ocean Carrier.

MS. WICKER:

This is not a 905 B action.

THE COURT:

I remember we using this case. If this action says under 933 the comparison of fault is as fault, negligence as it relates to the vessel or to the longshoreman –

MS. WICKER:

Maybe that's an improper cite. Maybe that's not the proper case.

THE COURT:

Let's leave that. Let's leave eight. That takes us to nine.

MR. DEKLERK:

I would submit that the test for loading stevedore is simply one of ordinary negligence under the circumstances. There are no cases which specifically state what that test is.

THE COURT:

The charge seems to say that the onloading stevedore has a duty of reasonable care but then I think it implies too much when it says that the duty was that the cargo should be properly stowed and properly separated with adequate dunnage. I'll exclude nine.

MS. WICKER:

Could we limit nine?

THE COURT:

We will exclude nine. Ten. This is all right in the general charges. I admit ten.

MS. WICKER:

One other thing the question of prejudgment interest, I don't know how we are going to resolve it. If we do resolve it and it goes to the jury – I guess we ought to go to the jury.

THE COURT:

They need to argue against the – including seven in the interrogatories. We will do it in that fashion.

MS. WICKER:

And then I give you a charge if you decide it goes to the jury –

THE COURT:

Do you have one prepared?

MS. WICKER:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay. Let's pass that at the moment.

MS. WICKER:

One other question was with regard to Workmen's – the longshoremen comp. I thought the Court was gong to address that. I didn't seek to address it myself. Whatever the Court wants to say.

THE COURT:

About the fact that Mr. Young has been compensated under the Longshoremen Harbor Workers Act with compensation benefits and they need not consider?

MS. WICKER:

Would you add something to that so that it will take care of that if they think he has already gotten money. They can think the Court will do whatever the Court thinks they need to do.

MR. CLEMENTS:

Also there should not be a suggestion he will not get future comp under the act. It's a question of past and future comp.

MS. WICKER:

But he doesn't get future comp until they get credit for this recovery so it all washes out.

THE COURT:

Now let's see where we are. With regard to the – that takes care of the plaintiffs requested charges. Let's go onto defendants. ARCASA, ENSIDESA, which one first: Let's take ARCASA first.

MR. GELPI:

Maybe we should try go to ENSIDESA first.

THE COURT:

The revised special jury charges dated April 25; is that right, let's start number one.

MS. WICKER:

With regard to number one paragraphs two and three are like plaintiffs charge one are more in the nature of their argument and the rest of it is already given in plaintiff's charge number two with a direct quote and, therefore, two or three I guess is covered by plaintiffs three since that's what the defense –

THE COURT:

I'll give jury charge one and paragraph one only, jury charge two and paragraph one only.

MS. WICKER:

Can I ask with regard to charge one on paragraph one can we just knock out only have and put ENSIDESA need exercise ordinary care instead of need only exercise ordinary care.

MR. DEKLERK:

I think that's precisely the point. That's what ENSIDESA has to do. They only have to exercise ordinary care.

MS. WICKER:

Those are unnecessary adjectives.

THE COURT:

I'll leave it all in.

MR. GELPI:

We can agree with our charges covered by ENSIDESA and that ENSIDESA and ARCASA be added.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. WICKER:

With regard to jury charge number two that's an improper statement of the law. That refers to Scindia category three case. This is a Scindia category one case.

THE COURT:

We are back as to whether the hazard was seen before the unloading or whether it developed during the course of the operation.

MS. WICKER:

The problem is that the defense would like to have law before the jury. Once you start, then their original duty goes away and that's what this charge alludes to and it's bad law. The Lemon case speaks contra to this. The Harris case speaks contra to this. I object. I think it's an improper statement of the law.

MR. GELPI:

I think that's what we just read from Lemon.

THE COURT:

I'll give two.

MS. WICKER:

Number three is addressed in plaintiffs charge number three as well as plaintiffs number four by direct quotes to the cases.

THE COURT:

Which one do you want?

MR. DEKLERK:

We would like four.

MS. WICKER;

No. I'm saying their charge three equals my charges three and four that you have already ruled on.

THE COURT:

This one three and four speak to the safety of the equipment. I don't know if we have that yet.

MR. DEKLERK:

Charge four has to do with opening arguments and that's very important evidence of the case and the applicable law.

THE COURT:

Let's give three paragraph one. Only the Court will give charge four paragraph one only. that takes us to five.

MS. WICKER:

Note my objection to this.

THE COURT:

I don't think we need five. We have already given that in some fashion. Omit five. This talks about the negligence of Cooper.

MS. WICKER:

I don't think the negligence of Cooper has any place in this case but also I believe that Scindia does not say that there is a duty on the part of the offloading stevedore to inspect.

MR. DEKLERK:

I think this comes directly from the Scindia wording.

THE COURT:

Prior to beginning operations.

MS. WICKER:

It's the owners duty to provide the offloading stevedore with a reasonably safe cargo which expert stevedores can offload with the use of reasonable care.

MR. GELPI:

I think the last part of what counsel said is maybe a correct statement.

THE COURT:

I'm inclined to give this charge and eliminate all the others that touch on it. The vessel owes to the stevedore and his longshoremen employees a duty of exercise and due care under the circumstances. This duty extends at least to exercising ordinary care under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able to by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety to persons and property and to warning the stevedore of any hazards on the ship or with respect to its equipment that are known to the vessel or should be known to it in the exercise of reasonable care that would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations and are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work. The shipowner thus has a duty with respect to the conditions of the ship's gear, equipment, tools and work space to be used in the stevedoring operations and if he fails to warn the stevedore of hidden danger which would have been known to him and in the exercise of reasonable care he has breached he [sic] duty and is liable if his negligence causes injury to a longshoreman. What does that eliminate?

MS. WICKER:

Six, seven, nine, ten, eleven, that far back.

THE COURT:

All of these came from Scindia.

MR. DEKLERK:

Yes. Seven is from Helaire.

MS. WICKER:

I think the balance of these charges are covered by the charge you just read.

THE COURT:

We have omitted five. We are on six again.

MR. DEKLERK:

The ship owner within limits is –

THE COURT:

Okay. I have it. I'll give that charge.

MS. WICKER:

That would be instead of six.

THE COURT:

Yes. I'll omit six and we will give the language: the shipowner within the limits is entitled to rely on the stevedore who owes no duty to the longshoreman to inspect or supervise the cargo operations.

Now we are on seven.

MS. WICKER:

With regard to seven I object to the charge in total because I don't think it has anything to do – again just for purposes of objection the category one case which this is more specifically with regard to paragraph two, that's not a statement of law. That's argument.

THE COURT:

I'll omit seven. I think it will be clear as to the duties of shipowner and the charterer of the vessel.

MR. GELPI:

For the record ARCASA strongly objects to the omission of the charge. We think it's in detail and shouldn't be omitted.

THE COURT:

I think it works both ways. We are trying to give the jury the understanding it's up to them to decide whether the dangerous condition existed at the beginning of the offloading operations or whether it developed subsequent to the beginning of the operations and so to limit the duty in some fashion of a vessel owner might confuse the jury.

MR. GELPI:

I think the law as stated in Helaire and jury charge number seven is clear. As I appreciate it, it's a matter of law if a competent stevedore felt that a condition although dangerous was within the province of his men to unload it even though it was dangerous. If he judged it safe enough, the vessel owner is exonerated from liability. I think that's the law. That's the basis for my objection. I'm not trying to say what this case holds. I think that's the law.

MR. DEKLERK:

This is a quote from the case.

MS. WICKER:

I strongly object to giving it.

THE COURT:

I guess we are reading seven. Nine is a little bit similar.

MS. WICKER:

I don't mind nine. I think that nine is an accurate statement. I would love not to have it but I think it's an accurate statement of the law. I don't think it applies to this case. Given your ruling if you are saying the jury gets to decide whether it's something that helped in the confines of cargo operations.

THE COURT:

So we will give nine. We are back to seven.

MS. WICKER:

I think seven is not an accurate statement of the law that applies to this case. I think any statement in that regard is covered by the general Scindia charge you intend to give and further I kind of gave up on nine because it basically talks about the same sort of thing and so seven is duplicitous.

MR. GELPI:

The key to plaintiffs argument is seven isn't a correct statement of the law. Whether it applies to this case, that's for the jury to decide.

THE COURT:

It does say in the footnote the owners actual knowledge of a dangerous condition which later injured a longshoreman would not in itself make the owner negligent. It might well be reasonable for the owner to rely on the stevedores judgment that the condition though dangerous was safe enough.

MS. WICKER:

The problem is that the Helaire case addresses a condition that came into existence once offloading had begun. That's not where we are.

THE COURT:

Let's strike all the language in seven and put this in. I better say owner or charterer. Instead of seven the charge will read actual knowledge of a dangerous condition by the owner or charterer of the vessel which dangerous condition later injures a longshoreman would not in itself make the owner or charterer of the vessel negligent. It might well be reasonable for the owner or charterer to rely on the stevedores judgment that the condition though dangerous was safe enough. That takes us to eight.

MS. WICKER:

I think you just covered that.

MR. GELPI:

I will concede eight is probably included in that.

THE COURT:

Nine, that's the same thing.

MS. WICKER:

Right, we did nine. Now we are on ten.

MR. DEKLERK:

I would like to add in the word might develop on nine.

THE COURT:

Let's just add in ENSIDESA and ARCASA had no duty to discover danger conditions that developed. We are on ten.

MS. WICKER:

I don't have any objection to ten.

THE COURT:

11.

MS. WICKER:

I don't think 11 has anything to do with this case.

THE COURT:

We will omit 11.

MS. WICKER:

Number 12 they site [sic] no case law.

THE COURT:

That's general law. I'll give 12.

MS. WICKER:

On 13 I only have an objection to a couple of words in paragraph two where it says at line – at the end of line five and beginning of line six even in the slightest degree I would like to have that omitted and again at the end where it says Jerry Young's negligence contributed to his own injury. I would like to have it changed to make it balanced. You may find he was not negligent at all or he was negligent to the extent of one percent to a hundred percent.

THE COURT:

I think this is balanced.

MS. WICKER:

As to charge number 14 this addresses assumption of the risk which is – with regard to 905 B cases has been excluded specifically by the Scindia case.

THE COURT:

We will omit it.

MR. DEKLERK:

Naturally we take a contrary position.

THE COURT:

That takes care of the defendants revised special jury charges. Let's go onto ARCASA charges.

MS. WICKER;

Defendants charge number nine is the same as ARCASA charge number one.

THE COURT:

I'll give one. We will omit one. Let's look at two.

MR. GELPI:

We are going to delete number two.

THE COURT:

Three, let's pass three. I'll give four. We will omit five, omit six, omit seven, omit eight, omit nine, omit ten, we will give 11, omit 12, omit 13. We will give 14. We will give 15, omit 16, omit 17, omit 18, omit 19, omit 20, omit 21, omit 22, omit 23. Let's give 24 – no, let's omit 24. I'll give 25. We will omit supplemental number one. Two, omit; three, I'll give three. I'll give four. Let's omit five, omit six. We will give seven.

MR. GELPI:

Can I make for the record my objections.

THE COURT:

This is in reference to the proposed jury interrogatories submitted on behalf of ARCASA. These are dated April 10, 1989 and the supplemental jury charges dated April 17, 1989.

MR. GELPI:

ARCASA would object to the failure of the Court to give its original charge number six, original charge number seven, and then with respect to its supplemental charges ARCASA has no objections and it's satisfied with the Court's decision based on the duplications that we have discussed.

With respect to ENSIDESA's charges I think I stated my objections when those were covered. I did not state my objection with respect to plaintiff's charges and I won't argue at this time. We object to the Court's giving charge – plaintiffs charges five, six, seven and eight.

MR. DEKLERK:

We would do the same thing.

THE COURT:

We are dealing only with the defendant revised special jury charges dated April 25, 1989; is that right?

MR. DEKLERK:

That's correct. We would object to Your Honor's failure to include . . .

R. Vol. VII at 93-113.

CIVIL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF ORLEANS

STATE OF LOUISIANA

JERRY YOUNG — NO. 84-17780

VS — DIVISION "I"

ARMADORES DE CABOTAJE, S.A. AND K&B EQUIPMENT COMPANY

Testimony and notes of evidence, taken in the above-entitled, cause, before the HONORABLE BERNETTE J. JOHNSON, Judge Presiding, on the 26th day of April, 1989.

APPEARANCES:

MS. FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER
Representing the Plaintiff

GERARD T. GELPI, ESQ.
BRIAN THOMPSON, ESQ.
Representing ARCASA

MILES P. CLEMENTS, ESQ.
ANDREW S. DE KLERK, ESQ.
Representing ENSIDESA

Reported by:

Barbara A. Burger
Certified Shorthand Reporter

by the Court. You must not reduce the amount of past wages to which you find Mr. Young is entitled by the fact that he has collected certain amounts in Worker's Compensation benefits. I'm saying to you that you may not reduce any amount you find he is entitled to in past wages on account of the fact that he has collected Worker's Compensation benefits, is that clear?

The vessel owes to the stevedore and his longshorerman employees a duty of exercising due care under the circumstances. This duty extends at least to exercising ordinary care under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert, an experienced stevedore will be able to by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety to persons and property and to warning the stevedore of any hazards on the ship or with respect to its equipment that are known to the vessel or should be known to it in the exercise of reasonable care. Such conditions must be made known if they are likely to be encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations, and if they are not known to the stevedore they must be made known to him by the vessel owner except that where they are open and obvious the vessel owner may expect that the stevedore would reasonably anticipate those and they expect that the stevedore would be reasonably competent in the performing of his work and unloading a vessel such as the one involved in this instance.

The shipowner thus has a duty with respect to the condition of the ships gear, equipment, tools and the work space to be used in the stevedoring operations. If the shipowner fails at least to warn the stevedore of

hidden dangers which would have been known to him in the exercise of reasonable care, he has breached his duty and is liable if his negligence causes injury to a longshoreman.

The vessel may be liable if the vessel fails to exercise due care to avoid exposing the longshoreman to harm from hazards that may be encountered in areas or from equipment under the active control of the vessel during the stevedoring operations.

As a general rule the shipowner may rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoreman to unreasonable hazards. This is because the federal statutes require the stevedore which is the longshoreman's employer to provide a reasonably safe place to work and to take safeguards with respect to equipment and working conditions.

In this case the plaintiff Mr. Jerry Young is seeking damages from ARCASA and ENSIDESA for personal injuries sustained on November 22nd, 1982 while he was working as a longshoreman for Cooper Stevedoring aboard the M/V LORENA.

Plaintiff claims that the defendants acting through their agents and/or employees were negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of this accident and injury. The vessel owner and charterer owed the stevedore and his longshoreman employes [sic] a duty of exercising due care under the circumstances.

MR. DE KLERK:

I think you already read that.

THE COURT:

Let's omit that. In this case ARCASA and ENSIDESA would be responsible for eliminating dangerous conditions which exist at the outset of the stevedoring operations but ARCASA and ENSIDESA would have no duty by way of supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations. It is a stevedore who must see to the safety of cargo operations. The shipowner and charterer of the vessel may be liable for a negligently stowed cargo which causes injury where the shipowner or charterer knew or should have known of the dangerous condition, that a danger is open and obvious is not necessarily a complete defense to a longshoreman's suit.

If the longshoreman's only alternatives would be to leave his job or face trouble for delaying the work, thus a longshoreman's own knowledge of shipboard hazard will not negate a shipowner's duty of care which would otherwise exist.

The law does not require the longshoreman or stevedore to request remedial action in order to recover from the shipowner for injuries due to a dangerous condition within the shipowner's control.

Under the law ENSIDESA and ARCASA need only have exercised ordinary care under the circumstances to provide a vessel that expert and experienced stevedores would be able to by the exercise of reasonable care to perform the operations with reasonable safety to persons and property.

The primary responsibility for the safety of Mr. Young rested upon Cooper Stevedoring. Under the law ENSIDESA and ARCASA would be entitled to rely on Cooper not to expose its employees to unreasonable hazards and ENSIDESA and ARCASA would have no duty to anticipate the action or inaction of a careless stevedore or to anticipate negligence on their part or to supervise them.

Before turning the vessel over to stevedore Cooper, ENSIDESA and ARCASA had the duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances, to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert stevedore could unload the vessel and the cargo safely. ENSIDESA and ARCASA are only under a duty to warn the stevedores of hidden dangers in the vessel and its equipment of which by the exercise of reasonable care they should have been aware.

This duty is not breached if the dangerous condition is an open and obvious one and the longshoreman could see. An obvious defect should be as apparent to the stevedore and its longshoreman employees as to ENSIDESA and ARCASA.

The shipowner and the charterer of the vessel within limits would be entitled to rely on the stevedores and owes no duty to the longshoreman as I said to inspect or supervise the cargo operations.

Once the longshoreman employees of Cooper began working, ENSIDESA and ARCASA had no general duty under the law to discover a dangerous conditions [sic] that developed within the confines of the stevedores operation.

Actual knowledge of a dangerous condition by the owner or charterer of the vessel which condition later injured a longshoreman would not in itself make the owner or charterer of the vessel negligent. It might well be reasonable for the owner or charterer to rely on the stevedores judgment that the condition though dangerous was safe enough.

The shipowner or charterer is not responsible for the negligence of the stevedore or its employees such as the flagman or crane operator. In other words, ARCASA and ENSIDESA are not responsible for the negligence of Cooper or Cooper employees. The shipowner or charterer itself must be actually at fault and that fault must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.

The plaintiff is under a legal obligation to mitigate his damages. In other words, he is obligated to seek employment if he can. If you find for plaintiff, any award you make should be reduced by the amount that he could have earned in the past and what he can earn in . . .

R. Vol VII at 29-35.

CIVIL DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE PARISH OF ORLEANS

STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 84-17780 DIVISION "L" DOCKET NO. 4

JERRY YOUNG

VERSUS

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A. and
K&B EQUIPMENT COMPANY

FILED; _____ _____
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Motion of Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and the Alternative Motion for a New Trial will be heard by the Court on Friday, June 16th, 1989 at 9:00 o'clock a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 30th day of May, 1989.

/s/ Bernette J. Johnson
DISTRICT JUDGE

PLEASE SERVE:

Mr. Jerry Young
through his attorney

Ms. Fredericka H. Wicker
LEWIS & KULLMAN
2615 Pan-American Life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

Arcasa through its attorney

Mr. Randall C. Coleman, III
GELPI, SULLIVAN, CARROLL & LABORDE
430 Notre Dame Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

CIVIL DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE PARISH OF ORLEANS

STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 84-17780 DIVISION "L" DOCKET NO. 4

JERRY YOUNG

VERSUS

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A. and
K&B EQUIPMENT COMPANY

FILED; _____ _____
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER

The Motion of Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or Alternatively for New Trial will be heard by the Court on Friday, June 16th, 1989 at 9:00 o'clock a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 30th day of May, 1989.

/s/ (sgd) Bernette J. Johnson
JUDGE

PLEASE SERVE:

Jerry Young,
Through his attorney of record:
Ms. Fredericka H. Wicker
LEWIS & KULLMAN
2615 Pan-American Life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

Empressa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A.,
Through its counsel of record:
Miles P. Clements, Esq.
LEMLE, KELLEHER, KOHLMEYER, DENNERY,
HUNLEY, MOSS & FRILOT
2100 Pan-American Life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring and
The Home Insurance Company,
Through their attorney of record:
Roch P. Poelman, Esq.
HEBERT, MOULEDOUX & BLAND
601 Poydras Street
1650 Pan American Life Center
New Orleans, LA 70130

IN THE

COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 90-CA-1107

JERRY YOUNG

Plaintiff-Appellee

VS.

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A.,

Defendant-Appellant

AND K & B EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.

APPEAL FROM THE CIVIL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ORLEANS, STATE OF LOUISIANA,
NO. 84-17780
HONORABLE BERNETTE JOHNSON

ORIGINAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE,
JERRY YOUNG

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, 6977
LAWRENCE S. KULLMAN, 7884
Lewis and Kullman
2615 Pan American Life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
(504) 588-1500

APPEAL COUNSEL FOR
JERRY YOUNG
PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE

CIVIL CASE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS	i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	iii
SYLLABUS OF PRINCIPLES OF LAW	vi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	1
STATEMENT OF FACTS	1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT	7
ARGUMENT	8
A. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW	8
B. RESPONSE TO SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS	12
1. THE JURY'S VERDICT ON LIABILITY, BOTH AS TO ARCASA AND ENSIDESA, WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS	12
2. THE JURY'S DAMAGE AWARD IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ORDER A REMITTITUR	16

3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY SUBMIT CLAIMS TO THE JURY, AND IT GAVE PROPER INSTRUCTIONS.. 20

4. THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY CHARGED THE JURY ON THE LAW RELATIVE TO COOPER STEVEDORING AND PROPERLY DECLINED TO SUBMIT A JURY INTERROGATORY REGARDING COOPER STEVEDORING'S "COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE" 21

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULINGS ON VARIOUS PRETRIAL AND EVIDENTIARY MATTERS 23

5. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED ENSIDESA'S MOTION TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL..... 24

6. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING ENSIDESA'S LIABILITY EXPERT AND CANCELING THE APRIL 1989 INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS..... 25

7. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF ALBERT ROSS, JOHNNY PORTER, DOUGLAS LEMOTT AND SAM DOUGLAS REGARDING THE SAFETY OF THE STOW 26

8. THE ECONOMIST'S TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED..... 28

9. THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY BELATED KNOWLEDGE OF PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL HISTORY AND 1987 AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT..... 29

10. JERRY YOUNG'S CONVICTIONS WERE PROPERLY EXCLUDED 29

11. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING DR. BOGRAN'S REPORT, THE PETITION RESULTING FROM SEPTEMBER 1987 AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT AND BY THE LIMITATION OF THE REDIRECT OF DR. CULVER 30

12. EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN STOW PLANS WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 31

13. PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT WAS NOT IMPROPER 31

14. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON ALLEGED JUROR MISCONDUCT 32

15. INDEMNITY 34

CONCLUSION 35

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 35

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

I. CASE CITATIONS

Armstrong v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 423 So.2d 79 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) 24

Bailes v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 512 So.2d 633, 643 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1987) ..... vii, 19

Belk v. Montgomery Ward and Company, Inc., 501 So.2d 1008 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987) 27

Bennett v. Sedco Maritime, 520 So.2d 894, (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) 34

Blandino v. Brown Erection Co., Inc., 341 So.2d 577, (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977) 34

Brown v. Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 426 So.2d 684 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) ..... vii, 19

Burgess v. City of Baton Rouge, 477 So.2d 143 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985) 29

Burton v. Berthelot, 567 So.2d 649 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) ..... vii, 16, 17, 18

Clay v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 525 F.Supp. 306 (E.D. La. 1981) 14, 15

Collier v. Williams-McWilliams Co., Inc., 459 So.2d 719 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984) ..... viii, 25

Daigle v. Coastal Marine, Inc., 488 So.2d 679 (La. 1986) ..... vii, 12

Dengle v. Hibernia National Bank, 539 So.2d 947 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) 26

Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen KK, 835 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir. 1987) 12

Duerden v. PBR Offshore Marine Corp., 471 So.2d 1111 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) 32

Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443, U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2753 (1979) ..... vii, 21

Falgoust v. Richardson Industries, Inc., 552 So.2d 1348 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989) 26

Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1976) ..... vi, 9

Fields v. Senior Citizens Center, Inc., 528 So.2d 573 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988) 32

Gordon v. Hubbard, 541 So.2d 211 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) 20

Handy v. Cheatum, 410 So.2d 322 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) 33

Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 730 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1984) ..... vi, 11, 14, 15

Heaton v. Gulf International Marine, Inc., 536 So.2d 622 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) 29

Hernandez v. M/V RAJAAN, 841 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1988) 14

Hill v. Texaco, 674 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1982) ..... vii, 21

Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 75 U.S. 709 (1986) ..... vii, 12

Kermarec v. Compagnia General Transantlantipa, 358 U.S. 625 (1959) AMC 597 (1959) 10

Kerr-McGee v. Ma-Ju Marine Services, Inc., 830 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1987) ..... vi, 8

Lemire v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 458 So.2d 1308 (La. 1984) 23

Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd., 656 F.2d 110 ..... vi, 11, 14

Lirette v. State Farm Ins. Co., 563 So.2d 850 (La. 1990)..... 13

Mitchell v. Clark Equipment Co., 561 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990)..... 17

Morrison v. J.A. Jones Const. Co., Inc., 537 So.2d 360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) 23

Muzyka v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 774 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1985).....viii, 31

Nance v. Gulf Oil Corp., 817 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1987)..... 23

Ogletree v. Willis-Knighton Memorial Hospital, 530 So.2d 1175 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1988) 32

Roby v. Hyundai Merchant Marine, 700 F.Supp. 316 (EDLA 1983) 14, 15

Roper ex rel Roper v. Gelsomino, 507 So.2d 868 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987)..... 27

Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1978)..... vii, 23

Sather v. White, 388 So.2d 402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980)..... 29

Schwamb v. Delta Air Lines, 516 So.2d 452 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987)..... vii, 19

Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614 (1981).....vi, 9, 10, 11

Trapani v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 524 So.2d 226 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988)..vii, 27

Treadaway v. Societe Anonyme Louis-Dreyfus, 894 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1990) 14

Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981) ..... vi, 9, 11, 14, 15

Uhler v. Evangeline Riding Club, 525 So.2d 550 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) 29

Webb v. Insurance Company of North America, 396 So.2d 508 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) 29

Williams v. Sentry Insurance Co., 370 So.2d 901 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) 32

Woods v. Samissa, 873 F.2d 842 ..... vi, vii, 10, 11, 14, 15, 20, 21

II. STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL

33 U.S.C.A. § 902(21) ..... vi, 8

33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b) ..... vi, 8

LOUISIANA

LSA – R.S. 40:893 29

LSA – C.C. art. 2324 23

LSA – C.C.P. art. 1601 24

LSA – C.C.P. art. 1602 ..... vii, 24

LSA – C.C.P. art. 1793 C ..... vii, 20

LSA – C. Evid. art. 403 31

LSA – C. Evid. art. 407 ..... viii, 31

LSA – C. Evid. art. 606 B ..... viii, 33

LSA – C. Evid. art. 609 A 30

LSA – C. Evid. art. 701 27

LSA – C. Evid. art. 702 27

LSA – C. Evid. art. 704 27

SYLLABUS OF PRINCIPLES OF LAW

1. "In the event of injury to a person covered under this act caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such a person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of § 33 of this Act." 33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b).

2. For purposes of liability pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), the "vessel" encompasses both the owner, operator and the time charterer. 33 U.S.C. § 902(21); *Kerr-McGee v. Ma-Ju Marine Services, Inc.*, 830 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1987).

3. The plaintiff may recover from either the owner/operator or the time charterer for negligence. These entities may attempt to shift the burden between them by way of indemnification. *Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Company, Ltd.*, 542 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1976); *Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd.*, 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981).

4. The vessel "owes to the stevedore and his longshoremen employees the duty of exercising due care 'under the circumstances.' " *Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos*, 451 U.S. 156, 166, 1015, Ct. 1614, 1622 (1981).

5. "With regard to a condition that exists prior to or at the outset of cargo operations, the vessel must exercise ordinary care to have the ship and its equipment

in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety. . . . " *Id.*, 451 U.S. at 167; 101 S.Ct. at 1622.

6. The vessel has a duty to warn the stevedore of any hazardous conditions on the ship or with respect to its equipment that are known or should be known to the vessel in the exercise of reasonable care, that would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations, and that are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious to, or anticipated by, him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work. *Id.*, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622.

7. A vessel interest has an obligation to exercise due care to ensure that the vessel's cargo is loaded such that it can be discharged with reasonable safety. The defendants may be found liable "for damages arising from a dangerous stow [in] situations where the [defendants] knew or should have known of the dangerous condition." *Woods v. Samissa*, 873 F.2d 842, 850 (5th Cir. 1989); *Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd.*, 656 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1981); *Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A.*, 730 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1984).

8. That a danger is "obvious" is not necessarily a complete defense to a longshoreman's suit, "because when faced with an openly dangerous shipboard condition, the longshoreman's 'only alternatives would be to leave his job or face trouble for delaying the work.' " . . . Thus " 'a longshoreman's own knowledge of a shipboard hazard will not negate a shipowner's duty of care which would otherwise exist.' " *Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiania, S.A.*, 730 F.2d at 299-300.

9. In a maritime case tried in state court, the standard of appellate review is governed by Louisiana law.

Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 75 U.S. 709 (1986); *Daigle v. Coastal Marine, Inc.*, 488 So.2d 679 (La. 1986).

10. "A trier of fact has much discretion in the assessment of general damages. Before an appellate court can disturb a trial court's award of general damages, the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making the award. If such an abuse of discretion is found, then the court may look to other awards made in similar cases as an aid to raising or lowering the award to the highest or lowest point which would have been reasonably within the discretion of the jury." *Burton v. Berthelot*, 567 So.2d 649 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).

11. "Future medical expenses must be established with some degree of certainty. However, an award of future medical expenses is in great measure highly speculative and not susceptible of calculation with mathematical certainty." *Burton v. Berthelot*, 567 So.2d 649, 663 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).

12. With regard to whether a jury's award is excessive, the Court of Appeal should consider "whether the award can be supported under the interpretation of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff which reasonably could have been made by the fact finder." *Bailes v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.*, 512 So.2d 633, 643 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1987).

13. The jury is not "bound" by the testimony of an economist. The test is whether or not the award is supported by the evidence. *Brown v. Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co.*, 426 So.2d 684 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).

14. The jury is not required as a matter of law to use any specific discount factor and can lawfully use the total offset method in calculating the plaintiff's loss

of future earnings. *Schwamb v. Delta Airlines*, 516 So.2d 452, 465 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).

15. "A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto either before the jury retires to consider its verdict or immediately after the jury retires, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection." LSA – C.C.P. art. 1793 C.

16. A shipowner sued by an injured stevedore cannot obtain contribution from a concurrently negligent employer. *Edmonds v. Compagnie Generele Transatlantique*, 443 U.S. 256, 268; 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2760 (1979); *Woods v. Samissa*, 873 F.2d 842, 846 (5th Cir. 1989); *Hill v. Texaco*, 674 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1982).

17. Since "the employer/stevedore's negligence would not, if proved, affect the longshoreman's recovery," there is no reason to submit the issue of the stevedore's negligence to the jury. *Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas*, 573 F.2d 884, 885 (La. 1978).

18. "A continuance shall be granted if at the time a case is to be tried, the party applying for a continuance shows that he has been unable, with the exercise of due diligence, to obtain evidence material to his case . . . "LSA – C.C.P. art. 1602. The "party moving for a continuance has the burden of proving that his motion falls within these peremptory grounds." *Collier v. Williams-McWilliams Co., Inc.*, 459 So.2d 719, 722 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).

19. Qualification of experts is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent manifest error. *Trapani v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company*, 524 So.2d 226, 230 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).

20. Evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible when offered for a purpose other then proving negligence or culpable conduct, "such as proving ownership, authority, knowledge, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, or for *attacking credibility*." LSA – C. Evid. art. 407 (Emphasis added.); *Muzyka v. Remington Arms Co., Inc.*, 774 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir. 1985).

21. The "Golden Rule" addresses only argument wherein counsel asks the jury to put itself in the plaintiff's shoes *with regard to damages. Duerden v. PBR Offshore Marine Corp.*, 471 So.2d 1111, 1114 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).

22. "Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question of whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror . . . Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes." LSA – C. Evid. art. 606 B.

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner/appellee, Jerry Young, a longshoreman, brought suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans for injuries he sustained while off-loading steel beams from a vessel, the M/V LORENA, in New Orleans,

Louisiana. The defendants were Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. (Ensidesa), a Spanish steel manufacturer that had loaded the cargo and chartered the vessel for the voyage to New Orleans, and Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. (ARCASA), the owner and operator of the vessel.

The plaintiff claimed that ARCASA and Ensidesa were both liable for negligence under section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act [33 U.S.C. section 905(b)]and, additionally, that Ensidesa, as the stevedoring company that had loaded the vessel, was liable for negligence under the general maritime law.

The jury found that both defendants were negligent and awarded $1,700,000 in damages.

Both defendants filed motions for a new trial and/or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied the motions and this appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On November 22, 1982, Jerry Young, then a 46-year-old experienced longshoreman employed by Cooper Stevedoring, was working with his regular gang in the No. 2 hold of the M/V LORENA, off-loading steel beams, when the sling his coworkers were using to try to pry up the beams slipped off, swung wildly, and hit him in the head before he could get out of the way. (Record, Vol. V, pp. 194-195; Vol. IV, pp. 54-60, 262, 289.)

This incident was caused by the hazardous condition resulting from the way the loading stevedore, Ensidesa, had stowed the steel. (Record, Vol. IV, pp. 46-60; Vol. IV, pp. 287, 325, 334-335; Vol. V, p. 448.)

These were 60-foot steel beams, called "H" or "I" beams. This means that they were webbed and flanged. If one looked at the end of a beam, one would see an "H" or an "I" shape depending on how the beam was turned. (Record, Vol. IV, pp. 264-265, 278-280; Vol. V, 318-321.)

The beams could be stowed on either the edges (the "H" manner) or on the flanges (the "I" manner). (Record, Vol. IV, pp. 39, 264; Vol. V, pp. 362-367, 421.) Wooden dunnage is placed between each tier of steel. (Record, Vol. IV, pp. 39-40, 265-267; Vol. V, p. 427.) When the beams are stowed in the "H" manner, the edges of the beams cut into the dunnage. The extent of damage to the dunnage depends on the weight of the stow (that is, how high it is loaded) and the quality of the wood used. Stowage in the "H" manner also creates an uneven surface on which the men have to walk while off-loading the cargo. (Record, Vol. IV, pp. 39-40, 265, 268-269, 280; Vol. V, pp. 366, 421-424, 442.)

On the other hand, stowage in the "I" manner puts a flat surface against the dunnage, so it is not cut. Stowage in this manner also gives the longshoremen a flat surface upon which to walk and work. (Record, Vol. IV, pp. 39-40, 54-60, 320, 342; Vol. V, pp. 367, 427.)

Defendant Ensidesa chartered this vessel and loaded it in Aviles, Spain. Ensidesa, as charterer and as loading stevedore, chose to stow the steel in the "H" manner. Also, the steel was loaded all the way to the top of the holds. (Record, Vol. IV, pp. 43, 355, 406; Vol. V, pp. 351, 354-355, 406, 410-414.)

Ensidesa's chief of port operations prepared the stowage plan and supervised the Ensidesa longshoremen

who loaded the vessel. (Vol. V, pp. 351, 354-355, 406.) He was responsible for seeing that the vessel was loaded properly to permit safe off-loading. (Vol. V, pp. 411, 414.)

The master of the M/V LORENA, ARCASA's employee, approved the stowage plan prior to loading the vessel. (Vol. V, pp. 352, 410.) As master of the vessel, he was the person ultimately responsible for the manner in which the cargo was stowed. (Vol. V, pp. 352, 410.)

Ensidesa knew that use of the "H" method to stow the steel beams would tend to cut and crush the dunnage between the tiers of steel beams. (Record, Vol. V, pp. 366-367, 424, 427.)

Ensidesa further knew that when the dunnage was crushed it made safe off-loading with standard rigging very difficult, if not impossible. (Record, Vol. V, p. 367.) In fact, when Ensidesa's own longshoremen encountered crushed dunnage, they used a different method and different tools to off-load the steel beams, unknown to American stevedores. (Vol. IV, pp. 61, 87, 100, 110, 335, 341; Vol. V, pp. 367-369, 385-386 416-421.)

In such circumstances, Ensidesa used a giant clamp to lift the beams sufficiently to replace the crushed dunnage, thereby permitting the placement of the chains for off-loading. (Vol. V, pp. 368-369, 416, 421.) Ensidesa's director of the Port of Aviles had been to the United States and observed American stevedoring operations. He knew that the giant clamps being used by Ensidesa were unknown to American longshoremen. (Vol. V, pp. 369-370, 385-386, 417-421.)

Despite this, Ensidesa never gave any warning whatsoever to Cooper Stevedoring about the need for special equipment and techniques. (Vol. V, pp. 416-421.)

After the M/V LORENA arrived at the Port of New Orleans, Cooper Stevedoring began the off-loading process. Mr. Glen Reibe, Cooper's ship superintendent, testified that when the M/V Lorena arrived he noted that the cargo was stowed in the "H" manner, which was very unusual. (Record, Vol. IV, p. 342-343.)

The longshoremen used standard rigging to remove the steel beam cargo. The crane cable was attached to a T-bar from which four cables were suspended, two on each side, with hooks at the end. (Vol. IV, pp. 36-37.)

Normally the longshoremen would insert wires between the tiers of beams. With adequate dunnage, the wires could be inserted a good distance from the ends of the beams. (Vol. IV, pp. 45, 271.) Then the wires would be attached to the hooks and the crane would lift the load. The longshoremen would insert chains beneath the bundles, then the chains would be attached to the hooks, and the load would be lifted out of the hold. (Vol. IV, p. 37, 271.)

When the steel beams are loaded in the "I" method, the dunnage present between the tiers of steel beams permits the safe insertion of the wires a sufficient distance from the end of the beams for safe and efficient lifting and placement of chains. (Vol. IV, p. 40, 271.)

But when the beams are loaded in the "H" manner and the dunnage is crushed, the situation is entirely different. In this case, as the longshoremen removed

cargo from the hold of the LORENA and reached lower tiers of beams, the dunnage became more and more crushed until the steel beams virtually were on top of each other without any separation at all. (Vol. IV, pp. 46, 50, 54, 267, 269, 345-346, 396-400.)

The Cooper marine surveyor, Capt. Ross, observed the entire off-loading process. He testified that the dunnage (which was supplied by Ensidesa) was soft and of poor quality that broke with compression. He saw that the longshoremen were having a lot of difficulty off-loading the beams and that they had to "nip" the ends of the beams to get them out. **Capt. Ross testified that he had never seen a stow of steel beams as bad as the one he observed on the M/V Lorena in November, 1982.** (Record, Vol. V, pp. 47, 442-448, 516-519.)

Mr. Glen Reibe testified in the same vein:

Q. As the longshoremen got further and further down in the hold and had discharged tiers of steel beams, what did you observe with regard to the dunnage?

A. I noticed that the dunnage had been crushed severely due to the compression of the steel on top of it.

Q. What did that do with regard to the off-loading longshoremen?

A. Made it even more harder as we got deeper. It was almost as if you had steel on top of steel without any dunnage.

(Vol. IV, pp. 345-46.)

Mr. Douglas Lemott, a member of Jerry Young's gang and an eyewitness to his injury, described the situation as follows:

> Q. On the day of Mr. Young's injury, can you tell the jury what it was like trying to unload those steel beams that were in that vessel, the M/V Lorena that day?
>
> A. Well, the dunnage under it had broke and the beams were beams on beams where they had fell and joined together and when we tried to get the chain under it you couldn't get a chain under it so we would catch just as much as we could catch to try and raise it up and then try to put a piece of wood under it until we could get enough to raise them all the way up.

(Vol. IV, pp. 45-46.)

In effect, the longshoremen were putting in dunnage after the cargo had been stowed. (Vol. IV, pp. 46-50, 269-272, 275-278, 375.)

It became impossible to insert the wires far enough onto the beams to lift them and place the chains. The longshoremen had to "nip" the end of the beam, or place the wire as far in as they could force it, have the beam lifted a little while they then threw wood chunks under the beam and then force the wire back farther. Of course, "nipping" the edge of the beam created a serious danger. (Vol. IV, pp. 46-50, 54-56, 127, 287-288, 302, 325, 329, 344, 400-401; Vol. V, pp. 447-448.)

But the longshoremen had no alternative but to continue to off-load the vessel as carefully as they could.

(Vol. IV, pp. 61, 100, 275, 302, 335-336, 345-346, 352, 363-364, 391, 402.)

In due course, while the longshoremen were "nipping" onto some beams and trying to raise them in order to insert dunnage, the wire slipped off the end and the T-bar swung wildly through the hold. One of the longshoremen screamed to get out of the way, but Jerry Young was not able to move in time to avoid this swinging bar. He was hit in the head and knocked unconscious onto the steel beams. (Vol. IV, pp. 54-61, 272-278, 288-290, 332-333; Vol. V, 203-206.)

As a result of this incident, Jerry Young suffered injuries to his head and lower back and arm.[1]

He was briefly hospitalized and then conservatively treated by Dr. Bogran for his continuing complaints.

In April, 1983, Dr. Bogran consulted Dr. John Watermeier, an orthopedic surgeon, because Mr. Young was continuing to complain of pain in his low back and radiating pain into his leg.

Dr. Watermeier readmitted Mr. Young to the hospital and diagnosed a probable ruptured disc at L4-L5 and attempted a chemical laminectomy with a chymopapain injection. Mr. Young's complaints improved somewhat and he was discharged from the hospital on April 19, 1983.

---

[1] Jerry Young had worked as a longshoreman for most of his adult life. He had suffered some minor injuries, but nothing that had caused him to miss work for a substantial period of time. At the time of this incident he was in good health, doing his full duties, and was not under any doctor's care.

Unfortunately, the improvement was only temporary and in June of 1983 Dr. Watermeier found that Mr. Young was again complaining of severe pain and was walking with a pronounced limp. At this point Dr. Watermeier recommended a lumbar laminectomy. Mr. Young was again hospitalized, from June 23 to June 28, 1983, and the procedure was performed. (Record, Vol. IV. p. 201.)

After the operation, Mr. Young continued to be followed by Dr. Watermeier. He had complaints with respect to both his back and leg and also his wrist. Dr. Watermeier diagnosed a probable carpal tunnel syndrome resulting from the injury in November, 1982. (Record, Vol. IV, p. 206.)

Mr. Young continued to see Dr. Watermeier every one or two months. By January, 1984, Dr. Watermeier noted that he appeared to be chronically depressed. In February, 1984, Dr. Watermeier began giving Mr. Young anesthetic injections into the muscles around his spine in order to try to at least temporarily relieve his symptoms. In addition, Mr. Young was taking oral Percodan, a narcotic pain medication.

Despite the two surgeries that had been performed, Mr. Young's symptoms did not improve. He continued to have severe pain in his back and leg, requiring monthly anesthetic injections. In December, 1984, Dr. Watermeier again hospitalized him for more diagnostic tests in light of the continuing problems.

Then, in May, 1984, Dr. Watermeier hospitalized Mr. Young for the fifth time and performed a laminectomy and fusion operation.

Unfortunately, Mr. Young's symptoms did not significantly improve. He continued to see Dr. Watermeier and to receive anesthetic injections at the office. Because the treatments provided only partial relief, Dr. Watermeier hospitalized Mr. Young for the sixth time, in September, 1985, so that he could be given a morphine injection into the spine.

Dr. Watermeier continued to follow Mr. Young and continued to try to treat his pain with various modalities, including Percodan, Marcaine anesthetic injections, and periodic hospitalizations to have morphine injections into his spine.

These treatments continued up to the time of trial.

Dr. Watermeier testified that Mr. Young was totally and permanently disabled. Even if he could be trained for some type of sedentary light employment, the constant pain and need for ongoing orthopedic and psychiatric treatment makes employment a practical impossibility. (Vol. IV, pp. 216, 219, 225, 226, 229-230, 234.)

Dr. Robert Newman, a psychiatrist, began seeing Mr. Young in April, 1988. He diagnosed his condition as an adjustment disorder, depression and withdrawal, and he began regular psychiatric therapy. (Vol. V, pp. 108, 134.) In January, 1989, Mr. Young became suicidal. (Vol. V, p. 122.) At the time of trial Mr. Young was still under Dr. Newman's care and it was Dr. Newman's opinion that he was disabled from returning to work as a result of his psychiatric problems resulting from his injury and inability to work. (Record, Vol. V, pp. 136-138, 191.)

At the time of his injury, Mr. Young was earning about $25,000 a year. (Vol. V, pp. 196-197.) From November 22, 1982, until the time of trial, Mr. Young was never again able to return to employment. In the opinion of his treating physicians, it was unlikely that Mr. Young would ever work again.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Both ARCASA and Ensidesa were negligent in failing to ensure that the loading stevedore in Aviles, Spain, (ENSIDESA) stowed the cargo in such a manner that it could be discharged in New Orleans with reasonable safety. The defendants further failed to warn the off-loading longshoremen both of the danger presented by the crushed dunnage and resulting overlapping, jammed and enmeshed stow and of the need for special equipment, or C-Clamps known to the Spaniards but unknown to American stevedores, to safely off-load the vessel.

The jury did not commit manifest error in finding that the two defendants breached their duty of care to Jerry Young. The jury properly evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, resolved conflicts in the testimony and made reasonable inferences of fact.

With regard to the damages awarded, the jury did not abuse its much discretion. The general damage award is supported by evidence that Jerry Young has been permanently and totally disabled and has endured an extraordinary course of medical treatment and measures to relieve pain that is going to continue for the remainder of his life.

The jury's awards for loss of earnings and future medical expenses are supported by the evidence

The defendants moved for a new trial and/or judgment not withstanding the verdict upon substantially the same grounds as are urged on this appeal. The trial court, which was intimately familiar with these lengthy proceedings, denied these motions. Your Honors should find that the trial court did not abuse her discretion and that the jury's verdict is not clearly wrong.

ARGUMENT

A. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW.

Jerry Young sued ARCASA and Ensidesa as "the vessel" for damages under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. section 905 (b). He also sued Ensidesa as the loading stevedore for negligence pursuant to general maritime law.

For purposes of liability pursuant to 33 United States Code section 905(b), the "vessel" encompasses both ARCASA as owner/operator and Ensidesa as the time charterer. 33 U.S.C. section 902(21); *Kerr-McGee v. Ma-Ju Marine Services, Inc.*, 830 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1987). Jerry Young has the right to recover from both for negligence. These entities may attempt to shift the burden between them by way of indemnification. *Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., Ltd.*, 542 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1976); *Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd.*, 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981).

In *Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos*, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, (1981), the United States Supreme

Court clarified the scope of the duties owed by the vessel to stevedores and longshoremen.

Stating that the vessel "owes to the stevedore and his longshoremen employees the duty of exercising due care 'under the circumstances,' " the Supreme Court in *Scindia* identified three separate aspects of this duty. *Id.*, 451 U.S. at 166, 101 S.Ct. at 1622.

First, with regard to a condition that exists prior to or at the outset of cargo operations, the vessel must exercise

> ordinary care to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety . . .

Id., 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622.

A corollary of this first *Scindia* duty is that the vessel has a duty to warn the stevedore of any hazardous conditions on the ship or with respect to its equipment that are known or should be known to the vessel in the exercise of reasonable care, that would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations, and that are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious to, or anticipated by, him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work. *Id.*, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622.

The "*Scindia* No. 2 duty" involves the vessel's liability when it actively involves itself in cargo operations and either negligently injures a longshoreman or fails to maintain equipment, etc., in the area over which it has maintained actual control during the stevedoring operation. No party alleged that, at the time Jerry Young was

injured, the vessel was in active control of the area in question.

The third *Scindia* duty applies to dangerous conditions that develop or come to light once stevedoring operations are under way. *Scindia*, 451 U.S. at 175-176, 101 S.Ct. at 1626-27. A vessel will, in this situation, be liable under section 905(b) if:

> It had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition . . . and actual knowledge that the stevedore was not acting to correct it.

Woods v. Sammisa, 873 F.2d 842, 847 (5th Cir. 1989).

In this case, Jerry Young contended that the vessel breached the first *Scindia* duty in two ways. First, he contended that the two defendants were negligent in failing to ensure that the loading stevedore in Aviles, Spain, (Ensidesa) stowed the cargo in such a manner that it could be discharged in New Orleans with reasonable safety. Secondly, and also under the first *Scindia* duty, he contended that the defendants failed to warn him both of the danger presented by the crushed dunnage and resulting overlapping, jammed and enmeshed stow and of the need for special equipment, or C-clamps known to the Spaniards but unknown to the American stevedores, to safely off-load the vessel. *Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique*, 358 US 625, 1959 AMC 597 (1959).

He further contended that Ensidesa, as the loading stevedore, was negligent in creating an unreasonably dangerous stow on the vessel. *Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique*, 358 U.S. 625, 1959 AMC 597 (1959).

The defendants, on the other hand, took the position that the cause of Jerry Young's accident was an unsafe condition created by the Cooper stevedores during the off-loading operation,[2] rendering this a case to be judged by the standards of the third *Scindia* duty.[3]

Since *Scindia*, several courts have considered the question whether the vessel's duty of reasonable care extends to hazardous cargo conditions created by a loading stevedore. The clear majority have decided that it does.

This question was first raised in *Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd.*, 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981). There an off-loading stevedore was injured when he fell from a stack of cargo that had not been properly shored by the loading stevedore. In concluding that the vessel owner and charterer could be found liable on these facts, the Ninth Circuit reasoned as follows:

> Imposing a duty on the Owner or Time-Charterer or both in this case should refer to the congressional goal of safety. The foreign stevedore, who is presumably primarily at fault, may in many cases be beyond reach of the court's processes, and the injured longshoreman would be unable to sue it. As between the vessel and

---

[2] *See* Arcasa Brief, p. 13, paras. 1, 2; n.4; Ensidesa Brief, pp. 9-13.

[3] The trial court correctly found that whether the dangerous condition, if any, that caused Jerry Young's casualty existed at the beginning of off-loading or developed within the confines of cargo operations was an issue of fact for the jury, and submitted the law relevant to both plaintiff's and defendant's theories to the jury. (Vol. VII, p. 106, 11. 13-22.)

> the stevedore-employer, the vessel is the only one in a position to insure the safety of the longshoremen. The off-loading stevedore has no control whatsoever over the foreign stevedore. The vessel, on the other hand, can insure safety by choosing a reliable foreign stevedore, supervising its work when necessary, and warning the off-loading stevedore of concealed dangerous conditions created by the foreign stevedore. . . . We hold, therefore, that the vessel had a duty to protect the plaintiff against concealed dangers created by a foreign stevedore which the vessel could, in the exercise of reasonable care, have corrected or warned of.

Id. at 1304.

In light of this duty, the Court held that the plaintiff could recover if he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the vessel "knew or should have known" of a hazardous condition created by the loading stevedore. *Id.* at 1304.

In three subsequent decisions the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has agreed that the vessel may be found liable under 905(b) if it knew or should have known of dangerous conditions created by a loading stevedore and failed to either correct the condition or warn about it. *Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd.*, 656 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1981); *Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A.*, 730 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1984); *Woods v. Sammissa*, 873 F.2d 842.

In *Woods v. Sammissa*, 873 F.2d at 850, the Fifth Circuit summarized these legal principles as follows:

> **Under the first *Scindia* duty, a vessel interest has an obligation to exercise due care to ensure that the vessel's cargo is loaded such that it can**

> **be discharged with reasonable safety. The defendants may be found liable "for damages arising from a dangerous stow [in] situations where the [defendants] knew or should have known of the dangerous condition."**

In this case, Judge Johnson charged the jury in accordance with these principles of law, and there was no objection by either defendant to the Court's instructions.[4]

B. RESPONSE TO SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS.

In this appeal, ARCASA has specified 7 errors and 11 issues for review, and Ensidesa has specified 17 errors and 20 issues for review. In effect, each defendant has attacked virtually every discretionary decision made by Judge Johnson during a lengthy trial.

We will discuss each of the alleged errors that was briefed, but will give greatest attention to what would appear to be the defendants' most important contention, that the verdict, both on liability and damages, was manifestly erroneous.[5]

---

[4] In *Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen KK*, 835 F.2d 490, 495-96 (3rd Cir. 1987), the Third Circuit held that the shipowner could not be held liable for conditions arising from the stowage of cargo. Obviously, even if this minority view were accepted, it would have no effect here on Ensidesa's liability under the general maritime law for its negligence as the loading stevedore.

[5] We have tried to simply address the merits of the defendants' arguments. This is obviously an important case to all concerned. That does not excuse some of the statements that have been made; for example, "The trial court facilitated plaintiff's concealment and ambush." (Ensidesa Brief, p. 50.)

1. THE JURY'S VERDICT ON LIABILITY, BOTH AS TO ARCASA AND ENSIDESA, WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS.

Both ARCASA and Ensidesa contend that the jury's verdict was not supported by the evidence and should be set aside. In this regard, the standard of appellate review is governed by Louisiana law. *Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington*, 475 U.S. 709 (1986); *Daigle v. Coastal Marine, Inc.*, 488 So.2d 679 (La. 1986). Under Louisiana law:

> It is well settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a finding of fact by a trial court or a jury in the absence of "manifest error" or unless it is "clearly wrong," and where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. . . .
>
> When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error – clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the fact finder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said.

Lirette v. State Farm Ins. Co., 563 So.2d 850, 852 (La. 1990).

From the evidence presented the jury could reasonably conclude the following: (1) Ensidesa, acting as loading stevedore, developed and carried out the stowage plan for the M/V LORENA in October, 1982. (Vol. IV, pp. 335, 406; Vol. V, pp. 351, 354-355, 406, 410-414.) (2)

Ensidesa was responsible for the "H" method of stow, the height of the stow, and the nature, amount and placement of the wood dunnage. *Id.* (3) the master of the vessel, an Arcasa employee, approved the stowage plan prior to loading and accepted the vessel when the stow was complete. (Vol. IV, pp. 355, 406; Vol. V, pp. 351, 354-355, 406, 410-414.) (4) the master was the person ultimately responsible for the manner of the stow. (Vol. V, pp. 352, 364, 410.) (5) Ensidesa knew when it loaded the vessel that the "H" method of stow tended to crush the dunnage between the tiers of steel beams making safe off-loading with standard rigging very difficult, if not impossible. (Vol. V, pp. 366-367, 424, 427.) (6) Ensidesa knew that its own longshoremen used a special technique and equipment, giant C-Clamps, to off-load "H" stows with crushed dunnage. (Vol. V, pp. 368-369, 416, 421.) (7) Ensidesa knew or should have known that this technique and necessary equipment was unknown to American stevedores. (Vol. V, pp. 369-370, 385-386, 417-421.) (8) Neither Ensidesa nor ARCASA at any time warned the American stevedore, Cooper T. Smith, either of the probable crushed dunnage and consequent jammed, overlapping and enmeshed nature of the stow in the lower tiers or of the need for special equipment to safely off-load the vessel. (Vol. V, pp. 416-421.) (9) Although Ensidesa chose, and ARCASA approved, the "H" stow, it was no more difficult or time consuming to load a vessel in the "I" method. (Vol. V, pp. 376, 421.) (10) Once the cargo was stowed, there was nothing the off-loading stevedores could do to correct the situation except to try to get the steel out as carefully as possible.

As discussed above, Judge Johnson charged the jury in accordance with the majority view that "the defendants may be found liable 'for damages arising from a dangerous stow [in] situations where the [defendants] knew or should have known of the dangerous condition.' " *Woods v. Sammisa*, 873 F.2d at 850. There is no requirement that the vessel have actual knowledge of the danger presented before liability attaches. Rather, that duty speaks in terms of a failure to exercise care. *Woods v. Sammissa*, 873 F.2d at 851.[6]. Here, as in *Woods*, neither defendant denies actual knowledge of the nature of the stow; rather they contend that the evidence does not establish either that the "H" stow, with its consequent crushed dunnage and jammed beams, created an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoreman or that they could be charged with knowledge of the risk if it existed.

The evidence that the "H" stow was unusual and unnecessary and that it foreseeably increased the risk of injury to the longshoremen and that the risk could have been avoided by using the "I" stow or by warning the American stevedore of the need for special off-loading equipment, that is, giant C-clamps, was ample for the jury to conclude that the defendants did not exercise

---

[6] Defendant Ensidesa argues that the *Woods* statement of the first *Scindia* duty at pages 850-851 is an "oversimplification." However, the Fifth Circuit in *Woods* was reiterating earlier statements made by various courts – *Hernandez v. M/V RAJAAN*, 841 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1988); *Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana*, 730 F.2d 296; *Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd.*, 656 F.2d 110; *Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd.*, 651 F.2d 1300; *Roby v. Hyundai Merchant Marine*, 700 F.Supp. 316 (E.D. La. 1988); *Clay v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc.*, 525 F.Supp. 306 (E.D. La. 1981). In *Treadaway v. Societe Anonyme Louis-Dreyfus*, 894 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1990) the Fifth Circuit confirmed this view of the law.

reasonable care to provide the longshoremen with a safe place to work. *Woods v. Sammisa*, 873 F.2d at 850-851.

Evidence that the stow was "dangerous," "poor," and "bad" is sufficient to support a jury finding of negligence. *See Woods v. Sammisa*, 873 F.2d at 851, and *Harris v. Grancolumbiana*, 730 F.2d at 298.

As the loading stevedore, Ensidesa is also liable to plaintiff for its negligence in creating a dangerous stow that it was reasonable to foresee might injure an off-loading longshoreman. *Turner v. Japan Lines, Inc.*, 651 F.2d 1300; *Roby v. Hyundai Merchant Marine*, 700 F.Supp. 316; *Clay v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc.*, 525 F.Supp. 306.

Finally, the defendants contend that they may not be held liable for a hazard that was "open and obvious" to the off-loading longshoremen. But this is simply not the law.

In *Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, S.A.*, the district court relieved the defendant from liability, finding that the danger had been "obvious" to all the longshoremen, including the plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding as follows:

> But that the danger was "obvious" is not necessarily a complete defense to a longshoreman's suit, "because when faced with an openly dangerous shipboard condition, the longshoreman's 'only alternatives would be to leave his job or face trouble for delaying the work.' " . . . Thus " 'a longshoreman's own knowledge of a shipboard hazard will not negate a shipowner's duty of care which would otherwise exist.' "

730 F.2d at 299-300.

Here, the uncontradicted evidence is that the longshoreman had no reasonable alternative other than to try to remove this steel cargo as carefully as possible. The fact that they were aware of the danger is simply not a defense to the claims against the defendants who created the hazard in the first place. Judge Johnson charged the jury in accordance with then settled legal principles, and the defendants made no objection. Clearly the jury had ample evidence to find that the defendant was not relieved of liability because the off-loading longshoremen had no alternative but to proceed to off-load the cargo.

2. THE JURY'S DAMAGE AWARD IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ORDER A REMITTITUR.

Defendant ARCASA (but not Ensidesa) attacks as excessive the jury's awards for general damages, past and future loss of earnings and earning capacity, and future medical expenses.

In considering this contention, the Court of Appeal must be guided by the following principles of Louisiana law:

> A trier of fact has much discretion in the assessment of general damages. Before an appellate court can disturb a trial court's award of general damages, the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making the award. If such abuse of discretion is found, then the court may look to other awards made in similar cases as an aid to raising or lowering the

> award to the highest or lowest point which would have been reasonably within the discretion of the jury.

Burton v. Berthelot, 567 So.2d 649, 661 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990). (Citations omitted.)

Here, the jury awarded Jerry Young $775,000 for past and future physical and mental pain and suffering and for his permanent disability. We respectfully suggest that this award is supported by evidence of an extraordinary course of medical treatment and measures taken to relieve pain and the uncontradicted testimony that Mr. Young is going to suffer with the same level of physical pain and emotional difficulties for the remainder of his life.

As of the time of trial Mr. Young had been hospitalized on eight occasions; he had had three surgical procedures; he had received anesthetic injections into the muscles around his spine on approximately 40 occasions; he had been hospitalized to have morphine injected into his spine on at least three occasions; he was regularly taking an oral narcotic pain medication; and he was permanently and totally disabled. (Watermeier, Record, Vol. IV, pp. 182-237.)

The medical testimony established that Mr. Young would probably suffer to the same extent for the remainder of his life and would continue to have to have significant ongoing treatment for the relief of his symptoms, including hospitalization and probable additional surgery.

In addition, as discussed above, Mr. Young suffered substantial psychological injury as a result of his injuries

and resulting inability to work. As Dr. Robert Newman, his treating psychiatrist testified, Mr. Young's whole sense of self was tied up in his ability to do his job and do it well. The combination of the physical disability and pain coupled with the vocational disability caused Mr. Young to suffer severe depression and anxiety. According to Dr. Newman he had difficulty in sleeping, loss of appetite and decreased interest in sex. (Record, Vol. V, p. 112.)

Dr. Newman saw Mr. Young regularly and prescribed antidepressant medication.

In January, 1989, Mr. Young's depression got worse and he told Dr. Newman that he had no hope and saw no future for himself and was seriously thinking about suicide. Although Mr. Young was no longer suicidal at the time of trial, his emotional problems remained.

As Dr. Newman testified, "his image of himself had been damaged beyond repair" by his injury and resulting disability. (Record, Vol. V, p. 136.)

Given the foregoing, we respectfully suggest that the jury's award of damages is supported by the evidence and does not represent an abuse of the jury's discretion.[7]

---

[7] Under the standards of appellate review set forth above, the Court of Appeal need not look to similar awards in similar cases unless it determines that there was an abuse of discretion. If Your Honors feel it is necessary to look to other awards, we refer the Court to recent decisions in *Burton v. Berthelot*, 567 So.2d 649 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990), and *Mitchell v. Clark Equipment Co.*, 561 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). In *Burton*, the Fourth Circuit approved an award of general damages totalling $377,000 for physical and mental pain and suffering following a

ARCASA also contends that the jury's award of $300,000 for future medical expenses is excessive and an abuse of discretion.

In this regard the law is clear that "future medical expenses must be established with some degree of certainty. However, an award of future medical expenses is in great measure highly speculative and not susceptible of calculation with mathematical certainty." *Burton v. Berthelot*, 567 So.2d at 663. (Citations omitted.)

Here, the award of future medical expenses is justified by the testimony of both of Mr. Young's treating physicians as to the need for medical treatment for the remainder of Mr. Young's life.

Specifically, Dr. Watermeier testified that Mr. Young (1) would continue to have to be followed on a regular basis by an orthopedic surgeon; (2) would require surgery to relieve his carpal tunnel syndrome in his wrist at a probable cost of $2,000 to $3,000 (Record, Vol. IV, pp. 226-228); (3) might require an anterior lumbar fusion at an estimated cost of $15,000 to $20,000; (4) would need intermittent hospitalizations for morphine injections every two months at a cost of $2,000 per treatment; (5)

---

back injury. But in Burton the plaintiff had had one back surgery with a resulting permanent disability before the injury in question. And, more importantly, there is nothing like the same objective evidence in that case as here indicating continued severe physical pain requiring extraordinary treatment measures providing only temporary relief. In *Mitchell*, the Court of Appeal affirmed a jury verdict in the amount of $400,000. Comparing the description of the injuries in that case with what Jerry Young has suffered, we again respectfully suggest that a much higher award would be justified here.

would need office visits and office anesthetic injections at a cost of $34 per visit and $22 per injection every month or every other month. (Record, Vol. IV, p. 230.)

The psychiatrist, Dr. Newman, testified that Mr. Young would continue to require supportive psychotherapy every two weeks at a cost of $82.50 per session and that this could be expected to continue for the rest of Mr. Young's life. In addition, Mr. Young would probably continue to require antidepressant medication.

Given the above testimony, the jury could reasonably conclude there was a reasonable probability that Mr. Young would require future medical care and treatment at a cost in the range of $12,000 to $15,000 a year for the remainder of his life. On this record, the award of $300,000 is well within the jury's discretion.

Finally, defendant ARCASA takes issue with the jury's awards for past and future loss of earnings and earning capacity.

The jury awarded $175,000 for Mr. Young's loss of earnings from the date he was hurt on November 22, 1982 until the time of trial in 1989.

From the evidence, the jury could have concluded that Mr. Young's annualized income for 1982 would have been approximately $25,000 and that various members of his former crew had continued to earn an income in this range from that time until the time of trial. (Record, Vol. V, pp. 196-197, 329; Vol. IV, pp. 66-68.) Since seven years had elapsed since the time of Mr. Young's injury, the jury undoubtedly simply multiplied $25,000 by 7 to reach its award of $175,000.

Certainly this was within the jury's discretion.

ARCASA also contends that the jury's award of $460,000 for loss of future earning capacity was excessive. In considering this contention, the Court of Appeal should consider "whether the award can be supported under the interpretation of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff which reasonably could have been made by the fact finder." *Bailes v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.*, 512 So.2d 633, 643 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1987).

ARCASA contends that the *maximum* the jury could have reasonably awarded for lost earnings would have been $331,097 based upon the testimony of the expert economist, Dr. Philip Jeffress. But obviously the jury was not "bound" by the testimony of either of the economists. *Brown v. Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co.*, 426 So.2d 684 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982). Rather, the test is whether or not the award was justified based upon all the evidence available.

Mr. Young was 52 years old at the time of trial. The jury reasonably could have decided that Mr. Young could have worked for an additional 18 years with approximate earnings of $25,000, and his future loss of earnings would have been in the range of $460,000. Clearly, the jury was not required as a matter of law to use any specific discount factor and could lawfully use the total offset method in calculating Mr. Young's loss of future earnings. *Schwamb v. Delta Air Lines*, 516 So.2d 452, 465 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).

3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY SUBMIT CLAIMS TO THE JURY, AND IT GAVE PROPER JURY INSTRUCTIONS.

Both defendants contend that the trial court erroneously submitted theories of recovery to the jury and gave improper jury instructions.

But it is clear that the defendants are foreclosed from any objection to the jury instructions because they made no objection whatever to the charges that were given. (Vol. III, p. 91, ll. 6-8, p. 93, ll. 4-6.) *Gordon v. Hubbard*, 541 So.2d 211, 212 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).

In this regard, article 1793 C of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

> A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto either before the jury retires to consider its verdict or immediately after the jury retires, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection . . .

The defendants rely upon the decision of the Fifth Circuit in *Woods v. Sammissa Co., Ltd.*, 873 F.2d 842, in support of their argument that Judge Johnson improperly submitted the failure-to-warn claim to the jury in this case. But in *Woods*, unlike here, the defendants specifically moved for a directed verdict on the failure-to-warn theory and objected to the jury's being charged with respect to it. If the defendants had not made this objection, the Fifth Circuit would not have considered any claim of error on appeal. The Fifth Circuit specifically addressed this with respect to the fact that the jury in

Woods was erroneously charged with respect to the third *Scindia* duty, stating the following:

> Under the law of this circuit, therefore, the jury should not have been charged on the third *Scindia* duty. Because the defendants, preferring to concede that the third duty applied and to argue that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that it had been breached, did not raise this issue in their motions for directed verdict and j.n.o.v., we cannot find error on this ground.

873 F.2d at 853, n.14.

Since the defendants made the same strategic decision here, they must be similarly foreclosed from the allegation of error.

But even if the defendants' arguments had been properly preserved for appeal, we respectfully suggest that they would not be well-founded.

In this case, as distinguished from *Woods*, there is a factual basis upon which the jury could have properly determined that the defendants were obligated to warn the off-loading stevedore about the manner of the stow of the steel cargo. The record in this case shows that the loading stevedore and vessel charterer, Ensidesa, knew that the cargo was being stowed in the "H" manner, knew that this would increase the likelihood of the destruction of the dunnage, knew that there were special tools available to facilitate the removal of the cargo under such circumstances, and knew that this equipment was unknown to American stevedores. Under such circumstances, the jury could have determined that the defendant was liable not only for failing to provide the off-

loading stevedores with a safe place to work, but also for failing to warn of the need for special equipment.

4. THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY CHARGED THE JURY ON THE LAW RELATIVE TO COOPER STEVEDORING AND PROPERLY DECLINED TO SUBMIT A JURY INTERROGATORY REGARDING COOPER STEVEDORING'S "COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE."

The longshoreman's exclusive remedy against the stevedore/employer is for workman's compensation benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. Section 905. As a consequence of the exclusive-remedy provision, the United States Supreme Court has held that a shipowner sued by an injured stevedore cannot circumvent the rule by obtaining contribution from a concurrently negligent employer. *Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique*, 443, U.S. 256, 268, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2760 (1979)[8]; *Woods v. Sammissa*, 873 F.2d 842, 846; *Hill v. Texaco*, 674 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1982).

---

[8] *Id.* at 2760: "As we have said, section 905 permits the injured longshoreman to sue the vessel and exempts the employer from any liability to the vessel for any damages that may be recovered. Congress clearly contemplated that the employee be free to sue the third-party vessel to prove negligence and causation on the vessel's part and to have the total damages set by the court or jury without regard to the benefits he has received or to which he may be entitled under the Act. Furthermore, under the traditional rule, the employee may recover from the ship the entire amount of the damages so determined. If he recovers less than the statutory benefits, his employer is still liable for the statutory amount.

"Under this arrangement, it is true that the ship will be liable for all of the damages found by the judge or jury; yet its

This decision has two implications in the context of this trial.

First, as defendant ARCASA properly requested, the jury was charged extensively on the law regarding the bearing of Cooper's alleged negligence on this case. (Vol. VII, 4/26/89, pp. 3-5, pp. 28-29, l. 10; p. 31, ll. 4-12; p. 32, ll. 8-14; p. 33, ll. 16-25; p. 34, l. 17 to p. 35, l. 20.)[9]

---

negligence may have been only a minor cause of the injury. The stevedore-employer may have been predominantly responsible; yet its liability is limited by the Act, and if it has lien rights on the longshoreman's recovery it may be out-of-pocket even less."

[9] In pertinent part, Judge Johnson instructed the jury as follows: In comparing fault as I said a longshoreman's award may be reduced by that portion of damages assignable to his own fault. As a matter of maritime law, the shipowner or the charterer of a vessel would be responsible to the plaintiff in full for the remainder of damages even if the stevedore, Cooper in this case, was also negligent or contributed to his injuries. The longshoreman may recover the total amount of his damages from the vessel owner Ensidesa and/or the charterer of the vessel or the owner of the vessel ARCASA if their negligence was a contributing cause of his injury even if the stevedore Cooper is partly to blame. (Record, Vol. VII, 4/26/89. at 28, ll. 1-16.)

If you find that the accident was caused solely by negligence of the plaintiff and the stevedore Cooper or Cooper employees, then you must find in favor of the defendants. (*Id.* at 28, ll. 17-21.)

As a general rule the shipowner may rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoreman to unreasonable hazards. This is because the federal statutes require the stevedore which is the longshoreman's employer to provide a reasonably safe place to work and to take safeguards with respect to equipment and working conditions. (*Id.* at 31, ll. 4-12.)

ARCASA and Ensidesa would have no duty by way of supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover

Second, since the employer/stevedore's negligence would not, even if proved, affect the longshoreman's recovery, the Fifth Circuit has held that there is no reason to submit the issue of the stevedore's negligence to the jury. *Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas*, 573 F.2d 884, 885 (5th Cir. 1978).

---

dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations. It is a stevedore who must see to the safety of cargo operations. (*Id.* at 32, ll. 8-14.)

The primary responsibility for the safety of Mr. Young rested upon Cooper Stevedoring. Under the law Ensidesa and ARCASA would be entitled to rely on Cooper not to expose its employees to unreasonable hazards and Ensidesa and ARCASA would have no duty to anticipate the action or inaction of a careless stevedore or to anticipate negligence on their part or to supervise them. (*Id.* at 33, ll. 16-25.)

The shipowner and the charterer of the vessel within limits would be entitled to rely on the stevedores and owes no duty to the longshoreman as I said to inspect or supervise the cargo operations. (*Id.* at 34, ll. 17-22.)

Once the longshoreman employees of Cooper began working, Ensidesa and ARCASA had no general duty under the law to discover a dangerous condition that developed within the confines of the stevedore's operation. (*Id.* at 34, l. 23, to 35, l. 1.)

Actual knowledge of a dangerous condition by the owner or charterer of the vessel which condition later injured a longshoreman would not in itself make the owner or character of the vessel negligent. It might well be reasonable for the owner or charterer to rely on the stevedore's judgment that the condition though dangerous was safe enough. (*Id.* at 35, ll. 2-10.)

The shipowner or charterer is not responsible for the negligence of the stevedore or its employees such as the flagman or crane operator. In other words, ARCASA and Ensidesa are not responsible for the negligence of Cooper or Cooper employees. The shipowner or charterer itself must be actually at fault and that fault must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. (*Id.* at 35, ll. 11-20.)

Defendant cites two cases for the proposition that an interrogatory concerning Cooper's comparative negligence should have gone to the jury. *Lemire v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.*, 458 So.2d 1308 (La. 1984), and *Nance v. Gulf Oil Corp.*, 817 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1987). In both of these cases, Louisiana law, not the maritime law, governed the substantive rights of the parties.

Moreover, in *Nance*, the court applied Louisiana Civil Code article 2324 as amended in 1987. Even if Louisiana law governed this issue, article 2324 as amended in 1987 could not be retroactively applied. *Morrison v. J.A. Jones Const. Co., Inc.*, 537 So.2d 360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULINGS ON VARIOUS PRETRIAL AND EVIDENTIARY MATTERS.

The defense has objected to virtually every pretrial and evidentiary ruling made by the trial court, as will be discussed below.

Prior to taking up each issue, a discussion of the course of this litigation is in order.

Suit was filed on October 21, 1984.

Between 1984 and 1989, the plaintiff conducted discovery.

Plaintiff filed the first motion to set for trial on December 30, 1987, and the trial was set for November 9, 1988. On June 30, 1988, however, Ensidesa filed a motion to continue trial. Trial was later set for April 17, 1989, as a special first fixing.

On Thursday, March 30, 1989, 18 days before trial, Ensidesa informed plaintiff for the first time that it had retained a *new* liability expert and of appointments unilaterally made for Jerry Young to undergo independent medical examinations one week prior to trial. On March 31, 1987, plaintiff filed a motion to strike the testimony of the new expert and to cancel the independent medical examinations. On April 3, 1989, at the pretrial conference, plaintiff's motion was granted. On April 5, 1989, Ensidesa sought supervisory writs with this court, which were denied.

On April 14, 1989, Ensidesa filed a motion to continue the trial, alleging that it had uncovered new evidence that Jerry Young had been shot in a gun fight. The plaintiff responded immediately and the motion was denied.

5. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED ENSIDESA'S MOTION TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL.

On April 14, 1989, (three days before this trial was scheduled to begin) Ensidesa filed a motion to continue, alleging that it had just uncovered "new evidence" that the plaintiff had suffered gunshot wounds and that this required additional discovery.

Article 1601 of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a continuance may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor." The decision to grant or deny a continuance on this basis rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will rarely be interfered

with by the court of appeal. *Armstrong v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.*, 423 So.2d 79, 82 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).

Article 1602 of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that: "A continuance shall be granted if at the time a case is to be tried, the party applying for a continuance shows that he has been unable, with the exercise of due diligence, to obtain evidence material to his case . . . " Under this article, the "party moving for a continuance has the burden of proving that his motion falls within these peremptory grounds." *Collier v. Williams-McWilliams Co., Inc.*, 459 So.2d 719, 722 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).

In this case, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a continuance because the alleged "new evidence" had, in fact, been known to the defendants for over two years.

In 1987 Dr. Monroe Laborde, the orthopedist hired by Ensidesa to evaluate Jerry Young, wrote Ensidesa's counsel a report informing him of the gunshot wound. (Record, Vol. VII, pp. 31-33.) Subsequently, in September 1988, Dr. Rene Culver, the psychiatrist Cooper hired to do an independent evaluation of Jerry Young, wrote Ensidesa's counsel an extensive report that discussed the gunshot incident and the subsequent surgery. (Record, Vol. VI, p. 212.)

Since the defendants had, in fact, obtained evidence with respect to this gunshot wound far in advance of the trial, we respectfully suggest that the trial court correctly denied their motion to continue on this basis.

6. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING ENSIDESA'S LIABILITY EXPERT AND CANCELING THE APRIL 1989 INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS.

On March 30, 1989, 18 days before the scheduled trial, Ensidesa first informed plaintiff that it had retained a new expert, Peter Duffy, and that it had unilaterally made appointments for Mr. Young to be seen by two physicians, Dr. Robert Applebaum and Dr. Monroe Laborde just one week before trial.

Plaintiff moved to exclude the testimony of Mr. Duffy and to cancel the scheduled examinations. Finding that these things came too late, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion, and Your Honors denied the defendants' writ application.

There is no reason for a different decision to be reached now.

The defendants had previously retained, and the plaintiff had deposed, two liability experts, Mr. Henry Feste and A. F. Frazier, both marine surveyors who had actually observed the off-loading of the M/V LORENA. There was no reason these witnesses could not have been called by the defendant.

Moreover, the defendants were not prejudiced by the exclusion of Mr. Duffy because the jury heard substantially the same evidence through various other witnesses. (Casimo Gonzalez Ayesta, deposition introduced at trial, pp. 5, 9, 17; Serafin Garcia, Vol. V, pp. 351, 353, 365; Florentino Quiroz, Vol. V, pp. 407, 416.) *Also, see Dengle v.*

Hibernia National Bank, 539 So.2d 947, 952 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989); *Falgoust v. Richardson Industries, Inc.*, 552 So.2d 1348, 1355-56 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).

With respect to the last-minute medical examinations, the defendants argued that the plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Watermeier, had only recently made any mention of Mr. Young's carpal tunnel syndrome and that they had to respond to this testimony. But, in fact, Dr. Watermeier had testified concerning the plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome in his deposition, which was taken by the defendant more than a year earlier, on November 10, 1987. Under these circumstances, we respectfully suggest that the trial court correctly decided these matters and did not abuse its discretion.

7. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF ALBERT ROSS, JOHNNY PORTER, DOUGLAS LEMOTT AND SAM DOUGLAS REGARDING THE SAFETY OF THE STOW.

The defendants want it both ways. While they object to the testimony by an off-loading surveyor and certain off-loading longshoremen with regard to the safety of the stow, they simultaneously rely upon the testimony of the loading surveyor, loading longshoremen, and another off-loading longshoreman on the same issue. (Charlie Otkins, Vol. VI, pp. 172-189; Deposition, Avesta; Florentino Quiroz, Vol. V, pp. 406-427; Serafin Garcia, Vol. V, pp. 350-391.) Defendants simultaneously proffer as an expert an individual who has never worked at the Port of New Orleans, has little experience loading steel beams, no experience off-loading steel beams and who relied for his

opinion upon ten photographs and an incomplete submission of depositions provided seven years after the incident, one month before trial. (Duffy deposition, pp. 28-31, 32, 33-34, 49-52.) Captain Ross, on the other hand, had substantial experience both loading and unloading steel beams. (Ross, Vol. V, p. 391.) Porter, Lemott and Douglas, likewise relied upon their own experience for their testimony (Lemott, Vol. IV, pp. 33-37, 39, 44-45; Porter, Vol IV, pp. 259-260, 264, 267, 283-288; Douglas, Vol. V, pp. 318-321.)

Qualification of experts is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent manifest error. *Trapani v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company*, 524 So.2d 226, 230 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988). A witness may be qualified as an expert based upon experience as well as knowledge, skill, training or education and may, as here, testify to an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. (La. C. Evid. arts. 702, 704; *Belk v. Montgomery Ward and Company, Inc.*, 501 So.2d 1008, 1012 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); *Roper ex rel Roper v. Gelsomino*, 507 So.2d 868, 871 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987). A witness, although not testifying as an expert, may give opinions that are rationally based on his perception and are helpful to the determination of a fact in issue. La. Code of Evid. art. 701.

Capt. Ross was abundantly qualified by virtue of his education, training, and experience to testify as an expert witness on the matters involved in this trial.

Capt. Ross graduated from nautical college in 1949 and then worked on ocean-going cargo vessels for the next 15 or 16 years in various capacities, including third

mate, second mate, chief officer and commanding officer. Then, in 1972, he began work as a port captain for Atlantic Shipping, a charterer of vessels. As port captain, it was Capt. Ross's responsibility to supervise the loading and off-loading of cargo from vessels, including steel cargo. He did this for five years until 1977, when he formed his own company and began working as a consulting marine surveyor.

He had been qualified in the federal courts as an expert in marine surveying and had testified with respect to safety considerations in regard to the handling and loading and off-loading of cargo.

It was clearly within the trial court's discretion to accept Capt. Ross as an expert in the area of marine surveyor and as an expert in safety with regard to stevedoring operations.

8. THE ECONOMIST'S TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED

Ensidesa complains that the trial court failed to strike the testimony of the plaintiff's economist, Dr. Philip Jeffress.

Dr. Jeffress calculated past lost wages of $141,365 and discounted future lost wages of $189,732, totalling $331,097. He based his calculations of both past and future lost wages on an annual income of $25,000, taking into consideration Mr. Young's annualized earnings in 1982 and information concerning the continued earnings of similarly placed longshoremen with similar experience. (Vol. VI, pp. 6, 9, 16, 23-26, 36-37, 45, 63-64; Jerry

Young, Vol. V, pp. 196-197; Sam Douglas, Vol. V, p. 329; Douglas Lemott, Vol. IV, pp. 66-68).

Past lost wages were calculated to date of trial. Since the plaintiff had no opportunity to invest this money, there was no reason whatever to discount this amount. (Vol. VI, p. 6). Dr. Jeffress had assumed a work-life expectancy of 10.1 years based upon the Department of Labor work-life expectancy tables and a 2½ percent below-market discount rate. (Vol. VI, pp. 11-14.)

Dr. Jeffress also testified that, if non wage benefits were not included in Mr. Young's W2 statements, he suffered an additional $62,381 in past losses and $91,743 as the discounted value of his future losses. (Vol. VI, pp. 4, 15, 50-53.)

Mr. Winn Niemond, a representative of the New Orleans Steamship Association, testified that Mr. Young would *not* receive credit for health, welfare and pension benefits after November, 1990. So there was no "double-dipping" on the calculation of Mr. Young's loss of future fringe benefits including pension benefits. (Vol. VI, pp. 77-79.)

Dr. Jeffress was fully cross-examined with respect to his fringe-benefit calculations, the "down turn" in the economy and all the other assumptions in his computations. There was no reason whatever for the court to have stricken his testimony.

9. THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY BELATED KNOWLEDGE OF PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL HISTORY AND 1987 AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT.

The defendants complain that they obtained new medical information just before trial and were prejudiced by not having it earlier. But since the defendants were not diligent in their quest for evidence of Jerry Young's medical history and extraneous casualties, they cannot now complain of the tardiness of their receipt of this information. *Heaton v. Gulf International Marine, Inc.*, 536 So.2d 622, 626 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988); *Burgess v. City of Baton Rouge*, 477 So.2d 143, 145-46 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); *Sather v. White*, 388 So.2d 402, 403 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); *Uhler v. Evangeline Riding Club*, 525 So.2d 550, 551-52 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); *Webb v. Insurance Company of North America*, 396 So.2d 508, 512 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).

The defendants never requested an updated deposition of either Jerry Young or Dr. Watermeier, and first subpoenaed medical records that were not in plaintiff's possession one week before trial.

Furthermore, defendants were not prejudiced because they extensively questioned the plaintiff and various other witnesses regarding Jerry Young's medical condition from 1968 forward, his gunshot wound and his 1987 automobile accident. (Culver, Vol. VI, pp. 212-214, 218-220, 225-228; Laborde, Vol. VII, pp. 19-23, 30, 32; Jerry Young, Vol. V, pp. 282-288, 307; Watermeier, Vol. V, pp. 41-45, 50, 57, 61, 65, 68, 79; Newman, Vol. V, pp. 141-144, 146, 151-153, 159, 167-168, 172, 175, 181-182.)

The bottom line is that all of this was fully aired before the jury.

10. JERRY YOUNG'S CONVICTIONS WERE PROPERLY EXCLUDED.

Ensidesa complains that it was not permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff with respect to certain criminal convictions. Mr. Young pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 40:983; therefore, this plea is clearly inadmissible. His conviction for illegal possession of a weapon was a misdemeanor punishable by no more than six months, and therefore was likewise inadmissable. La. C.E. art. 609(A). If Judge Johnson had let defendant counsel go into these matters, it probably would have been reversible error.

11. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING DR. BOGRAN'S REPORT, THE PETITION RESULTING FROM SEPTEMBER 1987 AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT AND BY THE LIMITATION OF THE REDIRECT OF DR. CULVER.

Ensidesa was permitted extensive cross examination of Jerry Young, and Drs. John Watermeier and Robert Newman, as well as extensive direct examination of Drs. Monroe Laborde and Rennie Culver, on the following subjects: Jerry Young's various minor work injuries between 1968 and 1982; Dr. Burkett's 1980 impression of low-back pain and depression; the September 1987 automobile accident and ensuing lawsuit; and the gunshot incident. (Young, Vol. V, pp. 238-247, 270-287; Watermeier,

Vol. IV, p. 238; Vol. V, pp. 14-15, 31-35, 37-51, 56-62, 65-67; Newman, Vol. V, pp. 141-144, 146, 151-153, 159, 167-168, 172, 175, 181-182; Laborde, Vol. VII. pp. 18-21, Culver, Vol. VI, pp. 212-213, 218-228, 252-259.)

While Judge Johnson permitted Ensidesa extensive examination concerning the 1987 auto accident and the fact that a suit was filed, she did not allow the First City Court petition to be filed in evidence, finding that a client is not bound by what his attorney put in a petition (Vol. VI, pp. 227, 257-259.) She further found the evidence cumulative of counsel's extensive prior examination of Mr. Young on the subject.

Ensidesa incorrectly claims that the court refused to permit Dr. Bogran to testify. On the contrary, the trial court refused to admit his report into evidence *unless* Ensidesa called him to testify. (Vol. VI, pp. 226-227.)

Defendant's complaint is merely that, having offered cumulative evidence on the above subjects, it was not permitted to offer *more* cumulative evidence in its attempt to totally obfuscate the issues.

The court was correct in her ruling that enough was enough and that the relevance of the excluded evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. La. C.E. art. 403.

12. EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN STOW PLANS WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.

In its opening statement and during questioning of each of the Spanish witnesses, counsel for ENSIDESA

brought out that there had *never*, to date of trial, been a complaint by a customer about an "H" stow. Testimony was elicited that ENSIDESA used an "H" stow before this casualty and continues to use an "H" stow today. (Garcia, Vol. V., pp. 378, 379; Quiroz, Vol. V, pp. 407-08.)

Only after these questions were asked did the plaintiff, on cross-examination, for the purpose of impeaching Ensidesa's contentions, elicit testimony that after 1982 the United States and Canada requested that all vessels traveling to those ports be loaded in the "I" method. (Garcia, Vol. V, pp. 390-391; Quiros, Vol. V, pp. 408-409.)

La. Code of Evidence article 407 (which is patterned after the federal rule) excludes subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence or culpable conduct, but allows use of such evidence for other purposes:

> This article does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, authority, knowledge, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, or for *attacking credibility*.

Emphasis added.

Since the testimony was offered here to rebut a false impression created by the defendant, the trial court was correct in permitting the testimony into evidence. *Muzyka v. Remington Arms Co., Inc.*, 774 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir. 1985).

13. THE PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT WAS NOT IMPROPER.

Both defendants contend that the trial court should have ordered a new trial because of the plaintiff's alleged improper closing argument.

In this regard, the law is clear that counsel has great latitude in argument before the jury. Flights of eloquence and touches of pathos are allowable as long as they are based on the facts of the case. Appeals to sympathy are not necessarily considered improper and furnish no grounds for complaint. *Fields v. Senior Citizens Center, Inc.*, 528 So.2d 573, 583 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).

Furthermore, the trial court properly cautioned the jury at the beginning and conclusion of the trial that arguments of counsel were not evidence. (Vol. IV, pp. 12-13, 18, 22.) *Williams v. Sentry Insurance Co.*, 370 So.2d 901, 903 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).

We agree that it is improper for counsel to ask the jury to put themselves in the plaintiff's shoes *with respect to damages*. But that is not what was done here. Rather, plaintiff's counsel sought to dispel any adverse inferences the jury might draw from the fact that the plaintiff's wife and children were not at trial by stating, "You would not want to subject your own spouse and children to a trial like this if you were Mr. Young."

Since the argument was not addressed to the issue of damages at all, it was not objectionable, much less so prejudicial so as to require a new trial. *Duerden v. PBR Offshore Marine Corp.*, 471 So.2d 1111, 1114 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).

"The trial court is in a better position than an appellate court to determine the possible prejudicial effects resulting from counsel's argument before a jury. Its refusal to grant a new trial should therefore be accorded great weight." *Ogletree v. Willis-Knighton Memorial Hospital*, 530 So.2d 1175, 1181 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1988).

14. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON ALLEGED JUROR MISCONDUCT.

After the return of the jury's verdict, the defendants timely filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a motion for a new trial based upon the alleged misconduct of one of the jurors. In support of its motion, the defendants sought to introduce into evidence the affidavit testimony of three jurors who opposed the jury's verdict.

Plaintiffs objected to the admissibility of the affidavits to impeach the jury's verdict.

The trial court denied the defendants' motions without indicating whether or not the affidavits had been admitted.

In this appeal the defendants again urge that the jury's verdict should be set aside for alleged misconduct and again base this contention upon the affidavit testimony submitted to the trial court.

We respectfully suggest that the affidavit testimony is not admissible and that there is no basis upon which to set aside this verdict upon alleged juror misconduct.

Article 606 B of the Louisiana Code of Evidence specifically provides as follows in this regard:

> **B. Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment.** Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question of whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror . . . Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.

The defendants apparently concede that they cannot introduce the affidavit testimony to attack the jury's verdict and so now, for the first time, suggest that the affidavit testimony is admissible on another basis; that is, to ascertain whether a juror responded untruthfully on voir dire.

While it is true that prior to the adoption of the Code of Evidence the Louisiana jurisprudence had recognized this narrow exception to the general rule, there are two reasons why Your Honors should refuse to consider the affidavits in this appeal.

First, the defendants never raised below any question concerning any juror's truthfulness in response to the voir dire examination. Having failed to make this argument before the trial court in its motion for a new trial, the defendants should be precluded from doing so here. *Handy v. Cheatum*, 410 So.2d 322, 323 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).

Secondly, the affidavits in question do not in fact demonstrate that any juror responded untruthfully to any specific questions posed during the jury interrogation. The Louisiana jurisprudence on this subject is clear that this exception "should not be employed where the alleged untruthful statement was a general one that the juror could not render an impartial verdict." *Bennett v. Sedco Maritime*, 520 So.2d 894, at 904 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).

Here, there is absolutely nothing in the affidavit testimony offered by the defendants that specifically impeaches any answers provided by any juror at the time of the voir dire examination. The defendants are using this argument as a pretext to attempt to introduce affidavit testimony of jurors to impeach the jury verdict, a clearly impermissible purpose. The affidavits themselves address juror Granderson's alleged offensiveness during deliberations. But "the presence on a jury of a highly opinionated person does not constitute improper behavior so as to preclude achievement of impartial justice" within the meaning of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1972. *Blandino v. Brown Erection Co., Inc.*, 341 So.2d 577, 580 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).

We respectfully suggest that Judge Johnson did not abuse her discretion in refusing to grant the defendants' motion for a new trial and that there is no reason, on this appeal, to reverse her decision.

15. INDEMNITY.

Both defendants take issue with Judge Johnson's refusal to grant contractual indemnity to either party. Since it is clear that both defendants are solidarily liable to the plaintiff, we have not addressed this issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Young respectfully suggests that the jury's verdict awarding him damages in the amount of $1,700,000 against both ARCASA and Ensidesa was supported by substantial evidence and that there was no error requiring a reversal of the judgment of the trial court. We respectfully suggest that this judgment should be affirmed at appellants' cost.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Fredericka Homberg Wicker
FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, 6977

/s/ Lawrence S. Kullman
LAWRENCE S. KULLMAN, 7884

LEWIS AND KULLMAN
2615 Pan American Life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
(504) 588-1500

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that I have on this 10th day of December, 1990, served a copy of the foregoing original brief of appellee on counsel for all parties to this proceeding by mailing the same by U.S. mail properly addressed, and first class-postage prepaid.

/s/ Fredericka Homberg Wicker

(3) (4)

No. 93-1040 and No. 93-1068

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JAN 27 1994
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1993

No. 93-1040

EMPRESA NACIONALE SIDERURGICA, S.A.,

Petitioner,

versus

JERRY YOUNG,

Respondent,

and

COOPER/T. SMITH STEVEDORING COMPANY, INC.,

Respondent/Intervenor.

No. 93-1068

ARMADORES DE CABOTAJE, S.A.,

Petitioner,

versus

JERRY YOUNG,

Respondent,

and

COOPER/T. SMITH STEVEDORING COMPANY, INC.,

Respondent/Intervenor.

Petitions For Writ Of Certiorari To The Louisiana Court Of Appeal For The Fourth Circuit

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/INTERVENOR IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI

ROCH P. POELMAN
(Counsel of Record)
JOHN H. MUSSER, V
HEBERT, MOULEDOUX & BLAND
601 Poydras Street, Suite 1650
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: 504/525-3333
Attorneys for Respondent/Intervenor, Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc.

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

30 pp

LIST OF PARTIES

The following are parties to the this proceeding:

1. Jerry Young, plaintiff/respondent;
2. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. – defendant/petitioner;
3. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc.[1] – intervenor/respondent; and
4. Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. – defendant/petitioner.

---

[1] Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.1, Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Corporation is the parent company of Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc.; River Grain Elevators, Inc. and Paco Terminals, Inc. are the only two non-wholly owned subsidiary companies of Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF PARTIES i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT OF ENSIDESA 4

1. GRANDERSON'S ALLEGED STATEMENTS DURING DELIBERATIONS MERELY REFLECT HIS EMOTIONAL REACTIONS AND MENTAL PROCESSES, AND ARE PROPERLY PROTECTED BY HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND PROTECTION FROM HARASSMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE 6

2. LOUISIANA'S PROCEDURES FOR DISALLOWING JUROR'S AFFIDAVITS TO IMPEACH THEIR OWN VERDICT IS SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE PARALLEL FEDERAL RULE AND IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 9

3. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S RULING THAT THE JURORS' AFFIDAVITS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECT OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE IS EXACTLY WHAT COURTS AROUND THE COUNTRY HAVE HELD ON THE SAME ISSUE AND REFLECTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE THAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THIS WELL-SETTLED AREA 10

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT OF ARCASA.. 12

TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Page

1. ARCASA FAILS TO STATE ANY REASONS WHICH INDICATE THAT THIS CASE IS APPROPRIATE FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW 16

2. THE TURNOVER DUTY OF SAFE CONDITION ENCOMPASSES THE METHOD OF CARGO STOWAGE 17

3. ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE NEGLIGENT STOWAGE OF CARGO BY THE VESSEL OWNER IS NOT NECESSARY 19

4. THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS NATURE OF THE DANGEROUS CARGO CONDITION DID NOT RELIVE ARCASA OF A DUTY TO CORRECT THE CONDITION 21

CONCLUSION 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

Bennett v. Sedco Maritime, 527 So.2d 894 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987) 5, 9, 10

Bjaranson v. Botelho Shipping Corp., 873 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1989) 14

Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K., 835 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 487 U.S. 1007, 108 S.Ct. 1733 (1988) 15, 18, 19

Jorgenson v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 160 F.2d 432 (2nd Cir. 1947) 12

Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company, 798 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1986), *cert. denied*, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1571 (1987) 7, 9, 10

Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981) 7

Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 13 S.Ct. 50 (1892) 8

Morris v. Compagnie Maritime Des Chargeurs Runis, 832 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1987) 21

Pluyer v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 664 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1982) 21

Pollizi v. M/V ZEPHYROS NO. II MONROVIA, 860 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1988) 22

Raines v. Diamond M Company, 396 So.2d 306 (La. App. 3rd Cir.), *writ denied*, 399 So.2d 623 (La. 1981) 9

Riggs v. Scindia Steam Nav. Co., 8 F.3d 1442 (9th Cir. 1993) 14, 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Ryals v. Home Insurance Company, 410 So.2d 827 (La. App. 3rd Cir.), *writ denied*, 414 So.2d 375 (La. 1982) 10

Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1615 (1981) 12, 14, 20

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966) 9

Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 602 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.Wisc. 1985) 11

Smith v. Brewer, 444 F.Supp. 482 (S.D.Iowa 1978) ..10, 11

Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739 (1987) 6, 7

Taylor v. Moram Agencies, 739 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) 21

Torres-Valencia v. United States, 464 U.S. 44, 104 S.Ct. 385 (1983) 16

Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981) 19

United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1980) ...7, 8

United States v. Riley, 544 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1976), *cert. denied*, 430 U.S. 932, 97 S.Ct. 1554 (1977) 9

Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd., 873 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied sub nom, Sammiline Co., Ltd. v. Woods*, 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853 (1990) 15, 19

STATUTES, CODAL PROVISIONS AND RULES:

33 U.S.C. §905(b) 2, 13, 14

La.C.E. art. 606(B) 4, 9, 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Fed.R.E. 606(b) 4, 7, 11

U.S. S.Ct. Rule 10.1 16

U.S. S.Ct. Rule 29.1 i

MISCELLANEOUS:

H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441 *reprinted in* 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4698 (1972) 13

S. Rep. No. 92-1125 (1972) 13, 19

3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, *Weinstein's Evidence*, §606[04] (1993) 10

27 C. A. Wright & V. J. Gold, *Federal Practice and Procedure*, §6074 (1990, Supp. 1993) 6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 22, 1982, Jerry Young (hereinafter "Young"), a longshoreman employed by Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc. (hereinafter "Cooper"), was injured while offloading a cargo of steel I-beams from the M/V LORENA, an oceangoing cargo vessel that was owned and operated by Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. (hereinafter "ARCASA") and voyage chartered by Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. (hereinafter "ENSIDESA"). ENSIDESA, pursuant to a charter party with ARCASA, loaded stowed and arranged for discharge of the cargo of I-beams. ENSIDESA employees prepared a stowage plan for the cargo, which was approved by the master of the M/V/ LORENA, an employee of ARCASA.

ENSIDESA loaded the cargo of I-beams aboard the M/V LORENA in a "H" configuration, as opposed to the preferred "I" configuration. The "I" configuration is preferred because it does not destroy the wooden dunnage (scraps of wood placed between the layers of cargo), making the cargo easier and safer to discharge.

The M/V LORENA arrived in New Orleans in November 1982 to discharge a portion of its cargo. At this time, ENSIDESA hired Cooper to offload the cargo. Cooper's personnel inspected the vessel and her cargo before beginning the discharge operations. Despite the fact that the cargo was loaded in the "H" formation, the Cooper supervisor authorized the longshoremen to offload the cargo. Recognizing the situation, Cooper proceeded because ARCASA did not provide an alternative means of offloading the cargo. As Cooper offloaded the cargo,

the effects of the "H" beam loading method became more apparent. As the longshoremen got farther down into the hold, the crushed nature of the wooden dunnage became even more apparent. Indeed, at some locations, several bundles of I-beams were resting directly on the bundles below them.

In order to discharge the cargo, the longshoremen, including Young, were required to "nip" the beams by trying to wedge a "breakout wire" under the edge of the bundle of beams. Once the wire is beneath an end of a beam, the crane operator will lift the beam slightly enabling the longshoremen to place the chain which is actually used to lift the cargo beneath the slightly raised beams. This procedure is then utilized again on the other end of the bundle of beams. While attempting to nip a bundle of beams, a breakout wire slipped off, struck Young, causing him to fall and sustain injuries.

In October of 1984, Young filed suit against ARCASA for vessel negligence pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (hereinafter "LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §905(b). Cooper intervened in that action, seeking to recover payments of medical expenses and compensation benefits paid to and/or on behalf of Young pursuant to the LHWCA. Young later amended his Petition to name ENSIDESA as a defendant as well. ARCASA and ENSIDESA both filed Cross-Claims for indemnity against the other. After a jury trial on April 17, 1989, the jury returned a verdict, finding ARCASA 15 percent at fault and ENSIDESA 85 percent at fault in causing Young's damages.

Following trial ENSIDESA obtained affidavits from three jurors, Cynthia Gleason, Gay Barbaran and Robert Jessup, Jr., who stated that during deliberations, one juror, Everett W. Granderson, Jr., repeatedly urged a verdict on grounds other than the evidence adduced at trial. Granderson allegedly stated that Young should prevail because he was a lone individual fighting corporations. Some of his remarks also allegedly appealed to racial bias and prejudice. One juror affiant stated that after deliberating almost ten hours, the jurors finally gave in to this particular juror out of frustration, and more than doubled the amount of what would have been their verdict.

On September 1, 1989, the District Court denied the Motions of ARCASA and ENSIDESA for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and also dismissed their Cross-Claims for indemnity or contribution. ARCASA and ENSIDESA later moved for reconsideration and remittitur, which the District Court denied, entering final judgment on October 6, 1989.

The District Court's judgment also recognized Cooper's lien for compensation benefits. Immediately prior to the trial, the District Court severed Cooper's intervention, presumably so that it would be tried at a later date. However, all parties subsequently agreed to the amount and nature of Cooper's lien, and included Cooper's lien in the final judgment. Because Cooper's recovery is dependent on Young's recovery in the main demand, Cooper now appears before this Honorable Court as a respondent to the writs of ENSIDESA and ARCASA.

ARCASA and ENSIDESA both appealed to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit reversed the

District Court's dismissal of ARCASA's Cross-Claim, ordering ENSIDESA to indemnify ARCASA, and also reduced the damage award. All other aspects of the Judgment were affirmed.

ARCASA, ENSIDESA and Young all applied for a writ of certiorari or review with the Louisiana Supreme Court. On October 1, 1993, the Supreme Court denied the applications of all of the parties.

ARCASA and ENSIDESA have petitioned this Honorable Court for writs. Cooper submits this Brief in opposition to the petitions for writs filed by both ARCASA and ENSIDESA.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT OF ENSIDESA

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 606(B), which is patterned after Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), states:

> Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the juror's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question of whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, and, in criminal cases only, whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about

> which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.

Under this article, the affidavits of these three jurors as to matters or statements made by Granderson during deliberations was properly found by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal to be inadmissible to question the validity of the jury verdict.

Prior to Louisiana's adoption of the code of evidence, a body of law allowed affidavits such as those offered by ENSIDESA for the limited purpose of showing that a juror responded untruthfully on voir dire. *Bennett v. Sedco Maritime,* 527 So.2d 894, 904 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987).

ENSIDESA argued that the affidavits were admissible to show that the juror in question violated his oath of impartiality. However, the exception cited should not be employed where the allegedly untruthful statement was a general one that the juror could render an impartial verdict. *Id.* Accordingly, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit ruled that the affidavits were inadmissible as they did not pertain to any outside influence and were also inadmissible to show that the juror in question violated his oath of impartiality.

1. GRANDERSON'S ALLEGED STATEMENTS DURING DELIBERATIONS MERELY REFLECT HIS EMOTIONAL REACTIONS AND MENTAL PROCESSES, AND ARE PROPERLY PROTECTED BY HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND PROTECTION FROM HARASSMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE

The fact that a juror may not generally testify to impeach his own verdict is a policy well-founded in the history of the law. 27 C. A. Wright & V. J. Gold, *Federal Practice and Procedure*, §6074 (1990, Supp. 1993). The two main goals behind this policy are the finality of verdicts and the insulation from judicial scrutiny of jury value judgments underlying a verdict or indictment. "Obviously, the goal of finality is threatened if the validity of the jury's decision is under attack. Similarly, the power of the jury to choose what values to reflect in its decision may be eroded if the validity of the decision is at issue." Wright & Gold, *supra*, at 406. Thus, the court's review of affidavits regarding the emotional or mental processes of jury members would reveal the thought processes of the juror and could undermine the policy of protecting jury value judgments from judicial inspection.

Furthermore, if the irregularities in the jury room are internal occurrences (i.e., emotional or intellectual misconduct), the court should refuse to permit testimony on the issue of such misconduct. *Tanner v. United States*, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739 (1987). In *Tanner*, the petitioners asserted that, contrary to the holdings of the district court and the court of appeals, juror testimony on ingestion of

drugs or alcohol during the trial was not barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). However, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the voluntary intoxication of a juror, no matter how severe, does not constitute the type of outside influence about which jurors may testify at a post-verdict hearing. *Tanner*, 483 U.S. at 122, 107 S.Ct. at 2748. The Court further held that long recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry. *Id.*, 483 U.S. at 127, 107 S.Ct. at 2751.

The Court should also exclude testimony that the jury reached a decision based on bias, the desire to complete jury service, uncertainty regarding the correctness of a decision, or considered prejudicial evidence. *Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company*, 798 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1986), *cert denied*, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1571; *United States v. Duzac*, 622 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1980); *Martinez v. Food City, Inc.*, 658 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981). In *Maldonado*, the defendant made a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit of one of the jurors which related to discussions during deliberations regarding the defendant's wealth and about giving the benefit of the doubt to the plaintiff. Here, the court ruled that the affidavit reflected certain subjective thoughts and emotions of the jurors that may have influenced their decisions during deliberations and, thus, were shielded from inquiry. *Maldonado*, 798 F.2d at 769.

In *Duzac*, the defendant's attorney moved for a mistrial based on certain prejudices among certain jury members. The defendant attempted to argue that the prejudices fell within the exception to the rule prohibiting jurors from impeaching their verdict. *Duzac*, 622 F.2d at

913. That exception allowed a court to set aside the verdict where there was evidence that improper external influences were brought to bear on one or more of the jurors. *Id.; see also, Mattox v. United States,* 146 U.S. 140, 13 S.Ct. 50, 52-53 (1892). In *Duzac,* the Fifth Circuit ruled that there was no evidence of any external influence brought to bear on members of the jury. The prejudice complained of was alleged to be the product of personal experience unrelated to the litigation. The court further ruled that the proper time to discover such prejudices is when the jury is being selected and peremptory challenges are available to the attorneys.

> Although the jury is obligated to decide the case solely on the evidence, its verdict may not be disturbed if it is later learned that personal prejudices were not put aside during deliberations. We therefore hold that the trial court acted properly in denying appellant's motion for a new trial.

Duzac, 622 F.2d at 913. Finally, the *Duzac* court held that post-verdict inquiries that took to probe the mental processes of the jurors are impermissible. *Id.*

In accordance with the above line of jurisprudence, the affidavits relating to any alleged statements made by Granderson during the deliberations merely reflect his mental processes and emotional reaction to the evidence heard at trial and should properly be protected by his right to privacy and protection from harassment.

2. LOUISIANA'S PROCEDURE FOR DISALLOWING JUROR'S AFFIDAVITS TO IMPEACH THEIR OWN VERDICT IS SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE PARALLEL FEDERAL RULE AND IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Both state and federal courts have generally disfavored post-verdict interviewing of jurors. The courts have repeatedly refused to "denigrate jury trials by afterwards ransacking the jurors in search of some new ground, not previously supported by evidence, for a new trial". *United States v. Riley,* 544 F.2d 237, 242 (5th Cir. 1976), *cert. denied,* 430 U.S. 932, 97 S.Ct. 1554 (1977). Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has declared:

> The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect its processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function.

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966).

Pursuant to La.C.E. art. 606(B), juror affidavits are generally not considered by the courts. However, exceptions are recognized when jurors have not been truthful during voir dire. *Bennett, supra; Raines v. Diamond M Company,* 396 So.2d 306 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), *writ denied,* 399 So.2d 623 (La. 1981). Also, the federal rule, from which article 606(B) derives, allows an exception for statements which tend to show deceit during voir dire. *Maldonado,* 798 F.2d at 770. However, the exception cited is not to be employed where the alleged untruthful statement was a

general one that the juror could render an impartial verdict. *Id.; Bennett,* 527 So.2d at 904; *Ryals v. Home Insurance Company,* 410 So.2d 827 (La. App. 3rd Cir.), *writ denied,* 414 So.2d 375, 376 (La. 1982). Thus, the affidavits should not be considered to attack Granderson's statements during voir dire because ENSIDESA's argument is directed only to an alleged general statement by Granderson that he could be impartial.

3. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S RULING THAT THE JURORS' AFFIDAVITS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECT OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE IS EXACTLY WHAT COURTS HAVE HELD ON THE SAME ISSUE AND REFLECTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE THAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THIS WELL-SETTLED AREA

Jury conduct which occurs in the jury room and injects a note of bias into the deliberations does not fit neatly on one side or the other of the dichotomy drawn in article 606(B). 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, *Weinstein's Evidence,* §606[04] (1993). The problem is whether such wholly intrajury statements can be viewed as extraneous information or an outside influence and, if so, whether the proof of such statements can be separated from proof of the effect of the statements on the mental processes of the jurors. *Smith v. Brewer,* 444 F.Supp. 482 (S.D.Iowa 1978). One prominent commentator has concluded that generally it seems better to draw the line in favor of juror privacy; in the heat of juror debate, all kinds of statements may be made which have little effect on outcome, "though taken out of context they seem damning and absurd." Weinstein & Berger, *supra,* at 606-636.

The general rule favoring the inadmissibility of juror testimony to impeach a verdict on the basis of alleged biased conduct occurring within the jury room is supported both by the language of Rule 606(b) and its legislative history. *Smith,* 444 F.Supp. at 489. The rule also applies where a litigant seeks to impeach a verdict by introducing evidence that a jury exhibited prejudice toward a party during deliberations. *Shillcutt v. Gagnon,* 602 F.Supp. 1280, 1282 (E.D.Wisc. 1985).

> Impeachment of jury verdicts on the ground that a juror has expressed racial or other bias would defeat the important interest of free and open jury deliberations and the finality of judgments. Jurors would be inhibited during deliberations by the knowledge that their statements might be disclosed to the public by a fellow juror. The exposure of statements made during deliberations would be commonplace since, if courts were to recognize a party's right to prejudice-free deliberations, the law would also have to allow all parties an equal opportunity to vindicate the right.

Id, at 1282. Impeachment of jury verdicts on the basis of prejudicial remarks would seriously undermine the finality of the verdict and the public's respect for them. "Where deliberations are lengthy, counsel would frequently succeed in finding an arguably prejudiced remark by a juror, perhaps made in the heat of debate and taken out of context." *Id.* Thus, the result would be the constant attack of jurors subsequent to a verdict in efforts to get a verdict impeachment hearing after every unfavorable ruling.

As Judge Learned Hand observed in *Jorgenson v. York Ice Machinery Corp.*, 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2nd Cir. 1947), the defects in the jury's verdict which the petitioner cites are intrinsic to a system which uses lay jurors and cannot be eliminated without eliminating the system itself:

> It would be impracticable to impose the counsel of absolute perfection that no verdict shall stand, unless every juror has been entirely without bias, and has based his vote only upon evidence he has heard in court. It is doubtful whether more than one in a hundred verdicts would stand such a test; and although absolute justice may require as much, the impossibility of achieving it has induced judges to take a middle course, for they have recognized that the institution could not otherwise survive; they would become Penelopes, forever engaged in unraveling the webs they wove. Like much else in human affairs, its defects are so deeply enmeshed in the system that wholly to disentangle them would quite kill it.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT OF ARCASA

In 1972, the United States Congress amended the LHWCA, thereby eliminating a vessel owner's liability to the longshoremen for unseaworthy conditions aboard the vessel, but retaining the owner's liability for its own negligence. The extent of this standard of care was not elucidated by Congress; rather, this task was left to the courts to resolve "through the 'application of accepted principles of tort law and the ordinary process of litigation'." *Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos,*

451 U.S. 156, 166, 101 S.Ct. 1615, 1621 (1981) (quoting, S. Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 11 (1972)). The 1972 Amendments abolished a vessel's absolute liability to injured longshoremen under the unseaworthiness doctrine, but retained the longshoremen's statutory action against vessels for negligence under 33 U.S.C. §905(b). Additionally, the amendments barred vessels from seeking indemnity from the longshoremen's employer-stevedore.

The legislative object of these amendments was "to place an employee injured aboard a vessel in the same position he would be if he were injured in non-maritime employment ashore, insofar as bringing a third-party damage action is concerned." House Rep. No. 92-1441, *reprinted in* 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4698, 4703. Summarizing the purpose of the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, the House Report concluded:

> Permitting actions against a vessel based on negligence will meet the objective encouraging safety because the vessel will still be required to exercise the same care as a landbased person in providing a safe place to work. Thus nothing in this bill intended to derogate from the vessel's responsibility to take appropriate corrective action where it *knows or should have known* about a dangerous condition.

Id. at 4704 (emphasis added).

Pursuant to the dictates of Congress, the courts have accepted this responsibility, and set out to determine what the vessel owner's duties are under the LHWCA. In *Scindia*, this Court granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement among the circuit courts concerning the applicable standard of care owed by a vessel to a

longshoreman under Section 905(b). The *Scindia* court laid out what a vessel's duty of reasonable care under the circumstances is to a stevedore and his longshoreman. In so doing, the Court drew a line between "turnover" duties (those which arise before the vessel is turned over to the stevedore and his longshoreman), and the other duties which arise after the vessel is turned over. The instant case involves solely the first duty, that of "turnover."

The *Scindia* court:

> . . . determined that a vessel's turnover duties extend *at least* to: (1) having the ship, its equipment, gear and tools, and the work space to be used in stevedoring operations in such a condition that an experienced stevedore can by exercising reasonable care carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety ("the turnover duty of safe condition"); and (2) warning the stevedore of *hidden* dangers that are known to the vessel or should have been known to it in the exercise of reasonable care with respect to any hazards on the ship, in its equipment, gear or tools, or in the work space ("the turnover duty to warn").

Riggs v. Scindia Steam Nav. Co., 8 F.3d 1442, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1993); see, *Scindia*, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622; *Bjaranson v. Botelho Shipping Corp.*, 873 F.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1989). It is only the turnover duty of safe condition that is at issue here.

Petitioner ARCASA argues that the circuit courts are in disagreement over application of the turnover duty of safe condition. However, this turnover duty has remained remarkably constant throughout all circuit courts, with

slight variations occurring because of the individual facts of each case. Rather than espousing different tenets of law, each circuit is deciding the cases within the applicable *Scindia* duties based on their individual facts.

The Third Circuit in *Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K.*, 835 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 487 U.S. 1007, 108 S.Ct. 1733 (1988), concluded that the turnover duty ordinarily did not include insuring of the safety of the method of the cargo stowage and, therefore, no corresponding duty to intervene to remedy the dangers created by negligently loading cargo.

The Fifth Circuit analyzed the issue slightly differently, but came to a similar result. The Fifth Circuit extends the turnover duty of safe condition, within the duty of ensuring the safety of "work space" in which the stevedore will be performing his cargo operation, to include responsibility for the reasonable safety of the cargo stow in all cases. *Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd.*, 873 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied sub nom, Sammiline Co., Ltd. v. Woods*, 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853 (1990). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit in *Riggs* clarified the turnover duty of safe condition to include dangers of cargo stowage which are open and obvious.

As a corollary of this duty to furnish a reasonably safe vessel, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits concluded that vessel owners are liable for negligent stowage of cargo when the vessel owner knows or should have known of the dangerous condition. *Woods*, 873 F.2d at 851-52; *Riggs*, 8 F.3d at 1445. In the instant case, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit analyzed the facts and found ARCASA liable because the evidence led to the conclusion that it "knew

or should have known that this method of stow presented these [unreasonable] risks to longshoremen." Because it was found liable, ARCASA petitions this Court to grant certiorari to resolve this "split" regarding the duty a vessel owner owes to a longshoreman injured during cargo offloading operations.

1. ARCASA FAILS TO STATE ANY REASONS WHICH INDICATE THAT THIS CASE IS APPROPRIATE FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW

Supreme Court Rule 10.1 states that "[a] review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for writ of certiorari will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor." Rule 10.1 lists reasons for which the Court may invoke its discretion. While petitioning this Court for review to "resolve a split in the Circuit Courts of Appeals," ARCASA fails to mention that the instant case is not a decision by a federal circuit. In fact, it is not even a decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court; rather, it is a decision from a state circuit court, with no precedential weight outside of the bounds of its jurisdiction. Hence, the "conflict" is not one that should trigger Supreme Court interest or review. Rather, this conflict would fall within the lines of what is known as a "tolerable conflict." As the Honorable Justice Rhenquist stated in dissent, "This Court can only deal with a certain number of cases on the merits in any given Term, and therefore some judgment must attend the process of selection." *Torres-Valencia v. United States*, 464 U.S. 44, 104 S.Ct. 385 (1983) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).

2. THE TURNOVER DUTY OF SAFE CONDITION ENCOMPASSES THE METHOD OF CARGO STOWAGE

ARCASA argues that once a vessel owner allows a stevedore to commence loading, the vessel owner is thereafter absolved of any responsibility or duty concerning the stowage of the cargo. ARCASA emphasizes greatly that the *Scindia* court "did not mention or refer to the duty extending to the *cargo*." This argument is understandable, in that the *Scindia* case did not specifically deal with cargo, but dealt with the defective equipment of a vessel. Therefore, many of its tenets are couched in language referring to equipment rather than other, more general terms.

The rule of law which is distilled from the facts of *Scindia* is quite simple: While the vessel has no duty to inspect the cargo handling operations, it has a duty, prior to the commencement of cargo operations, to provide a vessel which is reasonably safe for the longshoremen to load or offload the cargo. Consequently, once ARCASA and the M/V LORENA arrived at port, prior to cargo operations beginning, ARCASA had a duty to ensure that no dangerous conditions existed, and if such a danger did exist, to remedy it before turning over the vessel to the stevedore.

Once cargo operations begin, the vessel owner is no longer liable for new hazards that may arise as a result of defective cargo, or dangerous loading or offloading procedures. ARCASA seeks to argue that a vessel should be able to discharge to obligations by merely refusing to

examine a potentially dangerous situation, thereby avoiding the specter of "actual knowledge." This position is simply unreasonable. ARCASA or any other vessel owner cannot and should not be permitted to allow a stevedor to begin unloading cargo, and then claim, once a longshoreman is injured, that the accident arose out of "cargo operations," and that since the vessel owner did not have a duty to supervise these operations, it is relieved of liability.

In the instant case, both the District Court and the Louisiana Fourth Circuit concluded that ARCASA knew or should have known that the stowage of the I-beams in the "H" configuration increased the risk to the Cooper longshoremen, including Young. In so concluding, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit found that ARCASA was negligent in failing to exercise due care to make safe the portions of the ship that it turned over to the stevedore prior to the stevedore beginning his work. Since the cargo stowed aboard the vessel will be turned over to the stevedore as well, it too *must* be inspected for safety.

The *Scindia* court did not address the issue of cargo, as any discussion of this issue would have been necessarily dicta. While ARCASA emphasizes the negative language in *Derr,* it does not take notice that even *Derr* admitted that in certain situations there is a duty for the vessel owner to intervene to remedy dangers created by negligently loaded cargo. *Derr,* 835 F.2d at 496.

3. ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE NEGLIGENT STOWAGE OF CARGO BY THE VESSEL OWNER IS NOT NECESSARY

It is a corollary of the turnover duty of safe condition that a vessel owner does not have to have actual knowledge of the negligent stowage conditions. While ARCASA submits that this turnover duty should be no greater than that owed to a longshoreman once cargo operations have begun, the application of the "knew of should have known" standard is correct. The duty is not, as petitioner argues, with respect to the cargo, but rather to the method of cargo stowage. The Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits are in accord that at times, a vessel owner may be required to intervene to remedy the dangers created by negligently loaded cargo. *Derr*, 835 F.2d at 496; *Woods*, 873 F.2d at 850; *Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd.*, 651 F.2d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1981). This holding is in accord with Congressional intent when it enacted the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA. *See*, e.g., S. Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 10, 11 (1972) [Nothing enacted was intended to "derogate from the vessel's responsibility to take appropriate corrective action where it *knows or should have known* about a dangerous condition" as long as the vessel was not "chargeable with the negligence of the stevedore or employees of the stevedore." (emphasis added)]

Additionally, ARCASA misstates the statements made by this Court in *Scindia*. Petitioner states that "a vessel owner has no general duty by way of supervision of [sic] inspection concerning the work of the loading stevedore once operations commence." (Petn., p. 22) ARCASA goes further, stating that *Scindia* holds "without

equivocation that the determination whether to proceed with cargo operations is a matter of judgment committed to the stevedore." (Petn., p. 22) However, *Scindia* does not say that the judgment of the stevedore is supreme; rather, the converse is true. If a stevedore is proceeding improvidently, the vessel owner has the right *and duty* to intervene and prevent the unsafe practice. *Scindia*, 451 U.S. 175-76, 101 S.Ct. at 1626.

ARCASA also confuses the differences between the turnover duty of safe condition and the turnover duty of warning. In the instant case, ARCASA was not found liable for any condition which arose "during the cargo operations." Rather, it was found liable for failing to correct a defective cargo stow which existed prior to the commencement of stevedoring operations. ARCASA argues that if it does not know of an unsafe condition, it has no duty to warn of it. This reasoning is inconsistent with the mandate of the *Scindia* court that a vessel owner is required to take steps, reasonable under the circumstances, to eliminate any hazards. *Id.*

If the actual knowledge standard is implemented, then a vessel owner will be able to avoid liability by not inspecting his vessel, cargo, equipment, work spaces or gear at all. Thus, by failing to have "actual knowledge" of a defective condition or situation, it could not be found liable for any such defect. This argument is simply wrong. The vessel owner should continue to be held liable for any dangers that are within its ability to correct and control, including the method in which the cargo it carries is stowed.

4. THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS NATURE OF THE DANGEROUS CARGO CONDITION DID NOT RELIEVE ARCASA OF A DUTY TO CORRECT THE CONDITION.

In a final attempt to provoke a question of law when none exists, ARCASA claims that the Louisiana Fourth Circuit erroneously found that ARCASA violated its duty to warn of an open and obvious condition. Assuming ARCASA is correct in that there may not be a duty to warn (which is denied), the fact that a condition is open and obvious does not relieve the vessel owner of the duty to correct it, if the condition is unavoidable. An examination of the very cases that ARCASA cites evidences the truth of this proposition.

For example, in *Pluyer v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.*, 664 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982), the court noted that when there is an open and obvious danger which is unavoidable, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. *Id.* at 1247. In fact, a vessel owner can still be held liable when a longshoreman has no other alternative except to work in a dangerous area, but "he need only show that the circumstances made safer alternatives unduly impractical or time-consuming." *Morris v. Compagnie Maritime Des Chargeurs Runis*, 832 F.2d 67, 71 (5th Cir. 1987).

Other cases which ARCASA cites are distinguishable on their facts. For example, *Taylor v. Moram Agencies*, 739 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1984), discusses a defective condition of the cargo, not the cargo stow. When the nature of the cargo itself is dangerous, there is no obligation for the vessel owner to remedy the situation; rather, it must turn

over a *vessel* that is safe. In *Taylor,* there was not a dangerous condition until the operations began and cargo fell to the deck. This condition arose during the cargo operations, and it was the stevedore's obligation to remedy the danger, which it failed to do. In the instant case, the problem with the cargo stow pre-existed the cargo unloading operation.

Other cases cited by ARCASA deal with avoidable hazards. *See,* e.g., *Pollizi v. M/V ZEPHYROS NO. II MONROVIA,* 860 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1988). In the instant case, the hazard was unavoidable in that if Young had refused to proceed in the face of the danger, he would have lost his job. In that situation, Young had no choice but to proceed despite the danger.

The current state of the law is as it should be: both parties bear a burden, with the vessel owner having a duty to remedy open and obvious dangers which are impractical or impossible to avoid, and the longshoremen have a duty to avoid those open and obvious dangers that are avoidable. This balance of duties is fair and equitable. The balance which ARCASA proposes is neither.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, a thorough examination of the facts and law applicable to ENSIDESA's writ indicates that ENSIDESA was not denied due process of law at any time. Courts have been very reluctant to disturb a jury's verdict based on sworn affidavits from certain jurors. ENSIDESA has not met its burden to show that the

alleged jury misconduct was so egregious as to constitute a denial of due process. Therefore, Cooper urges this Honorable Court to refuse ENSIDESA's writ.

Cooper further urges this Honorable Court to refuse ARCASA's writ. Both the District Court and the Louisiana Fourth Circuit applied the appropriate law, and found ARCASA to be partially liable for Young's damages. Furthermore, ARCASA has failed to show why the holding of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit merits discretionary review by this Honorable Court. Therefore, Cooper strongly urges this Honorable Court to refuse ARCASA's writ.

Respectfully submitted,

ROCH P. POELMAN
(Counsel of Record)
JOHN H. MUSSER, V
HEBERT, MOULEDOUX & BLAND
1650 Pan-American Life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: 504/525-3333
Attorneys for respondent/intervenor, Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc.

Supreme Court U.S.
FILED
JAN 25 1994
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

(5)

No. 93-1068

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1993

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A.,

Petitioner,

versus

JERRY YOUNG,

Respondent.

Petition For Writ Of *Certiorari*
To The Louisiana Court Of Appeal
For The Fourth Circuit

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF *CERTIORARI*

GERARD T. GELPI
(Counsel of Record)
C. GORDON STARLING, JR.
GELPI, SULLIVAN, CARROLL & GIBBENS
430 Notre Dame Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: (504) 524-9714

Attorneys for Petitioner,
Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

11pp

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. The Court should grant *certiorari* to resolve a split in the circuit courts of appeals as to whether a vessel owner's duty to make safe the portions of the ship and ship equipment that it turns over to discharging stevedore, (the "turnover duty" of *Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De los Santos*, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614 (1981)), extends to cargo loaded by an independent, foreign stevedore. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, as well as the Louisiana Fourth Circuit, conclude the duty extends to the cargo. The Third Circuit concludes the duty extends only to the vessel and her equipment, not the cargo.

2. The Court should grant *certiorari* to resolve a split in the circuit courts of appeals concerning the duty a vessel owner owes longshoremen employed by a discharging stevedore for personal injuries arising out of the negligent stowage of the cargo by an independent, loading stevedore. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, as well as the Louisiana Fourth Circuit, conclude vessel owners are liable if they *knew or should have known* of the dangerous condition of the cargo and fail either to correct or warn of the condition, thereby implying a duty to supervise. The Third Circuit concludes vessel owners are liable only if they have *actual knowledge* of the improper stowage and fail either to warn or to correct the condition, recognizing the vessel owner has no general duty to inspect cargo operations at the loading port.

LIST OF PARTIES

The following are the parties to this proceeding:

1. Jerry Young,
   plaintiff-respondent;
2. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.,
   defendant-petitioner[1]
3. Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A.,
   defendant;
4. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc.,
   intervenor.

---

[1] Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.1, Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. states that it has no parent corporations or non-wholly owned subsidiaries.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED i

LIST OF PARTIES ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv

DECISIONS BELOW 1

JURISDICTION 1

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 4

ADDITIONAL REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 5

CONCLUSION 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K., 835 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 486 U.S. 1007, 108 S.Ct. 1733 (1988) 4, 5

Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 1993 A.M.C. 291 (E.D. Pa. 1992), *aff'd*, 998 F.2d 1003 (3rd Cir. 1993) (table), *cert. granted*, 62 U.S.L.W. 3441 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1994) (No. 93-670) 5

Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614 (1981) i

Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd., 873 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied sub nom., Sammiline Co., Ltd. v. Woods*, 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853 (1990) 3

Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A., 617 So.2d 517 (La. App. 4th Cir.), *writs denied*, 625 So.2d 170-71 (La. 1993) ..... *passim*

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1257 1

33 U.S.C. § 905(b) 2

RULES

U.S. S.Ct. Rule 13.4 1

U.S. S.Ct. Rule 15.7 3

DECISIONS BELOW

The decision of the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit is reported at 617 So.2d 517 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), and is reproduced in Appendix A. (App. pp. 1a-62a.) On May 12, 1993, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit denied the application for rehearing filed by co-defendant, Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. (hereinafter "ENSIDESA"), which order is reproduced in Appendix B. (App. p. 63a.)

On October 1, 1993, the Supreme Court of Louisiana denied the applications for writs of *certiorari* filed by petitioner, Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. (hereinafter "ARCASA"), ENSIDESA, and plaintiff, which denials are reported at 625 So.2d 170-71, and reproduced in Appendix C. (App. pp. 64a-66a.)

JURISDICTION

On March 31, 1993, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit entered judgment from which ARCASA seeks review. On May 12, 1993, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit denied ENSIDESA's application for rehearing.

ARCASA timely filed its application for writ of *certiorari* or review with the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which that Court denied on October 1, 1993. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and Rule 13.4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

The following statute of the United States of America is involved in ARCASA's petition:

33 U.S.C. § 905(b):

> In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any arrangements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such person was employed to provide shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking services and such person's employer was the owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer of the vessel, no such action shall be permitted, in whole or in part or directly or indirectly, against the injured person's employer (in any capacity, including as the vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer) or against the employees of the employer. The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other

remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A. (hereinafter "ARCASA"), files this supplemental memorandum in support of its petition for writ of *certiorari*, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 15.7, because this Court recently granted *certiorari* to review an issue identical to that raised by ARCASA.

On December 28, 1993, ARCASA filed its petition for writ of *certiorari* with this Honorable Court, requesting that this Court resolve a split in the circuit courts of appeals concerning the duty a vessel owner owes longshoremen employed by a discharging stevedore for personal injuries arising out of the negligent stowage of the cargo by an independent, loading stevedore. (U.S. S.Ct. No. 93-1068, Petition for Writ of *Certiorari* by ARCASA, pp. i, 16-24.) The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit had concluded ARCASA, the vessel owner, was liable to Jerry Young, a longshoreman employed by the discharging stevedore.

The Louisiana Fourth Circuit followed the rule enunciated by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd.*, 873 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied sub nom., Sammiline Co., Ltd. v. Woods*, 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853 (1990), concerning the vessel owner's standard of conduct. Specifically, if the vessel owner "knew or should have known" that the stowage of cargo by the independent, loading stevedore (ENSIDESA) was

a dangerous condition, the vessel owner has a duty to warn or correct the condition or be held liable. *Young*, 617 So.2d at 528 (App. p. 21a.)

As ARCASA raised in the district court, the court of appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court, and discussed in its petition for *certiorari*, this conclusion conflicts with the U.S. Third Circuit opinion in *Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K.*, 835 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988). The Third Circuit concludes the vessel owner has no general duty to inspect or supervise cargo operations and thus should be liable, if at all, for negligently stowed cargo only upon attaining actual knowledge of the hazard. *Id.* at 496. Thus, if the Third Circuit's interpretation of the law was found to be controlling, ARCASA would have no liability.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Since filing of ARCASA's petition for writ of *certiorari*, this Court has granted *certiorari* to review the identical issue for which ARCASA seeks review.

ADDITIONAL REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

On January 10, 1994, this Court granted a petition for *certiorari* in *Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A.*, 62 U.S.L.W. 3336 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1994) (No. 93-670). The Court there limited its writ of *certiorari* to the following issue: "Does not the ship owner's duty of care owed to a longshoreman under § 5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act extend to unsafe conditions existing in a cargo stow of which the ship owner knows or has reason to know, and which are unknown to the longshoremen and his stevedore employers, are not open and obvious, and would normally be anticipated?" See *Howlett*, Petition for Writ of *Certiorari*, p. i. Howlett, a longshoreman employed by the discharging stevedore, sued Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A. ("Birkdale"), the owner of the M/V PRESIDENTE IBANEZ, for injuries he allegedly received aboard the vessel while unloading cargo stowed by an independent stevedore. Following the precedent of *Derr*, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Birkdale because the undisputed material facts indicated it lacked *actual knowledge* of the condition of the cargo, which allegedly caused Howlett's injuries. *Howlett*, 1993 A.M.C. 291, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1992). The Third Circuit affirmed without a published opinion. *Howlett*, 998 F.2d 1003 (3rd Cir. 1993) (table).

ARCASA has petitioned this Court for review of the identical controlling issue. Under the Third Circuit's resolution of the issue, ARCASA, like Birkdale, would have no liability because it was without actual knowledge of the loading defect. However, because the Louisiana court applied the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the law, ARCASA was found liable.

CONCLUSION

ARCASA respectfully submits this Court should grant its petition for a writ of *certiorari* and consolidate this petition with *Howlett* for briefing and argument.

Respectfully submitted,

GERARD T. GELPI
(Counsel of Record)
C. GORDON STARLING, JR.
GELPI, SULLIVAN, CARROLL & GIBBENS
430 Notre Dame Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: (504) 524-9714

Attorneys for Petitioner,
Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.

(6)

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
MAR 18 1994
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No. 93-1068

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1993

ARMADORES de CABOTAJE, S.A.,

Petitioner,

versus

JERRY YOUNG,

Respondent.

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court Of Appeal

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

LAWRENCE S. KULLMAN (#7884)
LEWIS & KULLMAN
2615 Pan American Life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: 504/588-1500
Counsel of Record

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER (#6977)
434 Bellaire Drive
New Orleans, Louisiana 70124
Telephone: 504/482-1887

Attorneys for Respondent, Jerry Young

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

8 pp

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3

ARGUMENT 3

CONCLUSION 4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K., 835 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988).....2, 3

Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 62 U.S.L.W. 3441 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1994).....1, 4

Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994).....1. 3

Kirsch v. Plovidba, 971 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1992)....2, 3-4

Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).....4

Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd., 873 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied sub nom Sammiline Co., Ltd. v. Woods*, 493 U.S. 1050 (1990).....2

Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A., 617 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).....1, 2, 4

Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A., 625 So. 2d 171 (La. 1993).....1

OTHER:

Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, *et seq*.....2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent, Jerry Young, files this supplemental memorandum in response to the supplemental brief in support of petition for writ of certiorari filed by petitioner, Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A., (hereinafter ARCASA) specifically addressing *Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A.*, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994), in which this Court granted a petition for certiorari on January 10, 1994.

In *Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co.*, this Court limited its writ of certiorari to the issue:

> Does not the shipowner's duty of care owed to a longshoreman under § 5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act extend to unsafe conditions existing in a cargo stow of which the shipowner knows or has reason to know, and which are unknown to the longshoreman and his stevedore employers, are not open and obvious, and would not normally be anticipated?

See Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i; 62 U.S.L.W. 3441 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1994).

On March 31, 1993, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal rendered its opinion in the matter herein. *Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.*, 617 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).

On October 1, 1993, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied ARCASA's application for writ of certiorari. *Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.*, 625 So. 2d 171 (La. 1993).

The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, consistent with its jurisdiction, reviewed both questions of law and fact in this case, applying its own system for

reviewing factual determinations by juries of general maritime law and Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. § 901, *et seq.*) cases. *Young*, 617 So. 2d at 525.

In its factual review, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit referenced testimony regarding the ARCASA vessel master's actual involvement in preparing and approving the stowage plan, finding that the evidence heard by the jury furnished support for a finding that it was more probable than not that ARCASA's conduct contributed to the plaintiff's accident and resulting injuries. *Young*, 617 So. 2d at 523, 528.

While the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal followed the rule enunciated by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd.*, 873 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied sub nom Sammiline Co., Ltd. v. Woods*, 493 U.S. 1050 (1990), in its review of the questions of law, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal's findings on review of the facts make it clear that ARCASA is equally liable under the standard enunciated by the United States Third Circuit in *Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K.*, 835 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988), and more recently and expansively in *Kirsch v. Plovidba*, 971 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1992).

Even if the Third Circuit's interpretation of the law were found to be controlling, ARCASA would be liable.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

ARCASA's writ application should be denied because the resolution of any conflict existing between the United States Courts of Appeals as to the standard of care owed by vessel owners to offloading longshoremen is irrelevant herein since ARCASA is liable to respondent under either standard.

ARGUMENT

Apparently, in granting the petition for certiorari in *Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A.*, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994), this Court intends to address the conflict between the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals with regard to the standard of care owed by the vessel owner to an offloading longshoreman for harm caused by danger arising from cargo.

As petitioner, ARCASA, is liable under either standard, upon the evidence presented to the jury and addressed in respondent's original brief at pages 2-6, ARCASA's writ application should be denied.

Petitioner, ARCASA, interprets *Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K.*, 835 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988), as holding that the vessel owner has no general duty to inspect or supervise cargo operations and thus should be liable, if at all, for negligently stowed cargo only upon attaining actual knowledge of the hazard.

More accurately, the United States Third Circuit held in *Derr*, and more recently and expansively in *Kirsch v.*

Plovidba, 971 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1992), that the vessel owner owes a duty of care to offloading longshoremen for harm caused by dangers arising from cargo when the vessel's own conduct caused or contributed to the dangerous condition or when the vessel had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition.

Here, the evidence was uncontroverted that ARCASA was a co-participant with defendant ENSIDESA in designing, causing, permitting and approving the manner of the stow. The jury found the stow presented an unreasonable danger to the offloading stevedore; further, that the expert offloading stevedore could do nothing to avoid the hazard and conduct cargo operations reasonably safely. *Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A.*, 617 So. 2d at 523-24.

Under either of the conflicting interpretations of *Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De los Santos*, 451 U.S. 156 (1981), ARCASA is liable under the particular facts and circumstances of this case.

Thus, ARCASA's petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

CONCLUSION

ARCASA's writ application should be denied and its petition should not be consolidated with *Howlett v. Birkdale* because the resolution therein of any conflict existing between the United States Courts of Appeals as

to the standard of care owed by vessel owners to offloading longshoremen is irrelevant herein since ARCASA is liable to respondent under either standard.

Respectfully submitted,

LAWRENCE S. KULLMAN (#7884)
LEWIS & KULLMAN
2615 Pan American Life Center
601 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: 504/588-1500
Counsel of Record

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER (#6977)
434 Bellaire Drive
New Orleans, Louisiana 70124
Telephone: 504/482-1887

Attorneys for Respondent, Jerry Young